Turkey’s Role in Development Cooperation

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This paper examines Turkey as a rising provider of resources and expertise to support development efforts in other countries. Turkey’s efforts have attracted less attention internationally than the activities of other cooperation providers including China and India. However, in light of the recent expansion of its engagement, analyzing the profile of Turkish cooperation is useful both in understanding similarities between the orientations adopted by “old” and “new” aid providers, and the potential for learning from actors now gaining visibility as development partners. The paper provides an overview of Turkish development cooperation priorities, highlights the specificities of the Turkish model compared to those of other aid providers, and concludes with reflections on how UN entities and other actors can foster improved engagement with Turkey as an aid provider.

**General profile of Turkish development cooperation**

**Overview of volume, geographical and sectoral priorities**

Turkey has been providing Official Development Assistance (ODA) since the mid-1980s. The scope of its assistance was initially minimal, but has increased significantly over the last decade. In 2013 it amounted to 3.3 billion US dollars, nearly 50 times the size of Turkey’s 2003 ODA allocations (67 million US dollars). Particularly sharp increases were registered between 2011 and 2013, when the amount of Turkish assistance more than doubled due to massive amounts of aid for Syrian refugees and increased support provided to North African countries in the aftermath of the Arab spring. When compared to the 28 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries, Turkey ranked in 11th position in 2013, providing more assistance than donors such as Italy, Switzerland, or Denmark. Providing 0.42 percent of its GNI as ODA, Turkey does not meet the UN target of 0.7 percent but ranks well above the DAC average of 0.30 percent.²

According to estimates compiled by the OECD, Turkey has now become the biggest aid provider among the emerging economies, surpassing even China for the first time in 2013. Of all non-DAC donors only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provide more assistance than Turkey.³ At the same time Turkey still receives a considerable amount of ODA – 2.84 billion US dollars in 2013, with close to 90 percent coming from the EU institutions.⁴

A particularity of Turkey’s development assistance is its strong bilateral focus. In 2013 for instance, multilateral contributions were unusually high for Turkey but still accounted for only 151 million US dollars, corresponding to 4.6 percent of its total ODA (compared to a DAC average of 30 percent). Preliminary data for 2014 suggests a moderate overall increase of the Turkish ODA to 3.4 billion US dollars with an increase in bilateral aid and a decrease in multilateral aid to 89 million US dollars.⁵

Turkey’s ODA is broad in its geographical scope. In 2013 Turkey provided development assistance to a total of 128 countries worldwide, with Syria being by far the largest recipient (52 percent of bilateral ODA) followed by Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia and Afghanistan. Together, these five countries accounted for 80 percent of Turkey’s bilateral ODA. For Syria, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, Turkey is the largest donor country.⁶ The strong concentration of funds in these recipient countries leads to a regional bias in Turkey’s ODA distribution. In 2013, 56 percent of Turkey’s ODA went to the Middle East, 19 percent to Northern Africa, 15 percent to South and Central Asia, 6 percent to Sub-Saharan Africa, 3 percent to Europe, and less than 1 percent to America and Oceania.⁷ Even so, it is remarkable that in 2013, with the exception of three island countries, all 51 Sub-Saharan African states received Turkish ODA (though most of them received quite small amounts of less than two million US dollars). Of the 191 million US dollars provided to Sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia alone received 116 million US dollars, making Turkey the fourth largest donor there.

Viewing allocations by income grouping, Turkey strongly favors lower middle income countries, which received 79 percent of the country’s 2013 ODA, while low income countries only received 9 percent. At the same time, there is a strong focus on states classified as “fragile” (84 percent of Turkish ODA).⁸ In 2012 Turkey was the sixth largest bilateral ODA provider for fragile states, making the country a crucial global actor for peacebuilding and for achieving the respective Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 16).⁹

Most of Turkey’s key recipient countries are Muslim-majority countries which were in the realm of influence of the Ottoman Empire or have close ethno-cultural connections to Turkey. Turkey’s geographical priorities are also reflected in the distribution of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)’s 37 Programme Coordination Offices in a total of 31 partner countries. However,
the funds received by a specific country can fluctuate quite heavily from year to year as there seem to be no formal aid allocation criteria. Rather, according to Turkish and German government officials interviewed in May 2013, the selection often seems to follow the Prime Minister's priorities. In terms of the sectoral distribution of ODA, there is a strong focus on humanitarian aid (51.6 percent of the total). Relatively large shares of Turkish assistance are also used to support social infrastructure and services (22.3 percent) and multi-sectoral or cross-cutting issues (17.8 percent). A small percentage of the funds go to economic infrastructure and services (mainly transport and storage) and the production sector (mainly agriculture, forestry and fishing).\(^{11}\)

Aid provided to the social infrastructure and services sector finances projects in the education field (405 million US dollars) with a focus on post-secondary education, health (119 million US dollars), government and civil society (63 million US dollars), and water and sanitation (8 million US dollars). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains its selection of these sectors with the strongly demand-driven orientation of Turkish development policy that focuses primarily on addressing the basic needs of local populations.\(^{12}\)

**Preferred cooperation instruments**

Turkey employs a wide range of cooperation instruments. In 2013 the country’s bilateral assistance encompasses humanitarian aid (1.629 billion US dollars), concessional lending (561 million US dollars), programme assistance (319 million US dollars), technical cooperation (225 million US dollars), imputed student costs (223 million US dollars), support for asylum seekers (87 million US dollars), and - to a much smaller degree - direct budget support (17 million US dollars) and assistance to national NGOs (5.6 million US dollars).\(^{13}\)

Even though Turkey provided quite a large share of its ODA as concessional lending in 2013, the total amount of this consisted of just two loans: Egypt received one billion US dollars – of which 500 million were made available in 2013 – and Kyrgyzstan received a 100 million US dollar loan of which almost 61 million were allocated in 2013. Turkey typically provides loans and grants as part of a larger package that also includes technical cooperation. Turkey has not formulated any criteria specifying which country can receive loans and on which terms. Decisions are made on a case-by-case basis in which political and economic considerations play a decisive role.

Direct budget support was provided to only two countries in 2013. Somalia received 15 million US dollars and Kyrgyzstan 2.2 million US dollars. Most of Turkey’s programme assistance involves small projects rather than comprehensive programmes, although the project size can vary widely. The financing of infrastructure (particularly social infrastructure) plays a prominent role in programme assistance while capacity building is often an accompanying measure. In general, Turkey expects its partner countries to provide some input to the projects, either financially or in kind, but this mostly makes up only a small part of the project budget.\(^{14}\)

**Linkages between Turkish foreign policy and development cooperation**

In Turkey’s overriding foreign policy strategy the expansion and strengthening of its cooperation with other countries in various sectors plays a decisive role. Cooperation is perceived as a means for promoting Turkey’s security and foreign economic policy interests. In this context, development cooperation is one of several instruments in Turkish foreign policy (alongside peace missions, conflict mediation, and economic interdependence, to give a few examples) that is not actually given a central role but is nevertheless increasingly and intensively used by the Turkish government to position itself as a civilian power. By using development cooperation as a way to convey a positive image of the country to the foreign public, Turkey aims to gain support for Turkish concerns in international forums and to foster the expansion of foreign trade.

Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly sets the creation of a more peaceful and more stable environment in its neighbouring regions as an overarching goal of its own development cooperation.\(^{15}\) Poverty reduction and the promotion of sustainable development are viewed as a means for moving closer to the foreign policy goals of regional peace and stability. Yet Turkey also provides aid to more distant regions such as Southern Africa where ambitions to enhance the country’s global reputation also play a role.

A consequence of the perception of development cooperation as a foreign policy instrument is that Turkish development cooperation is normally accompanied by other public diplomacy measures. These include the diffusion of Turkish television, the expansion of airline routes through Turkish Air-
lines, the expansion of diplomatic presence and visa facilitations, the conclusion of preferential trade agreements, and the establishment of institutional religious connections. These public diplomacy measures are paralleled by private initiatives such as the Hizmet movement\textsuperscript{16} that maintains schools and private sector investments.\textsuperscript{17}

**Comparison of Turkish development cooperation to DAC donors and other South-South Cooperation providers**

In its self perception Turkey positions itself between longstanding donor countries and the “emerging powers” that conceive their cooperation activities as a form of South-South Cooperation (SSC). Turkey is a founding member of the OECD (1961) and has held observer status with the OECD-DAC since 1991. The country fulfils the membership criteria and the DAC has repeatedly invited Turkey to join the Committee, but Turkey currently seems to have no political desire for membership. However, it regularly participates in the committee meetings and reports its development assistance flows to the DAC. In general, Turkey seems to be interested in exchange with the DAC donors and is striving for the international prestige that stems from its role as an emerging donor country. It has endorsed the aid effectiveness principles outlined in the Paris Declaration and shares the basic values represented by the DAC, suggested by the promotion of human rights and gender equality. This proximity to the OECD-DAC and the European Commission differentiates Turkey from other emerging powers that tend to dissociate themselves from the established donors. However, the willingness to embrace OECD discourse does not necessarily mean that the implementation of Turkish aid reflects OECD-DAC best practice. For instance, Turkish efforts to monitor and evaluate development strategies and projects lag far behind DAC standards.

Even though Turkey frames its development cooperation in similar terms to the OECD-DAC donors, for example by emphasizing the responsibility to support sustainable development in partner countries as a core underlying motive for providing assistance, there are fundamental differences in the implementation of cooperation activities. These most notably arise due to the strong focus on bilateral assistance, the important role of humanitarian assistance, the renunciation of political conditionalities, limited coordination with other donor countries, and Turkey’s strong presence in its own neighborhood.

Although this approach may bear the hallmark of SSC, unlike other emerging powers such as China, India or Brazil, Turkey barely mentions the principles of SSC (solidarity between developing countries, mutual benefit of the cooperation, no political conditions, and so forth) in the presentation of its development policy. Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers SSC to be merely one important aspect of Turkish development cooperation.\textsuperscript{18} In practice, though, the concept of mutual benefit and the waiver of political conditionalities actually play an important role for Turkey.\textsuperscript{19}

It is difficult to compare Turkey with other “emerging donors”, as these heterogeneous countries mainly share the characteristics that they have experience as recipient countries and are not OECD-DAC members. The core development cooperation priorities and preferred implementation instruments vary widely among these donors. What Turkey shares with some of them is its status as an emerging economy, its experience as an aid recipient, a limited strategic foundation for cooperation programmes, the waiving of political conditionalities, and the focus on isolated projects (no comprehensive programmes). Turkey could tentatively be most easily compared with Mexico and Brazil. Mexico also holds observer status with the OECD-DAC and, like Brazil, promotes values similar to those of the DAC donors. None of these three countries are subjected to accusations that cooperation programmes disproportionately benefit them economically (as with China) and all three countries refrain from financing prestigious infrastructure projects. In contrast to Mexico and Brazil, however, Turkey displays greater transparency with regard to the volume and character of its aid flows by reporting funding to the DAC. While Turkey is similar to Arab donors in this respect, Turkey’s aid profile differs from the Gulf states’ cooperation portfolios given the latter’s stronger emphasis on infrastructure financing, and their reliance on development banks and multilateral organizations to channel development funding.

**The future of international cooperation: Turkey’s potential role**

The features of Turkish cooperation outlined above suggest core areas where Turkey might have a comparative advantage in relation to other aid
providers. This section highlights the value-added of the Turkish model in international comparison and provides an overview of its engagement both with other donors and in international development discussions.

Perceived value added of Turkish cooperation approaches

As the summary of sectoral aid allocation indicates, Turkish assistance is notably characterized by the high share of funding for development directed toward humanitarian aid. Guided by principles of impartiality and responsiveness to local needs, Turkish humanitarian aid involves a variety of governmental, non-governmental, and private sector actors and is marked by its bilateral orientation. Important areas of engagement for Turkey in recent years have been Somalia, where its ground presence distinguishes it from other international actors operating at greater distance and potentially signals a higher risk tolerance, and the response to the crisis in Syria involving hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees on its territory. Due to its Syrian refugee population, Turkey is the world’s largest host of refugees. Its role in managing the crisis extends beyond domestic commitments to coordinating the international response, however in this case humanitarian aid has a strong domestic component. These activities reflect efforts to address deficits in the extent and quality of international engagement where Turkey can play a credible role due to cultural-religious affinities and geographic proximity.

Another illustration of the unique contribution that Turkey can make to international cooperation concerns its engagement in Afghanistan since 2001. Delivering project assistance through multiple TIKA field offices involving investments in areas including education, health care, infrastructure, and capacity-building support for public administrations, Turkish aid to the country is part of a more comprehensive approach to engagement that also has a significant military and diplomatic component. Its interest in convening regional actors to support stabilization and reconstruction is indicative of its potential to act as a broker in its regional neighbourhood, where it has an unusual reservoir of goodwill in comparison to other international actors. The case is illustrative of Turkey’s engagement in fragile contexts. There is potential to learn more from the Turkish experiences working in these contexts, particularly in terms of how the country manages personnel and generates expertise to confront challenges in these difficult environments. However, it is important to note that Turkey’s assistance in fragile contexts has to date mainly focused on addressing the basic needs of local populations, having been directed only to a limited degree to institution and peace building measures at the national level.

In addition to its sectoral and geographic priorities, Turkey can be considered to have comparative advantages related to its approach to aid provision. As suggested above, a defining element of Turkish aid is the readiness to adopt a holistic approach to engagement. This carries over to the involvement of diverse governmental institutions in project implementation, as TIKA has access to an unspecified number of sectoral experts from other administrative units that it can engage on a project-by-project basis, giving Turkish aid a potential cost advantage over efforts from other donors. Its implementation processes are considered to create limited red tape. While an absence of strategic frameworks may reflect a case-specific approach to investment, this can also be perceived as a source of flexibility in the system. At the same time, TIKA emphasizes the partner and demand orientation of its development cooperation and takes national development strategies into account in programme planning. In accepting principles such as country ownership, sustainability, and coordination with the donor community, Turkey places its cooperation within the logic of internationally-accepted aid effectiveness principles, opening the question of how well the principles guide actual practice.

Examples of Cooperation with Other Aid Providers and Engagement in International Discussions

Although the Turkish aid programme remains overwhelmingly bilateral in orientation, the willingness of Turkey to collaborate with other donors is evident from small-scale initiatives. Turkey was declared a pivotal country for UNDP’s “Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC)” mechanism. Since 1988, the Turkish UNDP Country Office and Turkey (1988–2007 State Planning Organization, 2008–2013 TIKA) have been implementing a three-phase TCDC programme. By supporting Turkey in developing national institutions for technical cooperation with other countries, UNDP first wanted to promote and popularize SSC as a modality. Regional SSC was promoted in the second phase of the programme. The third phase of the programme (2008–2013) took Turkey’s role as a new donor into account and aimed to strengthen the national capacities of the country to plan and implement development assistance in line with aid effectiveness
principles, and encourage Turkey to contribute more intensively to global development forums and networks. One output of the strategic partnership between UNDP and the Turkish government was the creation of the Istanbul International Center for Private Sector Development, signaling UNDP’s interest in using the technical assistance programme to mobilize Turkish competencies to support engagement internationally.39

Collaboration with other aid providers has also included selected triangular cooperation projects on a small scale. One indication of the low visibility of Turkey in triangular cooperation is that it does not appear on the list of triangular cooperation providers in the OECD survey on triangular cooperation from 2012.30 Within this limited framework for joint work, the Japanese government (via JICA, the Japan International Cooperation Agency) has been one privileged partner, with TIKA and JICA signing an MoU in 2012 to expand triangular cooperation in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Africa and to strengthen the partnership between the two donors in the design and implementation of technical cooperation.31 Other examples include an agricultural project in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan jointly implemented by TIKA and Sweden’s SIDA, and agreements between Turkey and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and USAID to pursue collaboration. Cooperation with UN organizations has similarly been limited in scope.

Beyond these operational examples, Turkey has also demonstrated a growing interest in engaging in global development discussions. Its interest and involvement has varied depending on the forum and process. Turkey was considered to be minimally involved in the post-Busan process. However, Turkey appears to have taken a keen interest in the deliberations on the post-2015 Development Agenda. In the context of debates within the Open Working Group on the shape of the post-2015 agenda, Turkey coordinated its input with Italy and Spain, with which it shared a seat. In this context, Turkey showed a special interest in issues such as promoting food security and nutrition, addressing unemployment, combating inequality, and advancing a development agenda conscious of the underlying role of peace, rule of law, and governance in achieving development goals.32

Using its own voice in the intergovernmental negotiations for the MDG successor framework, Turkey called for supporting least developed countries (LDCs), through measures such as offering to host a technology bank to foster science and innovation in these country contexts. Turkey also highlighted aspects related to the operationalization of the post-2015 agenda, including enhancing capacities to take part in the monitoring and review of the agenda and the importance of promoting a variety of partnerships to improve implementation prospects.

The reference to support for LDCs reflects a Turkish interest in assuming a role as an advocate for the world’s poorest countries. It relates to Turkey’s hosting of the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul in 2011 (UN LDC-IV), a conference that is held every ten years and which raised Turkey’s international visibility in the development sphere. At the conference the government promised a total of 200 million US dollars a year to the least developed countries. Turkey itself justifies its support of the LDCs with a “moral and ethical imperative”,33 citing the importance of the LDCs for global peace and security. However, as noted above, Turkey’s funding commitments to low income countries including LDCs only account for a modest share of its overall aid portfolio, indicating an inconsistency between stated and practiced priorities in this domain.

The themes from the post-2015 discussion have also appeared on the Turkish agenda for the G20 Summit it will host at the end of 2015. Framed by the themes of inclusiveness, implementation, and investment for growth, the Turkish government considers development to be a core element of the agenda alongside efforts to promote economic growth through reform in international economic regulatory frameworks. In this context, Turkey has again underlined the importance of opening avenues for lower income countries to participate more fully in the world economy.

**Final assessment and recommendations**

**Key lessons from Turkey’s experience as a cooperation provider**

Turkey’s development cooperation is characterized by a “holistic” approach. Aid usually comes in a package with a range of other measures to foster bilateral cooperation and trade or support security and diplomatic interests. As an integral part of Turkey’s foreign policy, development cooperation receives support from Turkey’s top leadership. This is reflected in the attachment of the Turkish development agency TİKA to the Prime Minister’s office and joint visits to partner countries on the part of the Turkish Prime Minister and the President of TİKA. The comprehensive perspective and
high-level commitment to development indicate an advantage for Turkey in sustaining support for international cooperation.

A wide range of government agencies are involved in the implementation of development projects, and are entitled to seek new cooperation projects with developing countries. TIKA’s role is to coordinate the cooperation efforts and to act as a “door opener” where necessary. Even though Turkey is quite a “young” donor, it has already established a strong presence in partner countries via its 37 Programme Coordination Offices. However, unlike China for instance, Turkey does not bring its own workforce to implement projects but works with local staff and a number of Turkish experts who only stay there in the short or medium term for a specific project. While the orientation toward local needs represents a further advantage of the Turkish model, the extent to which Turkish aid reinforces other donor initiatives through complementary investment and coordination at the country level requires further attention.

A particularity of Turkey’s development cooperation is its strong focus on bilateral assistance, giving Turkey greater visibility in its partner countries and contributing to the overarching foreign policy objective of establishing ties to foreign countries via cooperation. At the same time, Turkey is striving to enhance its global strategic significance and acknowledges that this requires that Turkey assume a more active role in international organizations and multilateral decision-making platforms. A stronger Turkish contribution to multilateral cooperation represents one avenue for addressing the goal of more robust international engagement.

Turkey’s development cooperation has grown remarkably fast and has surpassed the contributions of many established aid providers, in both absolute numbers as well as in terms of the ODA/GNI ratio. For several developing countries Turkey is one of the largest aid providers. It plays an important role in countries with which it shares its historical and cultural heritage, but also in Muslim majority countries at large.34 A large share of Turkey’s aid goes to fragile states, where Turkey mainly provides humanitarian aid. The strong emphasis on fragile states points to the importance for Turkey of examining the institutional coherence of its bilateral activities in these contexts, and exploring the potential for further cooperation with other bilateral and multilateral aid providers to promote specialization within a coordinated division of labor in order to distribute risk and leverage support among external actors.35 As an example, although Turkey’s prominent bilateral presence in Somalia has been largely welcomed by Somalis and the international donor community, experiences there also indicate that greater engagement with other donors could enhance aid effectiveness by supporting the analysis of conflict dynamics and limiting duplication.36

Triggered by the large number of Syrian refugees in its own country, the experience gained with its work in Somalia, and not least due to Turkey’s experience with emergency aid and disaster relief at home, the country now seems to see a role for itself in the international arena as a provider of humanitarian aid. Efforts to learn from the Turkish aid model should in the first instance examine lessons from its experiences as a humanitarian aid provider.

In general, Turkey seems to complement the work of established donors in many areas. Its cooperation does not neatly fit in any category of “established” or “emerging” donors as it combines aspects of both groups. It shares many of the DAC values and principles but still has its own ambitions and does not seek strong coordination with other donors. So far, the international community has no blueprint on how to best engage with countries like Turkey for mutual benefit. The differentiation of Turkish aid from both DAC and other non-DAC assistance should provide the lesson that moving away from bloc thinking in analyzing cooperation models and promoting the exchange of best practices will be increasingly important in a diverse cooperation landscape where similarities and differences among donors cannot be attributed to their status as established or emerging donors alone.

Core channels for promoting cooperation between Turkey and other development actors

Turkey only cooperates with other donors when it expects a clear value added from the cooperation, as cooperation with established donors does not seem to be perceived as an end in itself. The country is also not interested in abstract debates on norms and values. With this in mind, seeking cooperation with Turkey on a country level seems to be one of the most promising ways to promote cooperation. One example could be the common implementation of triangular cooperation projects in cases where both partners, Turkey and the other provider of assistance, bring complementary areas of expertise to the project and where transaction costs remain manageable.
While TİKA is coordinating Turkish development assistance, the expertise and in many cases also the staff for project planning and implementation comes from the respective Turkish line ministries and agencies. These government entities are also often the source of specific cooperation projects with developing countries. It would thus be reasonable for other donors to address these ministries and agencies directly when promoting country level collaboration.

Triangular cooperation remains small in scale and larger issues surrounding the relationship between Turkey and other donors at the country level merit further attention. A high-level political commitment to Turkish participation in a division of labor among donors would help to provide a basis for improved coordination.

As suggested above, given the weight attached to bilateral aid in the Turkish context, there is potential to consider how to expand its multilateral contributions. Both multilateral organizations themselves and other bilateral donors can play a role in seeking stronger Turkish support for multilateral development initiatives. A good start would probably be to address issues in which Turkey has a strong interest such as humanitarian aid or LDCs.

**The potential role of the UN system in promoting knowledge sharing, best practice, and collaboration in further developing the Turkish model**

In international discussions on alternative development assistance approaches, the Turkish model has not been prominent compared to those of other emerging countries such as China or India. Considering the volume of aid and the benefits of the Turkish model, the UN should do more to increase its visibility by investing more in outreach to Turkey as a donor as suggested below, both in the individual country contexts where Turkey is particularly active and in international processes. Given that Turkey accepts the norm-setting competencies of the OECD-DAC, the operational role of UN entities in development provides a core entry point for the UN to engage with Turkey on concrete questions related to implementation.

In particular, in countries with which Turkey has close cultural, linguistic, or historical links, the UN could more actively seek to cooperate with Turkey in the implementation of specific projects and act as a broker promoting cooperation between Turkey and established donors. A goal of this cooperation should be to benefit mutually from existing experiences in engaging with government officials and local populations, and to identify areas where cost effective solutions responding to local needs can draw on the specific contributions of the UN, Turkey, and other donors.

At the country level, the role of UN country offices in stimulating dialogue around effective aid practice and promoting donor coordination is particularly relevant. Greater Turkish participation in existing coordination mechanisms would be for the benefit of partner countries, and would help to strengthen Turkey’s standing in the donor community as well as contributing to familiarizing other donors with the Turkish approach to cooperation. This type of engagement is especially important in fragile contexts, where stronger donor coordination is needed in the face of limited national capacities to steer development processes. Experience shows that coordination has functioned well when Turkish diplomats have held key positions in international organizations. The UN and other actors should build on these experiences to seek coordination in areas where Turkey itself does not assume a leadership role. Multilateral outreach related to engagement in fragile contexts may also encourage Turkish reflection on how it can move beyond project-focused assistance to better address institutional and capacity deficits in tandem with other cooperation providers. A good starting point for coordination in fragile contexts could be a joint analysis by the UN and Turkey, of how Turkey operates in these situations and the ways other donors can learn from these experiences.

Finally, any endeavor to involve Turkey more actively in global and country-level dialogue to promote strong and sustained commitments to global development goals should happen against the backdrop of UNDP’s vast experience in engaging with Turkey in capacity building to support the evolution of the Turkish development cooperation model. 25 years of collaboration in the context of the UNDP TCDC programme have given UNDP a unique understanding of the Turkish approach. These experiences that come with privileged access to Turkish decision makers and experts should be taken into account in planning new initiatives for knowledge sharing with respect to the Turkish model. Given that there are mixed signs about Turkey’s interest in collaborating with UN entities – financial support for multilateral development cooperation has been limited, while on the other hand Turkey has sought close cooperation with the UN in organizing major conferences, for example – future engagement efforts should build on the lessons learned through the decades-long collaboration between Turkey and UNDP.
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Endnotes

1 OECD (2015), Dataset: Total flows by donor (ODA + OOF + Private) [DAC1], OECD.stat. Available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE1#

2 OECD (2014), Aid at a glance. Available at https://public.tableau.com/views/AidAtAGlance/DACmembers?:embed=y&display_count=no&-showVizHome=no#1.


7 OECD (2015), Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], OECD.stat. Available at http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2a#

8 OECD (2015), Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], OECD.stat. Available at http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2a#

9 Turkey had the highest share of GNI allocated to fragile contexts in that year (0.25%). See http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/publications/documentuploads/SOF2015.pdf.


16 The Hizmet movement (also called Gülen movement) is a transnational religious and social movement led by Turkish Islamic scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen. It has no formal structure, no visible organization and no official membership. The movement funds hundreds of Islamic schools as well as think tanks and media outlets.

17 In this context, it is relevant to note however that Turkish foreign direct investment remains small in relation to the size of its economy.


19 The focus on partner country needs emphasized in discourse on South-South cooperation is similar to the focus on demand-driven, partner-centered development or country ownership on the OECD-DAC aid effectiveness agenda. The substantive distinction between South-South cooperation and OECD-DAC development cooperation is often poorly defined. Advantages associated with South-South cooperation can be found in OECD-DAC cooperation programmes and bad practices associated with DAC aid providers can also be found within the cooperation programmes of South-South cooperation providers.


22 One sign of Turkey’s increasing role as a humanitarian aid provider is that it will host the first World Humanitarian Summit in 2016.


24 The Annual Report on Turkish Development Assistance 2013 lists over 30 public entities that provide aid to partner countries with TIKA only being the fifth biggest provider of Turkish assistance.


27 Mustafa ahsin (2009) Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) and South-South cooperation, presentation held
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32 This overview of Turkish engagement in international discussions is based on summaries of national positions appearing in the Earth Negotiations Bulletin over the course of the Open Working Group’s term and during the intergovernmental negotiations on the post-2015 agenda.


34 The top 14 recipients of Turkish aid in 2013 were all countries with a Muslim majority population.
