BRIEFING
The World Humanitarian Summit 2016 – Requirements for an ambitious outcome

ABSTRACT

This paper outlines the need for Member States and other humanitarian stakeholders to take responsibility for the World Humanitarian Summit, drawing on the global consultations and the Secretary-General’s report, One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. It suggests that the core problem facing humanitarian action is that it is trying to deliver vastly different outcomes in a range of contexts that demand differentiated approaches. It suggests that the WHS cannot solve this wicked problem, but that through clear commitments linked to outcomes, it can begin to build systems that deliver as appropriate for each situation. It argues that Istanbul is a starting point, not an ending; highlights opportunities for deeper engagement; and makes a number of recommendations for commitments, including a format for commitments themselves.
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1 Background

"When did turkeys ever vote for Christmas?"1

No-one has substantially questioned the need for a World Humanitarian Summit (WHS). The WHS introduction to the Secretary-General’s Report One Humanity: Shared Responsibility (UN Secretary General, 2016) (hereafter One Humanity) notes that ‘we are confronting some of the greatest challenges of our time’ – with 125 million people in need of assistance, 60 million people forced from their home, 37 affected countries, and $20 billion needed.

The assumption that reform is necessary to meet these challenges, and that the WHS is the way to accomplish reform has echoed through the WHS consultation process. What is less clear are the desired outcomes and the steps that will achieve them: what exactly is to be reformed, how will the reform be accomplished, and who will be responsible for implementing reform? The consultation process has allowed a wide range of positions to emerge.

At the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) global forum (Knox Clarke and Obrecht, 2015) the consensus of 73% of attendees was that the United Nations (UN) was in need of reform. They hoped that the WHS would ‘reform UN agency mandates and roles to better meet the basic humanitarian needs of affected people.’ The Emergency Relief Coordinator, however, has made it clear that he feels that ‘the system is not broken’ and that the UN does not need to fundamentally change (Wall, 2016; and Aly, 2015).

The recent Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing observed that ‘[i]nsufficient funding for humanitarian aid means not only more suffering but also a wider spread of global instability’ and asked governments to use the WHS to ‘sign up to the concept of a solidarity levy and create a steady revenue stream for humanitarian action.’ (High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, 2016, p. vi)

Southern NGOs read a clear demand for a transfer of power to locals in the WHS synthesis report2 and presented a Charter for Change (Charter for Change, 2015), calling for greater localisation. Representatives of global NGO’s saw the consultations as affirming that ‘we’ve got the model right…what we struggle with is the delivery.’

The strongest area of consensus is that more political leadership is necessary to end and prevent conflicts (United Nations, 2016, Core Responsibility 1). But against this backdrop of differing opinions, the report, with over 130 explicit recommendations in the Agenda for Humanity and over 160 imperative statements (where actors must/should/need to) in the body of the text, has had to balance the need to keep all stakeholders happy with the need to be concrete. The choice has been to centre the report on ‘lofty concepts of humanity, shared responsibility and solidarity’ (Aly, 2016) and the result is both inspirational, and deeply aspirational.

The aspirational tone raises questions: If 70 years of the United Nations – an organisation whose charter remains anchored in saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war – has not changed the global political calculus; if all the public and private pressure over Syria has allowed 1.5% of the population to be killed and 45% of the population to be displaced3; and if the free movement of persons within the EU – ‘a

1 Christina Bennett, Overseas Development Institute, http://wwwodiorgcomment10324whs-world-humanitarian-summit-unagenda-humanity(accessed 24/02/2016)
2 For a detailed discussion, see Wall, 2015. For the synthesis report, see World Humanitarian Summit secretariat, 2015
3 For a summary see Black, 2016. For the original report, see SCPR, 2016.
fundamental right guaranteed by the EU to its citizens’ (EC, 2016) – cannot survive an influx of people fleeing war and starvation...then what chance does a World Humanitarian Summit have of ensuring greater political leadership to end conflict? How will it unite people around a common (and undefined) principle of humanity?

It is the rightful exercise of Secretary-General’s role for the report to identify the need for Member States to live up to their own commitments. Indeed, *One Humanity* is explicit on this point, noting that ‘...when many express doubt in the ability of the international community to live up to the promises of the United Nations Charter to end wars or to confront global challenges, we need, more than ever, to reaffirm the values that connect us.’ (United Nations, 2016, paragraph 15)

But statements of shared responsibility will not, by themselves, produce change, no matter how convincing their moral argument. The task of such reports is to mobilise Member State attention on critical issues; to try and reset the narrative to create an enabling environment for actual reform; as well as to make concrete proposals for change.

And despite harsh reaction from some quarters, one honest critic of the UN, Mukesh Kapila, trenchantly observed that the Secretary-General ‘can’t do more than say to the world: “Look, here’s the nature of the problem. Here’s the nature of the gaps. If you’re really interested in solving these kinds of problems, these are things that need to happen”.’ (Aly, 2016)

2 A passing of the baton

The publication of the report marks the passing of the baton from the WHS Secretariat to the Member States and other humanitarian stakeholders. If they wish to ensure that the World Humanitarian Summit is a success, they must now take substantial ownership of the process. The Summit will feature (WHS secretariat, 2016):

a. A Commitments to Action document, summarising Member State promises;

b. A Chairs summary and a subsequent Secretary-General’s Report

c. Special sessions seeking commitments on Financing, Urban Issues and Innovation.

This format offers humanitarian stakeholders the chance to draw on the ideas generated by the consultation processes and *One Humanity* in order to define:

a. **Outcomes**: The summit needs to provide a clear narrative of what global humanitarianism will look like if all its commitments are implemented. This is a key missing piece, and is critical to ensuring that the WHS has a reception beyond the technical audience. *One Humanity* and the WHS Synthesis Report are too detailed. One suggestion is that if humanitarian stakeholders can, at the Summit, tell the story of a disaster in the year 2020 and of how they see the world responding, it may inspire a wider audience, and lend credibility to the process.

b. **What**: Clarity on the precise nature of the issue(s) that the WHS commitments are supposed to address;

c. **How**: Clarity on the pathway where proposals can use existing or new tools to enable innovations and/or changes to the system and/or solutions to problems – drawing again on the global consultation process and *One Humanity*, which offer ideas;
d. **Whom:** Identify accountability mechanisms so that internal and external change is not only rhetorical, but actually happens.⁴

At the same time, Member States would also be well advised to remain humble. Improving a global response to disaster and conflict is a wicked problem, which means⁵:

a. The nature of the problem is difficult to clearly define; the problem possesses many interdependencies which are often multi-causal, and are unstable;

b. Attempts to address wicked problems often lead to unforeseen consequences;

c. Wicked problems usually have no clear solution, and effective remedies involve changing behaviours;

d. Wicked problems hardly ever sit conveniently within the responsibility of any one organisation and can be characterised by chronic policy failure.

Therefore, any proposals should recognise these constraints and risks – that there are real limitations to our knowledge and understanding of how to address present challenges, let alone meet future needs. Part of the basis for a renewed engagement with our shared humanity needs to be a commitment to learning, and to continuous adaptation based on this learning.

### 3 One problem to rule them all

A guiding principle for building a system is ‘that form ever follows function’ (Sullivan, 1896). A core problem identified in many of the discussions leading up to the WHS is that the functions of the system remain poorly defined. ALNAP, one of the most astute observers of the system, observed early in the process that ‘the formal system...is meant to be using a limited amount of money to fill a dizzying number of gaps: resilience, preparedness, provision of assistance and protection in the short term; long-term provision of basic services; urban crises and “mega” health disasters’ (Knox-Clarke, 2015).

They further explored this theme in their response to *One Humanity*, in a manner worth reproducing in full:

> While humanity may be our ‘shared value’, the problem is that development and humanitarian assistance represent two very different applications of this value, which arise out of distinct moral circumstances. Development assistance, as embodied in the 2030 Agenda, is a vision of humanity at its best: it depicts the ideal world to which we want our societies and governments to aspire. Humanitarian assistance, as embodied in International Humanitarian Law, is a vision of the ground floor for humanity: it provides the minimum threshold that we as a modern world are willing to accept in how human beings are treated. While shared humanity is at the core of both, they offer very different points of focus. [Obrecht, 2016]

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⁴ This formulation leans on the Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) concept, pioneered by Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock. PDIA focuses on solving locally nominated and defined problems in performance (as opposed to transplanting preconceived and packaged “best practice” solutions); It seeks to create an authorizing environment for decision-making that encourages positive deviance and experimentation (as opposed to designing projects and programs and then requiring agents to implement them exactly as designed). It embeds this experimentation in tight feedback loops that facilitate rapid experiential learning (as opposed to enduring long lag times in learning from ex post “evaluation”) It actively engages broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, relevant, and supportable (as opposed to a narrow set of external experts promoting the top-down diffusion of innovation). Further details on the PDIA approach can be found at [http://www.cgdev.org/publication/escaping-capability-traps-through-problem-driven-iterative-adaptation-pdia-working-paper](http://www.cgdev.org/publication/escaping-capability-traps-through-problem-driven-iterative-adaptation-pdia-working-paper) (accessed 24/02/2016)

⁵ Tackling wicked problems: A Public Policy Perspective, Australian Public Service Commission, 2007. This section of the paper draws heavily on prior work done for the ECOSOC dialogue, with Cooper and Ivanovic that looked at the links between relief and development, cf. Chandran, R; Cooper, H.; and Ivanovic, A., 2015.
This speaks to the central unresolved tension of the entire WHS process. International assistance must deliver solutions that require a variety of different outcomes:

a. **Crisis response**: Rapid interventions to help meet short-term needs from a sudden-onset crisis – most often in response to natural or man-made disasters;

b. **Long-term support**: Ongoing support to a situation with longer-term needs – such as conflicts, or situations of chronic vulnerability;

c. **Resilience-building/risk-reduction**: Helping communities, cities and countries to build back better after crises or reduce the effects of future crises.

These distinctions are imperfect. The manner of delivery is also affected by the context. ALNAP (Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2014) identified four differing models of assistance – looking primarily at crisis response and longer-term support, but that are arguably equally applicable to resilience/risk efforts, that are shaped by their context:

a. **The Comprehensive model**: where humanitarians attempt to strategically and operationally substitute for the domestic response because of the inability of governments and local actors;

b. **The Constrained model**: where humanitarians are severely limited by domestic actors, government and others, who may be creating the crisis and/or actively restricting the delivery of aid;

c. **The Cooperative model**: where humanitarians need to work in close collaboration with domestic national and civil society actors; and,

d. **The Consultative model**: where humanitarians fill gaps in nationally-managed responses, typically in developed countries.

That the current system is struggling to deliver these different outcomes, across these models, is reflected in its sprawl. In the absence of agreement on the functions, the system lacks a form, and lines of responsibility and accountability are harder and harder to draw. National governments retain the primary responsibility for the well-being and protection of their citizens (UN Secretary General, 2015, paragraph 84, bullet point 1). But who is ‘responsible’ for providing support to the middle-income countries that are overwhelmed by millions of refugees from Syria? Who is responsible for delivering education services in the eastern Congo, after more than 20 years of constant violence? How is that responsibility funded?

### 4 Concrete further steps

All of these questions do not have to be answered in Istanbul. But clarity on **outcomes** and on **what commitments** are addressing will be essential. *One Humanity* also contains a number of ideas that are ripe for concrete commitments. In its breadth, it offers the groundwork for deeper thinking; at the same time, there are also some marked omissions. This short note cannot cover the entire sweep of its recommendations, so it explores, briefly, four dimensions.

The first is what a commitment might look like in Istanbul. The second, is to explore through the example of financing, where stakeholders might be able to go deeper into the ideas of the report; the third where they might add more depth on underserved areas, such as the urban question; and finally, it addresses the perennial question of reform of the United Nations. For each of these, it proposes a sample commitment as a policy recommendation to the EU Parliament.

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6 Specific wording is taken from [http://www.alnap.org/blog/120.aspx](http://www.alnap.org/blog/120.aspx) — a concise summary of Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2014.
4.1 Getting to commitments, and then seeing them through

Istanbul will mark the beginning of a process, not the end. As such, the commitments made by Member States, more than any other actors, will set the forward pathway. It is Member States who shape the UN system, and Member States who, largely, fund global humanitarian response.

To motivate stronger commitments to stronger outcomes, Member States will need to come together quickly – there is limited time between today and Istanbul. They will need to formulate common statements of outcomes. *One Humanity* and the WHS Synthesis report could provide the basis for many of these statements. The European Union is also in a particular position of influence to articulate collective outcome statements, because of its ability to bring together Member States that play significant roles in the humanitarian system, as well as through the force multiplication effect of the scale of its own funding to the humanitarian system. But it would have to move quickly.

There is also no format for commitments yet. Careful thought – beyond the scope of this paper – will be required to develop a format, and to articulate concrete commitments. But if Member States can leverage the legitimacy of the global consultation process and the ideas both the consultations and *One Humanity* contain, and if they are willing to grapple with how their commitments relate to the issues of form and function, as explored above, the WHS could provide the beginning of the imperative process of describing humanitarian systems in terms of their functions, and developing forms that deliver those functions.

This would also recognise that the period after the WHS will be critical to ensure implementation. Three ideas could help to secure Europe-wide implementation, and send a useful signal to the wider world: (1) continued high-level political attention – perhaps through the identification of an Envoy for WHS implementation with regular reporting requirements to parliament; (2) a substantive link to peer review processes that increases the pressure for compliance, ideally linked to a scorecard and hard, independent ratings process of EU Member States quality of implementing EU-wide commitments; (3) a radical embrace of transparency with respect to proceedings. The opaque nature of decision-making on humanitarian actions is a particular driver of suspicion, doubt and uncertainty, and the EU has long-championed transparency.

The maintenance of political attention beyond the EU is critical to the long-term success of the WHS. This will only happen if the WHS is itself a success, and launches robust enough follow-up processes that demand engagement. The EU and its Member States are critical in this regard, because of the signalling effect. There is a strong argument that a critical outcome from the 2016 WHS should be a call for a 2020 WHS at head-of-state level, that reviews progress on commitments, thus ensuring attention. Finding a strategic way to link reporting to the High-Level Political Forum at the United Nations may also offer an opportunity to achieve the same outcome.

Two sample commitments for the EU are offered below, that draw on the model of outcome/what/how/whom outlined above. They draw on ideas expressed in the consultation process and in *One Humanity* and would, if implemented, likely deliver improved outcomes. But they are also necessarily flawed proposals.

Their purpose is:

a. to illustrate the potential for Member States to make Istanbul the start of a process of change;
b. to highlight the need for the EU to develop its own coherent vision for the outcomes it desires, and to link these to their proposals for commitments.

Given the level of reform required for commitments, this paper cannot outline an exhaustive list of the possible commitments. There are also no correct answers to some of the questions asked by *One
Humanity. One brief report cannot reconcile all of the tensions described above, and the pathway to a better humanitarian system will require experimentation and experiential learning.

As noted earlier, the WHS needs a clear narrative of what global humanitarianism will look like if all its commitments are implemented. Any commitments offered by the EU would benefit strongly by being linked to a concrete scenario that models the current climate of response, and how it would be made different by the commitment. Four or five general scenarios could arguably provide the foundation for all of the (hopefully many) European commitments to be made at Istanbul.

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<tr>
<th>Proposed EU commitment to prioritise national capacity</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome:</strong> All international assistance that is scheduled to last beyond X days adheres to the principle of national capacity first.</td>
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<td><strong>What:</strong> A commitment to ensure that international capacity reinforces, rather than replaces, national capacities.</td>
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<td><strong>How:</strong> After X days of assistance, a plan must be developed that specifies the transfer of assistance to national/community means of delivery within X days, and provides clear explanations of any exception, with written support from local organisations that these exceptions are valid.</td>
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<td><strong>Whom:</strong> All assistance from the European Commission’s Directorate general for humanitarian aid and civil protection (ECHO) will be reviewed against these commitments. After a 3 year phase-in period, organisations that are non-compliant will lose their eligibility for direct (ECHO) and indirect funding (contracts through ECHO grantees).</td>
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<th>Proposed EU Commitment to more integrated planning</th>
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| **Outcome:** After 12 months of assistance, all emergencies operate with multi-year ‘Crisis and Resilience Plans’.

| **What:** Ensures that emergency assistance has a sunset clause, and that the “developmental” aspects of emergencies are considered up-front. |
| **How:** All ‘humanitarian’ appeals are limited to one ‘rapid response’ appeal with a duration of no more than 18 months. Within 12 months, a multi-year Crisis and Resilience Plan should identify programmes that are (1) reviewed for their scale after a year; (2) likely to continue |

<sup>7</sup> This example draws on ideas developed with Claire Hajaj, and first articulated in “Time for a Reset: Fixing the Faulty Humanitarian Appeals Process.” Rahul Chandran and Claire Hajaj, [http://cpr.unu.edu/time-for-a-reset-fixing-the-faulty-humanitarian-appeals-process.html](http://cpr.unu.edu/time-for-a-reset-fixing-the-faulty-humanitarian-appeals-process.html) (accessed 24/02/2016). It is also consistent with the call in One Humanity under Collective Responsibility Four for “collective outcomes” and “multi-year plans in three to five year durations.”
for 2-3 years; (3) likely to span a 5-year or longer time-cycle, and transition/link to the ongoing development process within that time-frame.

Plans should (1) be agreed by governments and agencies; (2) provide a single binding plan for donors and agencies alike; (3) focus on outcomes.

**Whom:** The EU will implement this system in three countries, based on agreement from the host nation. It will fund a fully independent lessons learned exercise at 18 months and 3 years, and present these lessons learned publically. Based on these lessons, it may revise this commitment accordingly, but will move to full global implementation by 2020, at which point it will cease to finance contexts, UN agencies and other implementing partners that are not in compliance with this approach.

### 4.2 Going deeper: fixing humanitarian financing by moving sudden-onset crises to an insurance model

Like the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, *One Humanity* echoes the need to tackle the problem of sustainable financing. Its ideas on strengthening aid allocations to fragile situations, ensuring the viability of the Peacebuilding Fund, and increasing the International Development Association (IDA) Crisis Response Window are all robust.

Ongoing research between the Department for International Development (DfID) and the World Bank, however, has focused on the need to ‘create certainty when an unexpected event occurs’ (Dercon and Clarke, 2016). Their work suggests that the most effective way to ‘create a sustainable global humanitarian system’ is to have it built ‘around the principles of insurance’. Without reproducing the argument here, the move is to clarify where responsibilities for managing risks lie, prior to disasters, and to provide hard financing arrangements to meet contingent liabilities based on risk.

It is, again, beyond the scope of this note to identify how to build an insurance mechanism to, as their book is titled, make disasters dull. But the WHS provides the opportunity for a number of stakeholders to come together – perhaps in public/private partnerships – and explore how to do so in a serious fashion. Identifying a fool proof mechanism for financing crisis response would free up resources and space to explore how to address the gaps in conflict financing.

**Proposed EU Commitment on funding sudden onset-crises at the national and city level**

**Outcome:** 5 of the top 20 countries and cities at risk for sudden-onset crises in Lower and Middle Income Countries have a plan for insurance in place by 2020.

**What:** Creates a sustainable financing model for countries and cities to manage risk.
How: The EU, together with the United Nations, World Bank and Regional Development Banks, works with governments, municipalities, and the private sector to explore:
(a) What information would be required to identify and categorise risks in sufficient depth that they are insurable in volunteer countries and cities
(b) What financial mechanisms and instruments could be used to (i) support the extension of insurance to countries and cities under consideration; (ii) to strengthen the incentives for disaster risk reduction efforts; (iii) leverage financing for such efforts.
In 2020, EU and partners host a major lessons-learned exercise to understand outcomes and potential for extending the insurance system, if any.

Whom: EU agrees to fully fund this scheme; EU envoy on WHS implementation to provide regular reporting to the European Parliament (EP).

4.3 The unanswered question: future-proofing humanitarian action

A key special session at the WHS will focus on urban issues. One Humanity does not cover these issues in detail. This is striking. We live in an urban century, but we have little information on cities. There is a focus on the mega-cities, which offer outsized risks, and there is a greater and growing understanding of how to manage and mitigate these risks.

But the majority of future urban population growth is expected to take place in developing cities, which are highly fragile, and about which we know very little. There are over 3,500 cities with a population of more than 250,000 and less than a million – a minimum of 875 million people. The ongoing problem of displacement is also a particular concern, as the majority of people both in displacement and in return migrate to cities.

Early work (Muggah, 2016) has shown that while city fragility is concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, and South and Central Asia; there are also fragile cities in North America, Western Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. The universality of this fragility offers a useful opportunity for stakeholders at the WHS to re-prioritise the urban agenda, retain a strong link to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and begin to understand some of the contours of potential future humanitarian risks.

Proposed EU Commitment to address urban issues in humanitarian response

Outcome: The EU is more able to support a response that addresses urban-specific needs and situations.

What: Builds a body of knowledge around specialised urban needs beyond mega-cities, particularly with respect to the challenges of migration and of informal governance arrangements among vulnerable populations.

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I am grateful to John de Boer and Louise Bosetti of the UNU-CPR Fragile Cities programme for their input on this section.
How: The EU supports a major UN + multi-lateral bank, and urban stakeholder (e.g. ICLEI) research project designed to build a body of knowledge on (i) the specific dimensions of urban vulnerability to sudden-onset disasters in cities with a population of between 250,000 and 1,000,000; (ii) the small-scale disasters that affect these cities and particular communities (such as slum-dwellers); (iii) on non-state response mechanisms and how formal humanitarian response can engage these; and (iv) on how patterns of migration into these cities create and alter this risk/response dynamic.

Based on this body of policy-research, the UN and the multi-lateral banks develop a framework for urban response by 2018, and present proposals on the necessary instruments to address urban needs by 2020.

Whom: The EU will support the creation of a special envoy on Urban Disasters, working with all relevant parties, and providing annual updates to the EU Parliament.

4.4 Reform of the United Nations

Key systemic issues that relate to the United Nations are less clearly addressed in the report. And while this is appropriate, given its larger focus, the WHS also represents an opportunity for stakeholders to articulate the need for reform. One Humanity acknowledges this, noting that the world must ‘transcend the humanitarian-development divide’ and ‘move beyond the comfort of traditional silos [in order to] work across mandates, sectors and institutional boundaries.’ It also states, strongly, that ‘To make the United Nations fit for the future, the Summit must spark a process of renewal in the way the organisation works across mandates and responsibilities.’

The underlying diagnosis is that the UN’s response architecture is outdated. It was created in a different political world, to cope with different types of responses, and with different sets of partners. As has been argued throughout the process, it needs deep change. It needs its core mandate issues to be addressed. And it needs governance reform.

There are many ideas to extend this to improve the core humanitarian architecture – in addition to One Humanity’s ideas on bridging the humanitarian-development divide. An idealised set of outcomes would address planning issues in the UN, the need for devolution/decentralisation and the clamour for a mandate review. Addressing all of these issues is, again, beyond the scope of this brief note.

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9 See, for example, Global Report on Human Settlements, 2007 at http://www.preventionweb.net/files/2585_2432alt1.pdf (accessed 24/02/2016) or the 2015 UNISDR Global Assessment Report http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2015/en/gar-pdf/GAR15_Pocket_EN.pdf (accessed 24/02/2016) which highlights the "alarming development...that both the mortality and economic loss associated with smaller-scale, recurrent localized disasters are trending up." P.6 The lack of broader research on this topic is part of the basis for calling for this commitment.

10 See for example: ALNAP, 2015; Chandran, 2015; and Chandran et al 2015.
Proposed EU Commitment to localisation through the United Nations

**Outcome:** The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is located much more closely to its regional partners, able to build more robust planning relationships with governments, municipalities and civil society organisations, and able to fund them faster in emergency response.

**What:** Empowers the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to build deeper regional and local relationships to enable faster humanitarian response, and more localised funding.

**How:** The EU works to build a truly global coalition that, in the UN General Assembly Resolution that responds to the Secretary General’s report from Istanbul, requests the Secretary-General to propose decentralizing the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs such that:

(a) 60% of all staff are located in regional offices by 2018
(b) 20% of all CERF allocations flow to regional and national organisations in emergencies by 2020

In turn, the EU will:

(a) Ensure that CERF is adequately funded to meet these demands;
(b) Mirror these allocations in its own funding instruments, ensuring that 20% of all ECHO direct funding also flows to national organisations;
(c) Implement the various OECD recommendations on risk management, and move towards an enabling environment for fiduciary risks, recognizing the benefits;

**Whom:** The EU and ECHO agree to make this change a political priority and its Member States agree to consistently advocate for it across all the bodies of the United Nations; to fund at least 50% of any transition costs required by OCHA to move staff to the field. EU Special Envoy on WHS implementation to report to the EP on implementation.

5 Conclusions

The most striking feature of engaging with the WHS consultation process was the inevitability of change. The system, as it stands, will not stand. Change is happening, and the system can catch up, or not catch up. Fewer people will die unnecessary deaths if humanitarian stakeholders can come together at the WHS and manage the transition to a different and deeper partnership. But to do so will require those who have the most vested interests in the current system to surrender and share power, and embrace change. And as the epigraph says: when did turkeys ever vote for Christmas?
Bibliography


