

Modeling agronomic and economic flux in a small watershed in Niger river basin : case of Kourani-Baria

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Outline of the presentation

- Introduction
- Problematic
- Objectives of the study
- State of art
- Methodology
- Results
- Discussion & conclusion

Introduction

- Problem of externalities in irrigated area (flooding, siltation)
- Irrigation schemes are deteriorating because of these externalities
- Technical solutions for these externalities are experimented but they are not done spontaneously
- Issue must be addressed at the scale of watershed

Problematic : Upstream (1/3)


- Agro-pastoralists, with maximum numbers of animals, trying to provide food for them and their animals,
 - ❖ Deteriorate the environment
 - Because of bad agricultural practices
 - Because of the tragedies of the commons
 - This situation requires rules to limit numbers of animals and extension of slash and burn practices
 - ❖ create negative externalities
 - Erosion, silting, flooding and reduction cultivated area
 - to these externalities we can't apply Pigouvian tax
 - ❖ But agro pastoralist agree to reduce these externalities
 - if a salary is given at rates revealed by experience
 - if they are paid at rates revealed by experience



Problematic: Downstream (2/3)

- Rice producer create a tradable rice surplus
 - ❖ but they are faced with agronomic and economic losses
 - The yield decrease
 - Rice production cost also increase
 - The irrigate area decrease
 - The irrigation schemes will be completely degrade
 - ❖ They are suffering for externalities coming from elsewhere
 - Again, these externalities, it s also impossible to use the pigouvian tax based on the polluter pays principle
 - But it possible to apply an indirect tax based on the beneficiaries pays principle
 - ❖ They want to reduce upstream negatives externalities
 - ❖ They are ready to pays upstream farmer to preserve their environment

Problematic : Watershed scheme (3/3)



Objectives of the study

- To assess PES tools at local scale
 - Identify the responsibility of those who are generating externalities
 - Assess the impact of those externalities on upstream and downstream activities
 - Predict the sustainability of a watershed
- To achieve this goals, a bioeconomic model is develop to simulate different scenarios

State of art


- PES tools began around 1980 (Perrings and Arriagada 2009),
 - mainly applied in developed countries (Porras, Grieg-Gran and Neves (2008), Perrings and Arriagada, 2009; FAO, 2007)
 - begin to take hold in developing countries (Grain to green in China, Costarica, etc.)
 - are not experimented in Africa
- most of the PES concern
 - water services at small scale of watershed (Vittel, Evian, California, etc.)
 - carbon sequestration services at a large scales
 - and biodiversity protection services at a large scales
- We didn't found an example for PES in agriculture where farmers pays other farmers to provide them an ES

Methodology: Outline of model

(1/5)



- Mathematical programming, using GAMS
- Upstream and Downstream are in interaction
- distinguish three groups of users, both upstream and downstream
- include the flow of agronomic interest
- include equation of erosion, sedimentation
- under constraints of production and consumption
- Production and consumption are non separable
- SWC are in competition
- Dynamic and recursive
- Maximization of monetary income

Methodology: Steps to build model (2/5)





Methodology: Study area (3/5)



Kourani Baria Watershed

- ❑ W Niger, 90 KM NW Niamey
- ❑ located at the right side of Niger river
- ❑ 15000 habitants
- ❑ 21 Villages
- ❑ 17000 ha
- ❑ Severe upstream erosion's

Irrigated area of watershed

- Total irrigated area are 750 ha and 69 3 ha are harnessing
- 1774 rice producers
- 2 Cooperatives KB1 ET KB2
- Downstream deteriorate by externalities (flooding and silting)

Methodology : Upstream model (4/5)

- Only agro-pastoralists uses all the resources of the watershed under various constraints
- $\text{Max} ((Q(c) \times P_c + Q(e) P_a) + \text{Surf}(\text{TSWC}) \times \text{Sub}(\text{SWC}) + \text{rev Mig})$
- Under several constraint mainly land, labor, erosion capital, etc.
- Many scenarios are simulated (without subsidies, with subsidies)

Methodology : Downstream model (5/5)

- Only rice producers exploits all the resources of the watershed under various constraints
- $\text{Max} ((Q (rz) \times Prz + Q(e)Pa) - \text{Surf} (TSWC) \times \text{PES} (TSWC))$
- Under several constraint mainly land, labor, silting, Capital, etc.)
- Many scenarios are simulated (Without payement, with various amount of payment, 20 million, 25 billion, 30 etc.)

Some results

Some statistics about users behavior

Upstream model results

Dowstream model results

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Some statistics: Agro pastoralist behavior (1/2)

- 80% had a degraded land;
- 65% think that the main causes are their own farming practices;
- 43.75% have abandoned their fields because of bad cultural practices and runoff;
- 100% are willing to provide SWC services;
- View differ on the choice of kind of payment: 41.93% for cash payment and 48.38% for material payment;
- They need a means payment of **2,737** FCFA per workday to Realize SWC Techniques




Some statistics :Rice Producer behavior (2/2^o)


- 80% think that the irrigated perimeter is degraded and silting;
- They believe that irrigation infrastructure are deteriorate; and rice plots are lost and production costs are becoming higher;
- Over 80% are willing to pay for reducing silting;
- They can gives an average payment of **2842** FCFA / campaign by rice producer;
- They can contribute in physical payement

Upstream model results


- Population growth



Income evolution




Evolution of SWC adoption






SWC cost evolution




SWC self financing





Need subsidy for SWC




Upstream model Conclusion


- Agro pastoralist realization in their farm is not enough to reduce degradation and silting;
- Upstream agro-pastoralist need subsidies to achieve SWC in degraded land
 - When subsidies are low, SWC adoption are low, degradation is only slow down for only few years
 - When subsidies are high, SWC are well achieve and then irrigated areas are protected for so long time
- Is it possible to downstream rice producer to pay the subsidies ?
- Which amount of subsidies are reasonable for rice producer?

Downstream model results


- Income evolution




Erosion comparaison




Payment



Initial state Without Upstream dommage



Comparaison of different rates of payements






Downstream conclusion

- Realization of SWC techniques increase the sustainability of the irrigated area;
- Rice producers can finance the cost of realization of SWC techniques;
- The level of sustainability depends on the amount of the payment
 - When the payment amount is low, the duration of sustainability for irrigated area is too small
 - When the payment amount is high, the duration of sustainability for irrigated area is so long

Synthesis



Discussion & conclusion

- Without adoption of SWC, the watershed will degraded
- Watershed resource management is not sustainable
- Profitable SWC techniques (cultural practices) are adopted by upstream agro pastoralist without subsidy
- Effective SWC techniques are adopted in degraded area only if payment are gives
- Agro pastoralists invest more in SWC techniques whether agricultural land is no longer available and the soil depth becomes insufficient

Discussion & conclusion

- The conditions of PES, are satisfied
 - Agro-pastoralists are SWC service providers
 - Rice growers are buyers of SWC services
 - SWC services are identified and evaluated
 - SWC costs are estimated
- Financing of PES
 - Agro pastoralists realize free SWC techniques in their fields because they increase their production
 - Rice growers can finance SWC costs in the degraded area
 - The basic principle of PES can be met
- PES are possible at the local level within the framework of agriculture



Discussion & conclusion

- On the institutional side conditions are being established
 - Basin agencies
 - National coordination of users
- Competition of aid
 - NGOs and government make promises of funding for CES
- It should be require to compare those result with result of central planer model
- It would require further research that include transaction costs (costs institutional control and implementation of the ESC) to judge the effectiveness of PES
- It should also undertake studies that include negotiation between users, suppliers and buyers of environmental services



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