Gulf Donors and the 2030 Agenda: Towards a Khaleeji Mode of Development Cooperation

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Historical Characteristics of Gulf Development Cooperation

Amidst the changing international system, new and emerging actors are playing an increasingly significant role in development. Gulf development cooperation is not new, and many Gulf countries – including Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) but with the exception of Qatar – have been visible actors in aid since the 1970s. Yet, these countries represent drivers of a concurrent process, one in which non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors are slowly altering the way that such cooperation is carried out. Gulf development cooperation constitutes a specific model in this evolution.

The sheer volume of Gulf development aid relative to other providers may be its most apparent characteristic. Even by global standards, KSA, Kuwait, and the UAE have been among the most generous donors, with official development assistance (ODA) reaching about 1.5 percent of their combined Gross National Income (GNI). From 1973 to 1990, Gulf aid as a share of GNI was more than twice the target of 0.7 percent set by the United Nations and five times that of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-DAC average. While flows of Gulf aid as a share of GNI decreased from 1990 to 2008, Gulf donors continued to meet the UN target throughout the 1990s, with flows remaining almost twice as large as those of OECD-DAC donors from 2000 to 2008.

Unlike ODA from OECD-DAC donors, Gulf aid quantities were not greatly affected by the 2008 financial crisis. During the course of 2008-2010, Gulf financial institutions increased their cooperation activities – in particular around infrastructure projects in the transportation, energy, and water sectors. Recently, there have been efforts to devote more resources to agricultural and social initiatives. Gulf assistance is also diversifying: in 2012, the UAE disbursed US $1.43 billion (AED 5.83 billion) through 43 donor entities, the private sector, and individuals in support of development, humanitarian assistance, and charitable projects across 137 countries and territories.

Despite consistently providing more aid than OECD-DAC donors over the past few decades, however, there has been a clear downward trend in Gulf aid since 2000, particularly on the parts of Kuwait and the KSA. The literature and available data identify four major reasons for this downturn. First, while bilateral Gulf aid spending has remained fairly consistent since the 1980s, donors have steadily increased their multilateral commitments, from $1 billion in 1986 to $3 billion in 2006. This suggests that Gulf donors have begun to replace bilateral programming with multilateral spending. According to Shushan and Marcoux, the increase in multilateral commitments cannot compensate for the relative stagnation in the provision of bilateral aid, causing overall decline. Second, as Gulf aid has declined, non-Gulf assistance has increased, further decreasing the relative share of the former. Third, Gulf donors have experienced increasing domestic expenditures which detract from their overseas ones. Fourth, peaks in Gulf aid have tended to coincide with periods of increasing oil prices; the inverse has been said to be true as well. However, this last claim is more tenuous and recent trends suggest that the correlation may be less important than generally assumed.

Irrespective of trends in overall quantity, Gulf donors have historically supported efforts towards greater allocation effectiveness and use of ‘best practices’ through the provision of untied aid. While many DAC donors have historically tied foreign aid to the liberalization of investment law for donor companies, or to the purchase of donor country goods and services, Gulf states have limited their extraction of material gain from aid spending. Although their assistance remains very clearly grounded in national self-interest, Gulf donors appear to be global leaders in providing aid that supports the autonomy and interests of recipient countries.

Indeed, Gulf donors have never been proactive in advancing the normative debate around the objectives and design of development aid. Whereas the OECD-DAC has produced countless documents on how aid should be designed in order to promote poverty alleviation, sustainable development, environmental protection, gender equality, conflict prevention, local ownership, effective donor-recipient partnerships, good governance, and so on, Gulf donors have made no similar engagement with such topics. One exception is the Kuwait Fund, which according to McKinnon stresses the promotion of sustainable development; it has insisted on the inclusion of an environmental study in each project report since the mid-1980s.

This paper lays out the key elements that set the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – namely, KSA, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain – apart from other donors, identifying a “Khaleeji mode” of cooperation. Whilst the
Gulf donors are not entirely homogenous in their approach to development assistance – indeed, flexibility and adaptability are defining features – there are nonetheless common elements that can be identified. Outlining these key elements allows an assessment of Gulf states’ cooperation activities, highlighting how the Khaleeji mode straddles different approaches to development cooperation. This paper then makes the argument that the Khaleeji mode can allow Gulf donors to act as a gateway between northern and southern development actors.

The Khaleeji Mode of Development Cooperation

The Khaleeji mode of development cooperation represents both a distinct break from traditional DAC aid modalities and an attempt to remedy the latter’s shortcomings. It is framed within a South-South development cooperation model, bearing similarities to strategies followed by the BRICS states but with its own unique characteristics. Of course, the Gulf countries have not all been equally active in development aid. Nor have their contributions converged into an entirely uniform strategy. Differences in internal and external policies, structures, and practices of the various largescale, government-run development funds in the Gulf region showcase continuing difficulties in formulating a truly homogenous approach to ODA provision. Some aspects and practices of the GCC state approaches, moreover, highlight similar methodologies to those of OECD-DAC donors, including macro-level efforts to build a unified Gulf Development Fund, while other aspects suggest that the Khaleeji mode of development cooperation is in line with South-South cooperation approaches.

This section sets out the geographical, sectoral, and funding priorities of the Gulf donors, highlighting what sets them apart from both traditional OECD-DAC donors and other emerging southern actors. It also discusses the challenges faced by Khaleeji donors in addressing questions of transparency and accountability.

Geographical Focus

Middle Eastern and North African countries tend to receive the bulk of Gulf donor funding. For example, four Gulf states - Qatar, KSA, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates – agreed in 2012 to provide aid worth a total of $5 billion to Morocco in the period 2012-2017 to build up its infrastructure, strengthen its economy, and foster tourism. This five-year package of financial assistance was designed to help the North African kingdom weather Arab Spring protests; each of the four countries has committed $1.25 billion to Morocco for that period. Still, funding from Gulf donors is increasingly directed towards lower and lower-middle income countries, with significant portions of aid allocated towards sub-Saharan Africa and South and Central Asia. The reach of Qatar’s humanitarian assistance, for instance, has widened beyond Arab or Muslim countries within geographical proximity. Qatar provided emergency aid during a number of major disasters, including the 2010 floods in Pakistan, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and drought in the Horn of Africa. The Qatari government has also assisted Palestine and Sudan, as well as Japan after its earthquake and tsunami. Gulf multilateral institutions have allocated nearly two-fifths of their assistance to ODA-eligible recipients, and one-fourth to sub-Saharan African countries. It is unclear whether the expansion of recipients of Gulf aid is rooted in a fundamental shift in the development mindset of Gulf donors or whether this new trend is grounded in the perceived expansion of opportunities in new regions. A similar redirection away from traditional regional recipients appears to be emerging in the aid activities of other South-South donors. China provided 44 percent of its aid expenditures to sub-Saharan Africa in 2006, and Brazil is similarly expanding its cooperation activities beyond traditional partners in Latin America and Lusophone sub-Saharan Africa.

Sectoral Priorities

The sectoral priorities that drive Gulf donors tend to differ from those of DAC donors. Historically, while Gulf donors have focused aid more heavily towards infrastructural projects, specifically in transportation, energy provision, and water access, DAC donors tend to provide aid for service provision (including education and health care), improving governance (often via budget support), and towards economic stability. The latter stand parallel with the priorities of emerging donors. For example, China’s 2014 White Paper on development assistance expressed a focus on poverty alleviation, capacity building, improving local livelihoods, agriculture development, vocational training, medical capacity building, improving public facilities, infrastructure projects, disaster relief, transportation networks, and supporting natural resource and manufacturing industries. Bräutigam suggests that the differences between
emerging cooperation actors and DAC donors lie not necessarily in sectoral focus, but in approach: China's development assistance has been consistently tied to dispersal through technical cooperation projects, material goods, concessional loans, and infrastructure improvement, with a general push for soft power enhancement. Gulf actors, too, frequently follow such objectives.

Khaleeji donors also tend to prioritize humanitarian assistance. In the past five years, the UAE has allocated $708 million to assisting the world's refugees; it stands as the only non-DAC donor to have joined the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Donor Support Group. Dubai is also home to the International Humanitarian City, a logistics center that hosts more than 50 non-governmental organizations and commercial entities, including the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Meanwhile, Qatar was the 37th largest provider of official humanitarian assistance in 2011: 46.4 percent of its official humanitarian assistance went to fragile states, and 48 percent was spent in countries classified as long-term recipients of humanitarian assistance. In 2012, it provided $36.4 million in humanitarian assistance: its share of humanitarian contributions among Gulf state donors increased from 4 percent to 20 percent, with the majority going towards the humanitarian crises in Syria and Yemen.

A quantitative study by Neumayer argues that a state is most likely to receive support from Gulf donors if they are “poor, Arab, and sub-Saharan African,” or if they vote similarly to their benefactors in major international organizations. Evidence further suggests that Gulf states maintain stronger support for multilateral organizations that avoid attaching human rights and other conditionalities to assistance, such as the World Food Programme; in so doing, they indirectly protect the state of affairs back home. That Gulf donors focus on humanitarian assistance, in particular, may reflect the fact that these activities tend to avoid such conditionalities. However, Barakat and Zyck observe that it is mainly Western observers who employ such realist perspectives of Gulf assistance. Their interview subjects from within the region instead subscribe more readily to principles of religious solidarity and a genuine concern for human welfare in explaining Gulf humanitarian assistance.

Financing

As mentioned above, a number of Gulf donors have hit the UN target of 0.7 percent of GNI allocated as development assistance. For example, the United Arab Emirates contributed 1.34 percent in 2013 and 1.17 percent in 2014, while Saudi Arabia contributed 1.12 percent and 1.26 percent in 2003 and 2008, respectively. Yet, the volatility of Gulf aid spending raises doubts about the sustainability of Gulf financial assistance, especially in light of the recent fall of commodity prices. Cotterrell and Harmer suggest that the link between oil prices, output, and volume of aid appears to be fairly self-evident. Econometric modeling equally indicates a clear causal relationship between total aid amounts from Gulf states and total revenue earned from resource extraction.

At the same time, Young argues that the relationship between oil revenues and aid may not be as closely linked as widely speculated. Certainly, there are episodes in which oil prices rose without a respective increase in Gulf foreign aid, while at other instances ODA budgets rose despite record commodity price lows. The result of falling prices may be a move from assistance in the form of hard and soft loans to political and technical support and assistance, or other such resource-light measures. However, the increase in these measures may simply be an additional element of the assistance provided by Gulf States. Rather than being a mere after-effect of any fall in resources, such a shift to ‘capacity building’ may indicate an increased willingness on the part of Gulf states to export their own political and economic models as part of aid packages.

The volatility of assistance remains very much a reality, however, and is particularly problematic when juxtaposed with Gulf donors’ purported preferences for longer-term assistance. Employing a long-term focus is challenging when fluctuating oil revenue cycles dictate aid provisions. According to Desai and Kharas, disbursement amounts from donors that fall short of their initial commitments could force recipients to cut planned expenditure, while the basic inability to fund planned tasks limits program effectiveness and threatens development progress.

Moreover, the largely bilateral nature of Gulf co-
operation is accompanied by a cautious approach to multilateral cooperation. Barakat and Zyck argue that the Gulf states’ preference for channeling ODA through particular UN agencies such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) suggests two things: one, a keenness to engage with international development organizations; and two, a level of selectiveness that allows them to avoid working with partners who may opt to attach implicit political conditionalities. The latter consideration reflects a fundamental difference between Gulf states and DAC states, as the latter appear to be less uniformly sensitive to the attached normative associations and delineations of recipient international organizations, exemplified by a general willingness to work with a broader range of partners and funders. The Gulf preference towards the use of bilateral aid arrangements again serves to set apart the Khaleeji mode from that of the DAC; similar approaches can be identified amongst other non-DAC donors (China’s engagement with sub-Saharan Africa being a notable example).

Transparency, Accountability and Governance

An important challenge to the greater effectiveness of aid efforts is grounded in governance, lack of coordination, and specifically in this case the ability and willingness of Gulf donors to increase the transparency of their bilateral aid activities. According to Shushan and Marcoux, barriers to the latter appear in two main forms. First, inconsistencies in annual aid data reporting have created large gaps in aid statistics. While Gulf multilateral institutions tend to provide comprehensive documentation, bilateral donors have not. Additionally, bilateral Gulf donors generally do not report certain types of aid spending, including debt forgiveness. This – and the overall lack of clarity over what ‘counts’ as aid – has led to divergence between the rhetoric and reality of Gulf donor organizations. For example, figures provided by Gulf states suggest that between $900 million and $1 billion in relief funding has been provided to Syrians through multilateral, bilateral, and charitable organizations. Yet, reality indicates that Gulf contributions pale in comparison to other wealthy donor regions, and that their contribution to resettling refugees has been minimal. In late 2014, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch claimed that Gulf states had failed to resettle a single refugee emerging from the crisis in Syria.

Gulf states have pushed back against international criticism, with Saudi Arabia noting that it has ‘received’ roughly 2.5 million displaced persons from Syria, and the UAE arguing it has also ‘welcomed’ 100,000 Syrians. However, again it is the specific (and somewhat vague) terminology used by national spokespersons from the Gulf region that demonstrates the sometimes evident gap between reality and rhetoric. None of the GCC countries are signatories of the United Nations 1951 Convention on Refugees, denoting that while Syrians may be ‘welcomed’, they must apply and be processed largely through available visa schemes. Even once approved for a visa, there are few options for these arrivals to remain in Gulf states long term; indeed, observers argue that these states fundamentally fear the potential demographic and political effects of an influx of refugees. Thus, Gulf states obscure the assistance they provide through use of ambiguous terminologies and misleading claims. They are, meanwhile, actively attempting to shift focus towards their funding provisions to Syria, and what they highlight as a lack of relief participation from other states, in order to shield themselves from criticism regarding the resettlement of refugees.

Second, the transparency of bilateral Gulf aid is limited by the tendency of Gulf donors to make additional contributions above and beyond regular spending. Termed ‘political aid’, some Gulf donors supplement development aid spending with contributions distributed through national ministries of finance. A distinction should be made between ‘political aid’ and politically motivated ‘development aid’; the latter may be susceptible to the geopolitical interests of donor governments but remains geared towards development-based initiatives, whereas the former is not explicitly targeted towards enhancing ‘development’ per se. Saudi Arabia in particular has been said to conduct a large portion of aid activities through its Ministry of Finance.

Interrelated, a series of charitable donations by Gulf rulers has also contributed to the relative ‘fuzziness’ of Gulf aid by blurring the lines between public and private spending. For example, Sheik Mohamed, ruler of Dubai and Prime Minister of the UAE, has ‘personally’ established aid campaigns and provided several large donations to various initiatives. A key problem with such contributions is the difficulty associated with disentangling them from public state finances, especially as ‘private’ donations can be financed from public revenues.
towards increasing the transparency of Gulf aid. In 2010, the UAE for the first time released a whole-of-government report on its aid flows and associated activities.\textsuperscript{42} It became the first country outside of the DAC to report aid activities in such detail, marking a watershed in the monitoring of non-DAC donor activities. Given the absence of significant changes to the governance of the country, the UAE’s willingness to report aid data to the OECD may be linked to greater exposure to DAC practices and to larger efforts by the UAE to engage with the international aid community through the adoption of DAC norms. No other Gulf countries have followed the UAE’s lead, however, with limited transparency remaining the norm regarding total Gulf assistance, net flows, destinations, and internal sources of financing: one limited exception is Kuwait providing data on its response to the Syrian crisis.

The lack of movement towards transparency and accountability among Khaleeji donors stands in contrast to certain other emerging actors in the development sector, with China publishing several white papers partially detailing total flows,\textsuperscript{43} Brazil and South Africa making publically available related figures, and Turkey joining the DAC as an observing party. One option for Gulf donors might rest with the Coordination Group, which has provided a space to facilitate communication and cooperation among Gulf aid agencies, and has been praised for its ability to clearly define policies and procedures that follow best practices in project management and to promote harmonization among members. There is certainly potential for this forum to engage further on accountability and transparency.\textsuperscript{44}

A Gateway of Influence between North and South

As posited above, the Khaleeji mode represents a unique approach set apart from, and comfortably between, the two main poles of development cooperation: the exclusively hands-off, South-South partnership model of China and its BRICS compatriots and the traditional development aid formula of major multilateral organizations including the OECD-DAC, the World Bank, and the IMF. The Khaleeji model is materially focused, generally avoiding the DAC-preferred service provision style of ODA. Even as Gulf states avoid prescriptive aid conditionalities, they do not shy away from the language of donor/recipient unlike many typically ‘southern’ actors. That being said, theirs is not a fundamentally philanthropic approach, but instead serves the interests of donor states.

Gulf donors thus find themselves straddling the approaches to development cooperation which differentiate ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ actors. The Khaleeji mode represents their efforts to become soft power gateways of influence between North and South. Indeed, as global power begins to shift eastward, Gulf states have taken proactive steps to reshape their position in the international system, enhancing their visibility and voice. They have made concerted efforts to influence the institutional design of global governance frameworks, produced nuanced strategies to manage the impact of globalization processes, and started to disconnect their hard and soft power from their hydrocarbon stockpiles.\textsuperscript{45} Gulf states are indeed working to transition themselves towards knowledge-based economies, seeking to reposition themselves in the global system as genuine, dynamic, and adaptable partners in international affairs, including in development.\textsuperscript{46} The Khaleeji mode of development assistance serves as an implicit recognition and response by Gulf leaders to broader changes in global power.

The strength of the Khaleeji model lies in its flexibility and malleability, and in the willingness of Gulf countries to try new approaches. Gulf cooperation is not ideological, with no allegiance to one particular strategy and far less ownership of the principles of South-South cooperation than in emerging economies. Given the economic strength of the Gulf and the fact that certain countries in the region are well-established as donors, the ‘opportunist’ nature of Khaleeji aid could allow Gulf states to act as a ‘Gateway of Influence’ between North and South.

The eclectic aid relationship between Gulf states and their neighbors in Yemen underscores the ‘gateway’ potential of the Khaleeji model. While the case also reflects divergence between GCC rhetoric and reality,\textsuperscript{47} it has demonstrated the rapid ability of Gulf states to shift the type and method of aid provision in accordance to conditions on the ground. In September 2015, for example, UN-adverse Saudi Arabia signed several executive agreements with UNICEF, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Development Programme to provide targeted aid for food security and health interventions.\textsuperscript{48} This has been paired with what one Gulf official has called a multi-pronged strategy consisting of maintaining air and sea security, enabling humanitarian aid, engaging in post-conflict reconstruction and development,
Saudi Arabia has also attempted to maintain what it sees as a long-standing special relationship with Yemen, acting as an informal middleman to external actors, particularly the United States. According to Burke, most other GCC states place considerable policy and rhetorical emphasis on not contradicting the aid and intervention dictates of Saudi Arabia. Its role of gatekeeper between North-South development efforts is equally recognized by external actors: Western diplomats and development officials are said to have assiduously courted Gulf support in attempting to formulate joint responses to Yemen’s on-going internal crises. True to the characteristics of the Khaleeji mode, however, Gulf states have been hesitant to work with Western donor organizations for fear of implicit and explicit prescriptions regarding democratization, human rights protections, and donor-agenda-led development. Gulf diplomats argue that they wish to “do what Yemen wants to do,” rather than define for it a required developmental path.

**What Role for the UN?**

The Gulf states’ approach to development cooperation contains elements which could complement the post-2015 development agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This includes the Khaleeji mode’s focus on infrastructure (in line with Goal #9) and aid provision in conflict-affected regions (in sync with Goal #16). More generally, Gulf countries’ aid cooperation will—must—be part of the implementation of the global partnership for sustainable development that Goal #17 advocates.

The UN can play a key role in supporting Gulf donors on two levels: first by encouraging coordination efforts at a sectoral level (for example in education or infrastructure development, through specialized UN Agencies), and second at the highest level of collaboration. The latter has been particularly neglected to date, but the UN has the potential to serve as a neutral stakeholder that facilitates the creation of inclusive, collaborative mechanisms between DAC countries and the Gulf states. Furthermore, the United Nations as a mediating party can support increased transparency and accountable governance of Gulf states’ cooperation, strengthening the confidence that DAC partners have in their Khaleeji counterparts as part of a new inclusive, multilateral development approach. Gulf donors can see this process as advantageous for them in two ways: first, it enhances their global soft power and visibility. Second, it further legitimizes their choices of recipient countries and areas of focus by aligning them with global “standard” practices.

International concerns over fragmentation, moreover, could be addressed through improved cooperation between traditional DAC, emerging, and Gulf donors. The 2011 fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan was the first of the aid effectiveness meetings to actively include non-DAC and civil society actors. While the degree to which the Busan agenda has sparked any real improvements to international development coordination remains unclear, Gulf donors, who were well represented at Busan, seem to support efforts towards strengthening donor coordination and have welcomed a dialogue with northern and southern donors to improve the effectiveness of development finance.

There have been some indications of a growing appetite on the part of Gulf states to engage with the UN on development cooperation. Both UNDP and UNICEF have commended the cooperative and facilitative nature of their relationships with officials in Kuwait, a country that channels little aid through UN agencies. Meanwhile in 2012, Qatar signed a cooperation agreement with OCHA that outlined that both parties would consult one another regularly in areas of humanitarian coordination and policy, information management, and fund raising for disaster response. Qatar also recently hosted the first Arab States Regional South-South Development Expo, in conjunction with the UN Office for South-South Cooperation and UNDP, designed to match the technical skills and capacities of various actors for improved delivery and effectiveness of development assistance. The Arab Gulf Fund for Development’s support to UN Development Organizations appears as another example of this trend, allocating nearly 40% of its resources to UNICEF projects, as well as contributing to UNRWA and other UN agencies.

However, there remains limited movement at the individual level. In 2010, only 2 percent of ODA from KSA, Kuwait, and UAE was channeled through UN agencies, and only 4 percent through the World Bank, with the remainder dispersed via bilateral aid or national Red Crescent Societies. While it appears that the appetite for partnership and cooperation can and does exist under the
right set of circumstances, the hesitance of Gulf states to engage with any organization that carries with it the possibility of a specific political agenda should not be underestimated; in fact, it may continue to be an endemic difficulty. The advocacy of regional leaders, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, might be required to either push the rest of their consort into action, or alternatively to press the UN to develop a new modality of engagement that accounts for a wider range of views around cooperation, including Gulf concerns on normative prescriptions and conditionalities.

Discussions around the post-2015 development agenda have made clear that redesigning and rethinking global and regional cooperation are necessary steps in order to embrace the truly universal nature of the SDGs. Such a process must highlight bottom-up dynamics and take into account a wider range of development actors, including the Gulf countries. A more inclusive approach can bring together different approaches to development assistance, allowing complementarity and, ultimately, better ways to address emerging global challenges.
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Endnotes


2 Debra Shushan and Christopher Marcoux (2011) “The rise (and decline) of Gulf aid: generosity and allocation in the oil era”, World Development, vol. 39, No. 11. In relation to the global financial crisis (2008–2009), ODA from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE significantly increased in both relative and absolute terms. The relative share of KSA, UAE and Kuwait almost doubled from 2008 to 2009, as opposed to the two years preceding the crisis, rising from 2.1 percent to 3.9 percent.


4 Ibid.


6 The Coordination Secretariat of the Arab National and Regional Developmental Institutions notes that the total commitments of the eight Arab financial institutions rose significantly during the 2008–2010 period compared to the pre-crisis period (2005–2007). Total commitments became approximately US$ 7 billion in 2010, as opposed to US$ 4.7 billion in 2007. The majority of the assistance from 2008–2010 came from three institutions: the Islamic Development Bank (36 percent), Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (21 percent), and Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (13 percent). 87 percent of these funds were used for development projects overseas with the remaining 6.9 percent and 6.1 percent going towards humanitarian and charitable activities, respectively. In 2012, the country's ODA reached AED 4.56 billion (USD $1.24 billion) or 78.2 percent of UAE’s foreign aid. This figure experienced a 118.2 percent increase over 2010 and a 52.2 percent increase over 2011.

7 In 2013, UAE's total foreign assistance reached $5.89 billion.


12 Ibid.


15 Khaleeji literally means “the Gulf” or “pertaining to the Gulf”, referring to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.


25 Sultan Barakat and Steven A. Zyck (2010) “Gulf state assistance to conflict affected environments”, The Kuwait Programme on Develop-
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30 Ibid., p. 46.


33 Any number of related arguments can explain the difference, including the Western-centrism or reflexivity of international organizations (IO), the prominent positions held by DAC states in major IOs, differential agenda-setting power by states in IOs, the dichotomy between secular and religious governance styles, and normative matching between DAC states and the United Nations.


44 For further details, see http://www.arabfund.org/Default.aspx?pageld=472.


47 While Gulf states pledged nearly US $2.5 billion in 2006 for Yemen, they failed to disperse much of that amount. Observers noted that a mere 7 percent of total pledged funding had been provided to Yemen by 2010, and Saudi Arabia had yet to even meet half of its pledged $1.2 billion as of 2012. The narrative for this limited adherence has been focused on a local incapacity to accept and appropriately disperse provided aid. See Edward Burke (2012) “One blood and one destiny? Yemen’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council” (London School of Economics and Political Science: London), pp. 17-19. Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/documents/yemen-and-the-gcc.pdf.


51 Ibid., p. 21.


56 Ibid., p. 11.

57 E/ESCWA/OES/2013/2