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# UN Preventive Diplomacy in the 2008-10 Crisis in Guinea

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## Introduction

On 28 September 2009, large crowds gathered in Guinea's capital, Conakry, to protest the decision of the ruling military junta to stand in national elections. Security forces close to the junta charged the stadium where the protestors had gathered, killing 150 unarmed civilians and injuring hundreds more. This massacre, coming less than one year after a military coup had rocked the already fragile country, pushed Guinea to the brink of civil war.<sup>1</sup>

Seen as a threshold moment, the September 2009 massacre led to an immediate intensification of international diplomatic efforts, including by the UN, led by UN Special Representative Said Djinnit, who travelled to Guinea 45 times in the 2009-10 period to help regional partners mediate between the junta and the opposition coalition. The UN's efforts—including mediation, assistance to the political transition and elections, and coordination of regional and international actors—culminated in the December 2010 inauguration of the first democratically-elected president of Guinea and a dramatic reduction in the risks facing the country. While Guinea continues to face major challenges, and the deeper causes of instability in the country are far from fully addressed, a widely-feared violent crisis was averted in 2009-10.

This case study assesses the UN's role in addressing the imminent risks of violent conflict in Guinea and in helping the Guinean leaders establish the conditions for peaceful political transition in the country. It focuses most intensely on the period between the December 2008 military coup and the 2010 agreement to hold national elections, though it also touches upon the UN's efforts to support the elections themselves. Within this timeframe, the study examines the UN's influence on the decision-making of the key conflict actors in an effort to evaluate the impact of the UN's preventive diplomacy. How the UN adapted its strategy and approach and how it coordinated with other actors to gain leverage over the main decision-makers, are questions at the heart of this study.

This case study is the first to utilize an Assessment Framework for Preventive Diplomacy developed by the Centre for Policy Research in 2018. It is organized around the six core questions of the Framework: (1) What were the major factors contributing to an imminent risk of violent conflict? (2) What influenced the decision-making of the key conflict actors at the crisis moment? (3) What is the most likely scenario that could have taken place absent external intervention, including by the UN? (4) To what extent can the outcome be attributed to the UN's engagement? (5) What enabled and/or inhibited the UN's capacity to contribute to preventing violence? And (6) To what extent was the prevention effort linked to addressing longer-term structural causes of violence? Together, these lines of inquiry trace the contours of the UN's role in helping to prevent violent conflict in Guinea, and provide lessons about what works well in preventive diplomacy.

## 1. Context Analysis—What were the major factors contributing to an imminent risk of violent conflict in Guinea?

### *Rags and Riches*

Guinea is both extraordinarily rich and staggeringly poor. With newly-discovered oil reserves and the largest source of aluminium ore in the world, the country was nonetheless near the bottom of the Human Development Index in 2008.<sup>2</sup> Huge socio-economic inequalities and underdevelopment were the result of 52 years of authoritarian rule following Guinea's independence, leaving the country deeply affected by widespread corruption, weak state institutions, and severe limitations on political space and civil society.<sup>3</sup> After 24 years in power, President Lansana Conté had exploited ethnic divisions to maintain his grip on power, pitting the four major ethnic groups of Guinea against each other and limiting any efforts to create meaningful political parties, all while building an opaque and often brutal security apparatus around the presidency.<sup>4</sup>

Throughout 2008 an economic downturn meant that already desperate living conditions worsened dramatically for everyday citizens. Less than 40 per cent of the Conakry population had access to piped water, while wages fell far short of rising costs of rice and fuel. Public discontent over the government's mismanagement of the country's natural resources began to gather momentum, and several protests resulted in violent clashes between civilians and the state security services. Protests were also partially driven by political discontent, as President Conté continued to stall on the legislative elections that had been delayed since 2002.

### *The 2008 Coup: A Destabilizing Moment*

President Conté's natural death on 22 December 2008 was followed hours later by a bloodless military coup, led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara and a group of officers calling themselves the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD). Within Guinea, the coup was initially greeted with optimism, as many saw the end of the Conté era as an opportunity to put in place democratic institutions and improve the highly corrupt, ineffective governance institutions. Anti-corruption actions, such as arresting the former president's son on drug trafficking charges, were seen as evidence that the CNDD meant to bring positive change to Guinea.<sup>5</sup>

SRSJ Said Djinnit, head of the Dakar-based UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), travelled to Guinea on 3 January 2010, the first of about 45 such missions he would undertake over the next two years. He reported that "considerable confusion" reigned in the country but also relayed what he considered to be fairly encouraging discussions with Captain Camara, whom he pushed to take the shortest possible path to elections. In his meetings with the UNCT, including

the World Bank, the overriding sentiment was that, while the CNDD was not trusted—and was in fact suspected of harbouring both alleged drug traffickers and perpetrators of human rights abuses—there was no other option than to work with the new regime, given that it was the only actor able to instil the order and discipline needed to restore the democratic process.

In the months following the coup, public euphoria quickly dissipated as Camara dissolved the government, suspended the constitution, and cracked down on any opposition activity.<sup>6</sup> The situation in the streets of Conakry followed a similarly negative trend: political opponents were questioned and arbitrarily detained, militias began forming along ethnic lines, and soldiers ran rampant in many parts of Conakry.<sup>7</sup> A growing opposition coalition—calling itself the *Forces Vives*—began calling for an end to military rule and for a democratic process in Guinea.

At the regional and international levels, condemnation of the coup was swift and harsh. Guinea was immediately suspended from the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) soon followed suit and suspended Guinea, while the UN Secretary-General issued a—more muted—statement calling for a “peaceful and democratic transfer of power.”<sup>8</sup> On 30 January 2009, on the margins of an AU summit meeting in Addis, the AU and ECOWAS formed the International Contact Group for Guinea, with active support and participation from the UN, aimed at facilitating a transition to democratic rule and to head off the growing risks of further violence in Guinea.<sup>9</sup>

The Contact Group scored an early success in January when Camara publicly committed to holding elections within the year, and further committed that he would not run in them.<sup>10</sup> This was the major demand of the opposition groups and should have paved the way to a peaceful transition of power. However, it became increasingly clear that Camara was preparing to renege on his promise and, in off-the-cuff remarks in April 2009, he indicated that he might resign from the military and stand for office in the elections. In August, Camara dramatically broke his earlier commitment, announcing on public radio that he planned to run for the presidency (he formally informed the Contact Group of the same in early September). Across the country, divisions between his supporters and opponents reached a great and potentially explosive divide, driving up the risk of widespread violence.

All indicators were trending negatively for Conakry. Strong economic decline—not helped by the AU’s imposition of sanctions against the junta following Camara’s announcement on elections—meant already dire living conditions worsened. Human rights violations by junta-affiliated groups rose significantly too, with *Forces Vives* members regularly complaining of harassment, abuses and ethnically-targeted arrests by Camara’s forces.<sup>11</sup> And reports of mobilization along ethnic lines raised serious warnings amongst

international experts about the stability of the country.<sup>12</sup> Conditions conducive to serious violence in Guinea were all coalescing.

#### *The September 2009 Massacre*

On 28 September 2009, the day of Guinea’s independence, large crowds gathered in Conakry stadium to peacefully protest the junta leaders’ decision to stand in the elections, in defiance of an order banning demonstrations. Security forces close to the junta charged the stadium and opened fire, killing 150 unarmed protestors. An estimated 1,200 people were severely injured amidst reports of rapes and other atrocities.<sup>13</sup> With many political leaders injured or under arrest,<sup>14</sup> any space for dialogue between the CNDD and the *Forces Vives* seemed to have vanished, and the risk of imminent, widespread violence rose dramatically.

While the massacre was the worst moment in the 2008-10 period, it also triggered a step-change in international and regional engagement, and ultimately opened the door for greater pressure to be placed on the junta leadership. In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, the AU, in cooperation with ECOWAS and the Contact Group, imposed harsher sanctions against Camara, his inner circle, and the Prime Minister.<sup>15</sup> Major bilateral actors, including the US and France, also imposed sanctions.<sup>16</sup> Soon after, the Security Council despatched an ASG-level envoy on an exploratory mission to Guinea, following which it established an International Commission of Inquiry into the massacre.<sup>17</sup> Camara, reportedly concerned at the possibility of future ICC action against him, reluctantly accepted the Commission, while also forming a national-level one to investigate the incident.<sup>18</sup>

#### *Preventive Diplomacy Begins in Earnest*

The massacre also caused a rapid increase in preventive diplomatic action. Days after 28 September, AU, ECOWAS and UN envoys<sup>19</sup> met with President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso in Ouagadougou and jointly devised a strategy to bring the parties back into mediation and put in place the conditions for democratic transition. This AU-ECOWAS-UN troika, in which Compaoré was quickly designated the ECOWAS envoy, became the core mediation group, bringing together members of the CNDD and *Forces Vives* in Ouagadougou in November 2009 and leading several rounds of subsequent negotiations.

Initially, however, the positions of the two sides seemed unbridgeable. Many members of the *Forces Vives* were still wearing bandages from the 28 September incident when they first met with the mediation team to communicate the conditions for their participation in further talks. And the opposition’s conditions were bold: the immediate departure of Camara, establishment of an international interposition force to protect the population from the junta and allied security forces, establishment of a commission of inquiry, and an arms embargo on the CNDD. For its part, the CNDD

rejected any transitional arrangements it would not lead, refused the call not to stand in future elections, and abruptly rejected the demand for Camara's immediate departure.

Early efforts to find common ground failed. After several negotiation rounds, President Compaoré presented a draft agreement to the two sides that attempted to meet their respective needs: Camara would be retained as president and head of a transitional council that would steer the country towards elections, and members of the CNDD—including Camara—could stand in the elections if they resigned four months prior to the vote. These concessions to the CNDD were seen at the time as necessary to keep the junta in the talks, but they triggered an immediate rejection by the *Forces Vives*, a threat to pull out of the talks, and public commentary casting doubt on Compaoré's impartiality. Several subsequent rounds of talks failed to bridge these differences of views, and it appeared the international troika had suffered a serious setback in its standing with the *Forces Vives* by potentially conceding too much to the CNDD.

#### *A New Opening: Camara Leaves Guinea*

On 3 December 2009, an assassination attempt against Camara by his aide de camp, Lieutenant "Toumba" Diakité, radically changed the equation of power in Guinea, with a profound impact on the mediation effort. Toumba, who had led the troops involved in the 28 September massacre, had become convinced that Camara would shift sole blame on him via the International Commission of Inquiry and the national inquiry process. These fears were heightened when the junta arrested some of Toumba's troops on suspicion of plotting a coup. When, on 3 December, Toumba visited Camara to request the release of the alleged plotters, the discussion reportedly degenerated into an exchange of fire in which Camara sustained a gunshot to the head. Using an aircraft supplied by President Compaoré, Camara was evacuated to Morocco for medical treatment, while Toumba and his allies went into hiding.

Camara's departure was immediately viewed as an opening for the mediation effort, despite the heightened sense of insecurity following the assassination attempt. When deputy leader of the junta, General Sekouba Konaté, assumed leadership of the CNDD he openly opposed Camara's participation in the elections, acceding to the core demand of the opposition. His standing with *Forces Vives* was also strengthened by the fact that he reportedly had been away from Conakry on the day of the massacre, and by his repeated statements that he wished to relinquish power as soon as possible.

For its part, the *Forces Vives* responded with a much more conciliatory position, publicly stating that they would work with General Konaté as the head of the transition process. This was a departure from its previous position against participation of any CNDD member in the transition and allowed the negotiations to proceed. *Forces Vives* was soon

rewarded when, on 6 January 2010, Konaté stated on national television that he was ready to name a prime minister from the opposition to lead a transitional government of national unity. The positions of the parties had quite suddenly become much closer, in large part due to the absence of Camara.

#### *A Diplomatic Breakthrough: The Ouagadougou Declaration of January 2010*

The success of the mediation effort hinged in large part on solidifying the positive momentum caused by Camara's departure from Guinea and transforming the public commitments of both sides into a concrete agreement. These priorities were suddenly put at risk when, on 12 January 2010, Camara unexpectedly arrived in Ouagadougou ahead of a planned visit there by General Konaté.<sup>20</sup> Camara initially insisted upon returning to Guinea and on resuming leadership of the CNDD on the ground. Konaté reportedly threatened to resign if this were to happen, and a heated debate took place between the two camps.

However, supported by the mediation and witnessed by President Compaoré, Konaté and Camara signed a joint declaration with the *Forces Vives* on 15 January under which Camara would stay in Burkina Faso for a six-month "recovery period." During this period, Konaté would lead the transition within Guinea, to be followed by a new prime minister designated by the *Forces Vives* and the establishment of a National Council for the Transition.<sup>21</sup> Critically, the joint statement clearly indicated that CNDD members would not be eligible to stand for elections. This was the blueprint for a return to constitutional order in Guinea, and signalled the true start of the transition process, with presidential elections now explicitly foreseen within six months. Interestingly, it was primarily mediation *within* the CNDD members itself that was necessary to reach this breakthrough.

The path to the elections after the Ouagadougou Declaration was not always a smooth one. In fact, just hours after signing the declaration Camara again insisted upon return to Guinea with Konaté, only be dissuaded after strong interventions. But overall, the momentum towards the elections appeared now too strong to stop. By spring 2010, the core institutions of the transition had been set up, a national unity government established, and a new prime minister chosen by the *Forces Vives*. Presidential elections were scheduled for June, and pledges of international assistance began to grow. The US and France restored bilateral assistance, while the EU eased many of the harsher sanctions on Guinea.<sup>22</sup> Security in Conakry gradually improved, with monitors reporting a significant reduction in human rights abuses and more disciplined behaviour by the security services. The imminent risk of widespread violence that rose following the 28 September massacre appeared to have retreated.<sup>23</sup>

*From "On Track" to "Fragile"—Guinea's Elections Stutter Forward*

Internally, however, the UN was becoming increasingly worried that the elections themselves could be a renewed trigger for violence. SRSG Djinnit's reporting had switched from referring to the transition as "on track" to calling the process "fragile," while international experts warned that ethnicity and group affiliation was being manipulated in dangerous ways ahead of the polls.<sup>24</sup> Tensions between the political parties and amongst the leaders of the transitional institutions were growing, and there was alarm in some quarters that the interim prime minister might attempt to hold on to power beyond the 27 June poll date. In another worrying sign, President Konaté warned that elements of the army might attempt to disrupt the transition process, amidst reports that armed elements sympathetic to Camara were mobilizing in his home region. With continued poverty, high unemployment and no sign of economic improvements, these conditions were in many ways similar to those preceding the 28 September massacre.

Three days prior to the poll, on 24 June 2010, violent clashes between rival political parties outside of Conakry raised alarms again and triggered an urgent visit by SRSG Djinnit, ECOWAS Commissioner Gbeho and AU Special Envoy Ibrahima Fall. This group met with President Konaté who agreed to their recommendation to issue a public call for calm ahead of the elections. This he did, standing alongside a range of political leaders and the president of the Transitional Commission, all of whom expressed the same message of calm and unity in front of the press.

The peaceful conduct of elections on 27 June 2010 appeared to significantly reduce the risks of further violence in Guinea. International observers endorsed the poll, while the five main contenders expressed initial confidence in the process in private meetings with SRSG Djinnit. Yet in the days following the poll, claims by political leaders alleging large-scale fraud led to a delay in the release of provisional results, fuelling suspicions amongst the population that the results were being manipulated. When the results were eventually released, no candidate had won an outright majority and a run-off was required.<sup>25</sup> This ushered in an extremely dangerous period for Guinea, as a three-month delay in the holding of the run-off meant frequent opportunities for further crises.

While the elections period is not the main focus of this case study, it is worth noting the crucial role that the core mediation group—and in particular SRSG Djinnit—played in keeping the major players positively engaged through the run-off. On several occasions, and in the face of accusations of having manipulated the elections, President Konaté threatened to resign, an act that would have surely thrown the country back into turmoil. And there were moments of actual violence as well, including an 11 September 2010 clash between supporters of rival candidates in Conakry that left one dead and more than 50 injured. As described below, the

efforts of the mediation to garner strong public calls for calm by all political leaders appeared to play an important role in preventing greater escalation.<sup>26</sup>

Indeed, even after the run-off took place in relative calm in November 2010, both parties alleged widespread malpractice, and the loser—Cellou Diallo—refused to accept the results. Violent demonstrations by Diallo's supporters from 15-16 November were met with heavy-handed response by the security services, resulting in 10 dead and more than 300 injured.<sup>27</sup> Worryingly, the demonstrations had a distinctly ethnic element to them, as Diallo hailed from the only major ethnic group not to have ever held the presidency and generated large numbers of protestors from his group. Only after Diallo publicly agreed to abide by the ruling of the Supreme Court—which upheld the election results on 17 November—did the risk of more widespread violence truly subside. And on 22 December 2010, Alpha Condé was sworn in as Guinea's first democratically elected leader.

## **2. Causal Analysis—What influenced the decision-making of the key conflict actors at the crisis moment?**

The 2009-10 crisis in Guinea centred around two main conflict actors: the CNDD leadership (Camara and Konaté) and the *Forces Vives* opposition leadership. While other political factions and groups on the ground played important roles, it was the clear ability of these two principal parties to escalate or de-escalate that places them at the centre of the preventive diplomacy effort. This section examines the core interests of each party and describes the factors that most directly impacted their decision-making through the key crisis moments.

### *Dadis Camara—An Unstable Interlocutor*

Captain Dadis Camara rose to power hours after the death of President Conte and was initially seen as a consensual and unifying factor. His early decisions to hold high officials accountable for corruption were held up as evidence of his desire to improve the governance capacities of Guinea, as were his early commitments to transition to civilian rule. But it quickly became clear that Camara was interested in one thing alone: remaining in power. By early May 2009, the Contact Group met and agreed that Camara was in fact an interlocutor, whose commitment to the transition was no longer trusted. This was made clear on repeated occasions, including in December 2010 when he attempted to override his party's demands and return to Guinea.

Most of Camara's actions can be seen through the lens of his desire to maintain power at almost any cost. Efforts to broker a deal in which he would stand aside and allow a transitional government to oversee the transition process were absolute non-starters for the CNDD while he was heading it. His 19 August 2009 public announcement that he was planning to stand for election—defying earlier

commitments—is clear evidence of his drive for the same kind of autocratic dictatorship he had replaced. And even his apparent conciliatory actions, such as the agreement to allow the International Commission of Inquiry into Guinea, were in fact driven by a mistaken understanding that he would face ICC liability if he did not permit the Commission (ironically, it was the Commission itself that later recommended ICC involvement).<sup>28</sup>

As such, Camara appeared relatively impervious to external forms of coercion and inducement. For instance, in October 2009, the AU imposed direct sanctions on Camara and his close associates, in part punitively for his role in the September massacre, but also to pressure a more constructive position on the transition. According to the UN, however, this only prompted an “entrenching of the CNDD position,” while reports soon circulated that the junta was actively thwarting the arms embargoes by hiring thousands of ex-combatants from Sierra Leone and Liberia.<sup>29</sup>

In fact, Camara overwhelmingly played an obstructionist role to the attempts to ward off further violence following the September massacre, and the talks made almost no progress while he remained at the helm in Conakry. The most important factor that influenced his role in the crisis was not diplomacy, but the bullet that nearly killed him on 3 December 2009, taking him temporarily out of the picture. After that, the international approach appeared largely focused on keeping him out of the way, in which SRSG Djinnit’s successful persuasive effort to keep him from returning to Guinea after the Ouagadougou declaration in January 2010 appeared crucial.

#### *General Sekouba Konaté—Catapulted into a Leadership Role*

The window for preventive diplomacy opened significantly when Konaté took control of the CNDD in December 2009. First and foremost, he was not Camara: he was not seen by most as the orchestrator of the 28 September massacre of opposition activists, and his early approach was to acknowledge the need for a transition to civilian rule and for the CNDD to be kept out of the presidential elections.

Konaté also appeared much more susceptible to external persuasion and was clearly interested in being seen as the person who delivered the transition for Guinea. For example, during the disputes following the elections, Konaté threatened to resign on several occasions, citing the accusations of his meddling as unacceptable. But following entreaties by the Secretary-General, SRSG Djinnit and AU Chairperson Ping, during which the UN suggested Konaté could be “a hero of the transition,” he agreed to stay on. Similarly, he quickly acceded to Compaoré’s proposals about the transition process during the January 2010 Ouagadougou process, something Camara had resisted strongly.

There is evidence too that Konaté was influenced by bilateral and regional actors. As defence minister under President

Conté, he had been instrumental in awarding government contracts for major Western companies, including offshore oil exploration by US companies.<sup>30</sup> And he had a long history and important connections with rebel and militia groups in neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone. This may have made Konaté more open to discussions with a broader range of actors, but it also made him a dangerous conflict actor: following the 28 September massacre there were widespread reports that he using his longstanding connections with rebel groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone to recruit additional mercenaries into the CNDD-affiliated ranks. Keeping him focused on the benefits of engagement with the mediation was thus crucial for the process itself, and also to avoid further mobilization in the peripheries.

#### *The Forces Vives—Some Flexibility, Some Redlines*

The *Forces Vives* coalition of opposition groups formed following the 2008 coup and grew out of the growing disenchantment with how the junta was governing Guinea. As such, its overriding interest was to put in place meaningful processes to transition out of military rule and hold national elections. Following more than 50 years under autocratic rule, the group fundamentally distrusted the CNDD’s promises about elections, and had two main redlines: elections had to have a clear timeline, and the CNDD could not be part of them. Within those constraints, the *Forces Vives* showed a significant amount of flexibility, allowing Konaté to serve as interim president, among other concessions.

However, it is important to keep in mind two other characteristics of the *Forces Vives*. The first is that the 28 September massacre was directed at their supporters and their leadership. *Forces Vives* leaders came to October 2009 talks still bandaged from wounds received at the hands of the junta’s security services. While the group was willing to make some concessions on the transition process, they demanded meaningful investigations and anti-impunity measures. The establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry therefore met an important need for the group and appeared to give it a sense that they could rely upon the international community for support. The role of justice in giving the UN some leverage and influence is an important one in this case.

The second point is that the *Forces Vives* was not a monolithic entity: it was a loose coalition of different groups unified by the idea of ending military rule. Different ethnic groups, factions and interests were represented in the group, and it was often a challenge of the negotiation process to help the leadership address the many voices that arose during the talks. In this, the *Forces Vives* was often reliant on the international mediation, which worked behind the scenes to help the group’s leadership reach common positions and “pitch” them internally to their different constituencies. This may have made the *Forces Vives* more amenable to compromise, but it also meant an additional challenge of not allowing the group to agree to something that might cause an internal divide (e.g. allowing Konaté to lead the transition).

### What Prevented Widespread Violence in Guinea?

Following the 28 September massacre, the risk of much more widespread violence appeared very real. But several factors came together to prompt both sides to walk away from violence and eventually agree to the January 2010 Ouagadougou commitments, setting the stage for peaceful elections. Taking into account the above interests and positions of the conflict actors, the main factors were:

- Camara's absence from Guinea at a key moment in the negotiations. As soon as he was replaced by Konaté, the mediation process had a new opportunity to make progress.
- United international and regional pressure, in particular on Konaté but also the *Forces Vives*, to move forward on a transition process. As mentioned above, both appeared to be influenced by the messaging of the UN, AU and ECOWAS, especially in the lead up to the Ouagadougou agreement, but also through the elections process itself.
- Meaningful justice/anti-impunity processes (including the International Commission of Inquiry and eventually the ICC), which reassured the *Forces Vives* that their concerns would be addressed, but also appeared to influence the CNDD leadership to allow more international engagement in Guinea.
- Strong, respected mediators—including SRSG Djinnit, AU Special Envoy Fall and the regional powerhouse President Compaoré—who were able to speak with authority to both sides.
- While not definitive, it appears that the AU's decision to sanction the junta may have contributed to its early decision to seek international acceptance, including by appointing a civilian PM, which was a constructive step for the mediation.
- Positions of major bilateral donors, which had sanctioned Guinea following the 28 September massacre but who appeared poised to provide assistance to the country if a deal could be reached.<sup>31</sup>
- Logistical and financial support to the transition process, which assured both sides that the elections would take place and eliminated the risk that delays would cause a breakdown in relations. Support to the SSR process was also seen by some experts as important.

Taken together, these factors opened a path away from violence for the conflict actors and allowed them to agree a way forward on the transition process. The next section briefly addresses what would have happened absent an international intervention, including by the UN.

### 3. Counterfactual—What is the most likely scenario absent external intervention, including by the UN?

The 28 September massacre offers a glimpse into Guinea's trajectory absent international intervention. It showed the junta as willing to direct its security services against unarmed civilians, killing dozens and beating, raping and abusing hundreds more. It also triggered the complete suspension of talks between the ruling CNDD and the *Forces Vives*, leaving the parties with no forum or willingness to talk directly with each other. While the UN, AU and ECOWAS had been engaged with the parties ahead of the massacre, the event triggered a much more concerted and direct engagement by the international community, including the deployment of the Commission of Inquiry, imposition of sanctions, a far higher pace of high-level visits, and increased scrutiny by international and regional actors.

Without this intervention, it appears extremely likely that the 28 September massacre would have led to much more widespread violence, in particular by the junta-affiliated security services against opposition groups. Reports from the time indicate that the junta leadership was actively recruiting militia members from neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone, while within Guinea there were credible indications that ethnic groups had begun mobilizing outside of Conakry. While it is possible that the junta could have quelled these groups and held on to power, the deep socio-economic dissatisfaction, increasingly coherent coalition of opposition groups, and total lack of trust in the institutions of state almost certainly would have precipitated further violence, and on a larger scale.

The international intervention was very much a joint effort, co-led by the AU, UN and ECOWAS. In this, President Compaoré played an especially important role, hosting the most important meetings in Ouagadougou, and providing support at key moments (e.g the aircraft that flew Camara out of Guinea following the assassination attempt). The US and France, beyond their role on the Security Council, placed important pressure on the parties by pushing for the commission of inquiry into the 28 September massacre.<sup>32</sup> Less visible, countries like China and Russia with large investments in the bauxite extraction businesses in Guinea, may have exerted pressure on the junta to take a constructive approach through the crisis.

Taken together, this effort appears to have delivered important results, offering the junta a path away from further violence while reassuring both sides that the mediation process would address their core needs. Without this, it is highly likely that the violence would have spread and intensified following the 28 September massacre. In the elections period too, without the concerted international support, monitoring, and ultimate validation of the process, the likelihood of more widespread violence would have been far greater. The next section describes in more detail the UN's specific roles in helping to deliver this outcome.

#### 4. The UN's Roles—To what extent can the outcome be attributed to the UN's engagement?

When the UN works in close collaboration with other actors—such as the case with the joint UN/AU/ECOWAS group working on Guinea—it can be difficult to disaggregate the UN's specific impact on conflict prevention.<sup>33</sup> This is still more the case where the UN's role is largely one of support and coordination, rather than delivery of a distinct outcome. Nonetheless, looking more closely at the different roles played by the UN, and in particular the ways in which SRSJ Djinnit was able to impact the political process, there is a strong case to conclude that the UN contributed meaningfully and positively to the outcome.

##### *From Early Warning to In-Country Presence*

SRSJ Djinnit and the UN more generally were engaged on Guinea well before the 28 September massacre. In fact, a joint UN-ECOWAS mission to Guinea in July 2008, prior to the military coup, found that there were signs to justify concern that the country was drifting closer to civil war than it was in January 2007. This early engagement with the crisis was made more efficient by the presence and support of the UN's regional office UNOWA. In fact, UNOWA's longstanding presence in the region—since 2002—meant the UN already had a track record of preventive diplomacy in other relevant settings, including alongside ECOWAS. While difficult to prove, there was a sense among some experts that this was helpful in allowing the UN to be an early, credible voice of alarm, and also to establish relationships with the key parties. The active work of the UN Resident Coordinator's Office in Conakry too helped build strong relationships with key actors on the ground.<sup>34</sup> And Djinnit's frequent visits to Guinea, which increased after the September massacre, meant that he was well-positioned to help broker talks when the opportunity arose.<sup>35</sup>

Beyond the early warning role, the UN decided in June 2010 to base a senior mediation advisor from UNOWA permanently in Conakry. This was followed by President Compaoré's decision to appoint a special representative based in Guinea, both of whom were funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund. Having a constant presence in Conakry meant that the mediation kept its finger on the pulse of the parties and the situation, and was able to act quickly to events on the ground at a very volatile time. It also helped maintain the mediation's legitimacy: rather than seen as an outside entity "parachuting" in, the in-country presence of mediation-related personnel at a senior level appeared to reassure the parties.

##### *Keeping the Junta Engaged*

The AU's reaction to Camara's announcement on the presidency was punitive, moving the situation quickly towards sanctions and isolating approaches. Following the 28

September massacre, the AU and ECOWAS took even more direct steps to punish and isolate the junta, while the EU imposed embargoes on the country and the US put in place travel bans on key junta leaders.<sup>36</sup> Amidst widespread calls for the junta leadership to face justice for the massacre, and a newly opened ICC investigation into the matter, Camara and his group were increasingly isolated.

In this context, there was a role for the UN in playing a more moderate, bridging role with the junta in particular. For example, in the wake of strident condemnations by the AU and ECOWAS of Camara's intention to stand in the election, the UN Secretary-General issued a far more moderate statement, merely calling for a "peaceful and democratic transfer of power."<sup>37</sup> Nor did the UN impose sanctions on Guinea during the crisis (though this may have had more to do with internal Security Council dynamics than a concerted effort to take a moderate line on the junta). While the UN did lead the commission of inquiry into the massacre, it did so with the consent of Camara himself.

The effect was that the UN appeared to keep the junta leadership from becoming too isolated. As the above analysis demonstrated, the AU's sanctions did not seem to influence the CNDD meaningfully, other than perhaps to make it even more stubborn in its positions. In contrast, SRSJ Djinnit's concerted efforts to keep lines of communication open and maintain direct contact—more than 45 visits to Guinea during the crisis period—helped keep the junta engaged in the talks.

##### *Broadening the Buy-In*

During the negotiations, the UN (both the mediation and the Country Team) took active steps to include actors from Guinean society outside the elite political and military leadership. This included regular meetings with women's organizations, direct support to civil society platforms and local dialogues, and mobilization of funding for peacebuilding initiatives at local level in many parts of the country.<sup>38</sup> Support by the UN Resident Coordinator's office for women's participation in elections monitoring is another example of broadening participation.<sup>39</sup>

Importantly, the mediation included security sector reform as a confidence-building measure in the negotiations in Ouagadougou. This had two positive impacts: it reassured the armed forces that they would receive continued support through and after the transition, and it also reassured the *Forces Vives* that the transition would be focused on improving the conduct of the security services. This latter point was especially relevant for the broader population, many of whom had suffered at the hands of the army in the 28 September massacre.



### *Building and Maintaining Unity*

Because SRSG Djinnit was already heading UNOWA before the 2009 crisis broke out, the UN was positioned early to build and coordinate the mediation effort. Under SRSG Djinnit's leadership, the early mediation efforts were brought together, including the development of joint messaging across the UN, AU and ECOWAS. Following the appointment of President Compaoré to lead the ECOWAS effort, SRSG Djinnit moved into a more supportive and advisory role, proposing mediation strategies to the group and providing reports from their team in Conakry. Part of keeping the mediation well-coordinated and coherent was logistical too: UN flights between Ouagadougou and Conakry were crucial in allowing the mediation frequent contact with the parties and in connecting the mediation teams at key moments.<sup>40</sup>

### *Delivering Justice*

It was the UN that despatched an ASG-level official to Guinea to scope out a possible International Commission of Inquiry following the 28 September massacre, and the UN Security Council that eventually authorized the Commission. The launching of the Commission appeared to increase pressure on the CNDD and accentuate the cracks already visible in the ruling junta. It met one of *Forces Vives'* key demands regarding accountability for the massacre, and also laid the groundwork for further post-conflict justice measures to address the impunity problem in Guinea. As such, the UN's approach to justice sent an important message that events like the massacre would not be allowed to go unnoticed by the international community; this may have constrained further violence.

There are potential longer-term impacts of the transitional justice measures (described below), but it is worth pointing out here that the Commission's work contributed to the ICC's eventual indictment of Camara for his role in the September 2009 massacre, sending a strong message about accountability to the Guinean population.<sup>41</sup>

### *Technical Support to the Elections*

The UN provided significant technical and logistical support to the national elections process, deploying additional staff and experts through the electoral period. This was in addition to significant logistical and financial support to the mediation process itself, and also more than USD 12 million to support the broader implementation of the Ouagadougou Accord. This financial and technical support was instrumental in the eventual conduct of the elections. As SRSG Djinnit wrote during the run-off elections, "the sense prevails that the technical requirements are generally met and that there is room for no more excuses or further delay." And delay was a major risk factor for the overall process, as the US representative said at the time, "if the presidential election does not take place on 27 June 2010, it will never occur."

Especially facing reluctant—and even at times obstructionist—political officials, the technical support eliminated a key risk of delay in the elections.

### *Moral Pressure/Acceptance*

There were key moments when President Konaté appeared ready to resign the interim presidency, an event which would have put the entire transition process in jeopardy and thrown the situation into a much riskier phase. In these moments, SRSG Djinnit appeared able to appeal to Konaté's desire to be seen as a saviour to Guinea, and to offer public praise as an inducement to positive actions.

More generally, there was a role for the UN in publicizing both the positive and negative actions taken by the parties. The Commission of Inquiry's findings on culpability for the 28 September massacre was one such moment.<sup>42</sup> Equally, the Security Council's welcome of the 15 January Ouagadougou Agreement sent a strong positive signal to the parties that they would be rewarded for their constructive positions, bolstered by the almost immediate restoration of bilateral aid by the US and France.<sup>43</sup>

### *The UN Contribution to Preventing Violence*

Each of the above roles and contributions of the UN, by itself, likely did not play a determinative role in preventing escalation into more widespread violence during the crisis period. However, taken together, they indicate that the UN was able to help provide the conflict actors with the space to resolve the core issues driving the risks at the time, leverage (through moral authority and via coordinated international approaches) to push the parties towards more constructive negotiating positions, and concrete assurances that the key interests and demands of the parties would be met. In this, the UN's provision of financial, logistical and advisory support played a clearly positive role in delivering the outcome.

## **5. Success Factors—What enabled and/or inhibited the UN's capacity to contribute to preventing violence?**

While the above section argues that the UN did play an important preventive role, this section asks what enabled and/or inhibited that role, and what steps the UN took to increase its impact on the situation.

### *Access and Relationships*

The UN's pre-existing presence in the region, SRSG Djinnit's frequent travel to Conakry and Ouagadougou, and the decision to establish a permanent mediation presence in Guinea all combined to give the UN very strong access and relationships with the parties. This was especially important as the AU and ECOWAS took steps to isolate the junta, meaning the UN could play a crucial bridging role.

The personal characteristics of SRSJ Djinnit were a clear positive element in this regard. Beyond his status as an accomplished diplomat in the region, his previous role as Peace and Security Commissioner for the AU and his central role in development the AU's Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government meant that he was easily able to work alongside AU and ECOWAS envoys and provide meaningful advice to all involved.

#### *Willingness of the Parties to Accept a UN Role*

While the CNDD was sometimes reluctant for the mediation to intervene, overall both sides showed a clear willingness for the UN presence and activities in Guinea. Perhaps the strongest evidence of this was Camara's consent for the UN-led Commission of Inquiry into the September massacre—while in part motivated by his own concerns about the ICC, it also showed a relatively strong readiness to accept international involvement in the crisis. Other steps too, such as the readiness of both *Forces Vives* and CNDD to travel to Ouagadougou for talks, the acceptance of the UN mediation's permanent presence in Conakry, and the acceptance of the joint UN/AU/ECOWAS proposal in January 2010, all evidence a willingness for the UN to play a role. It is worth highlighting that this too may well have related to SRSJ Djinnit's personal standing in the region, as well as that of UNOWA, which by that point had become part of the sub-regional peace and security architecture.

#### *Unity Regionally and Internationally*

The creation of the International Contact Group for Guinea was an important step that consolidated and maintained international/regional unity through the crisis. This unity was not always a given—in fact, behind the scenes in the AU there were widely disparate positions on how to deal with Guinea.<sup>44</sup> But in terms of the approach to the mediation, the public messaging that came out of the Security Council, the African Union and ECOWAS was well-coordinated and unified. Even on the fairly contentious issues of transitional justice and the ICC, there was general unanimity in the need for an international inquiry and accountability. Overall, the message of the international and regional entities was clear and forceful: there will be public rewards for constructive behavior—e.g. removal of sanctions, restoration of bilateral aid, support to security sector reform—and penalties for obstructive or dangerous actions.

#### *Diplomacy Plus Dollars*

The UN's ability to provide significant funding and other support to the mediation process should not be underestimated. UN flights transported the parties and the mediation in and out of Conakry, UN funds supported the establishment of permanent mediation presences in Conakry, UN logistical and technical support contributed directly

to timely, credible elections. In fact, UN support was more crucial than in many other situations, because the post-coup severance of relationship by major bilateral donors meant that often the UN was the only available source of funds.

In this context, the support of the Resident Coordinator system and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) were significant. The RC raised USD 12.8 million between 2007-10, roughly USD 15 million in 2011, and the Peacebuilding Commission generate more than USD 48 million for SSR, national reconciliation and jobs for youth and women in the wake of the Ouagadougou agreement of January 2010.<sup>45</sup> These funds significantly boosted implementation of the political agreement between the parties, and also showed a good faith effort by the international community to reward the parties for their agreement.

#### *Pure Chance*

While the above analysis has made a case for a wide range of factors that helped the UN play a role in preventing widespread violence in the 2009-10 crisis period, chance was perhaps the most important of all. The assassination attempt against Camara that triggered his flight from the country opened the door to a mediation process that had otherwise hit a dead end. At the time of the assassination attempt, the parties' positions were apparently unbridgeable, and there is a real possibility that the situation would have devolved into violence.

However, the fact that the UN was present, had established relationships, had a strong standing in country, and had built the necessary frameworks for diplomacy (the Contact Group) meant that when the unpredictable moment arose, the UN was ready to act.

### **6. Sustainability—How was the prevention effort linked to addressing longer-term structural causes of violence?**

Less than a year after the election of Alpha Condé to the presidency of Guinea, international warnings of the risks of renewed violence sounded remarkably similar to those leading up to the 2009 crisis. In the wake of another attempted military coup on the presidency in July 2011, International Crisis Group warned that rising tensions ahead of legislative elections could spark inter-ethnic violence. Early in his tenure, President Condé had taken several worrying decisions, appointing former junta leaders to key positions, releasing members of Camara's inner circle widely considered to have blood on their hands, and taking very few concrete actions to implement the ambitious security sector reform process for the more than 45,000 member army.<sup>46</sup> Perhaps most worrying, Crisis Group argued that the 2010 elections process "gave new impetus to the idea that Guinea's history is a struggle between its four major ethno-regional blocs."<sup>47</sup>

Economically, while some positive steps were taken to increase regulatory controls, curb corruption, and address the ballooning costs of basic goods in the wake of the inflation during the crisis, in 2011 experts warned of a “looming economic disaster.”<sup>48</sup> Subsequent economic shocks—driven by the Ebola crisis and the drop in costs of commodities—meant that Guinea suffered further downturns in living standards and development through 2014 and 2015.<sup>49</sup> The 2016 decision of the multinational corporation Rio Tinto to abandon its \$20 billion extraction project in Guinea put 50,000 jobs at risk and sent a strong signal that Guinea’s political instability was impacting its economic future. Given that economic conditions were a major trigger of the 2009 crisis, these developments are worrying.

Politically, the hoped-for transition towards open, pluralistic, peaceful elections has been far from ideal. More than two years after President Condé took power, hotly contested legislative elections led to violent street protests and results still disputed by a large number of opposition parties. The 2015 presidential elections too, in which Condé narrowly won a second term, were marred by further violence, with EU observers citing “massive deficiencies” in the process.<sup>50</sup> Even as of the writing of this study, local elections in February 2018 triggered serious violence in Conakry and beyond, resulting in multiple deaths and a widespread strike by opposition groups and their allies.<sup>51</sup>

It would be unrealistic to burden the 2009-10 preventive diplomatic engagement with all of these negative trends in Guinea today. In fact, the above analysis indicates that the UN took meaningful steps to ensure that the elite bargain of January 2010 was more than just a band-aid: the inclusion of SSR, and the funding of programs to improve the inclusion of women and youth in the implementation of the agreement, both evidence an attempt to link the short-term agreement with longer-term sustainability.

One of the potential issues to consider is the extent to which the Ouagadougou agreement may have missed the ethnic and the socio-economic dimensions of the conflict in Guinea. In fact, the arrangements of the 2010 elections could have had the unintended consequence of hardening inter-ethnic fault lines, potentially pushing voters more solidly into their own ethnic blocs.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, while it was laudable to have included SSR in the Ouagadougou agreement, reform of the security services was clearly insufficient to address the widespread problems of corruption, inequality and rising costs of living in Guinea. Again, while it is unrealistic to demand that the mediation should have comprehensively addressed these issues, the question of how better to tie the political activity with these underlying drivers of conflict is something to consider in future interventions.

## 7. Conclusions/Recommendations

As with many cases of preventive diplomacy, it is difficult to claim that the intervention in Guinea was a success, especially as Conakry continues to suffer from the same kind of politically- and ethnically-driven violence that drove the country into crisis in 2009. However, as the above analysis has demonstrated, some of the UN’s approaches and activities did work well in heading off the imminent risk of widespread violence at the time and should be considered for future interventions.

**1) UNOWA(S) Works:** In terms of its early warning, access and continuous support to the mediation, UNOWA played a crucial role in ensuring an effective UN intervention. Of note was the deployment of a UNOWA-affiliated senior mediation adviser to Conakry on a permanent basis. UNOWA has since been renamed UNOWAS, in recognition of its broader role on the Sahel. Continuing to consider how the preventive capacities of UNOWAS could be strengthened, including via dedicated mediation capacities, is worth considering in the future. And comparing the UNOWAS experience to those regional centres that have not enjoyed as many successes might also be useful.

**2) Transitional Justice Can Work:** In some of the other cases considered elsewhere, there was an apparent tension between the need to uphold human rights standards while also maintaining good relations and access to the parties.<sup>53</sup> The Guinea case is a clear example where the targeted use of justice tools—the International Commission of Inquiry, the ICC and bilateral sanctions linked to human rights violations—did not appear to negatively impact the UN’s access or standing with the parties. In contrast, there is a compelling argument that bold justice approaches helped, gave leverage to the mediation, and assured the opposition parties that their concerns would be addressed.<sup>54</sup>

**3) Strategic Coordination Builds Leverage:** The early, strong, and effective coordination of UN, AU and ECOWAS throughout the mediation stands out as a key factor in the success of the process. In this context, the formation of the International Contact Group for Guinea was also important, allowing the mediation to feed a broader influential group, and sending a strong message that the international community remained engaged on the issue. The above analysis also shows the utility of coordination between the mediation and the efforts of the UNCT on the ground, the latter of which raised significant funds to support the Ouagadougou Agreement.

**4) The Economy Isn’t a Side Issue:** Popular discontent leading to the 2009 crisis was driven by an economic downturn that meant Guineans were unable to afford fuel and rice, a situation they (rightly) blamed on corruption and poor governance. While the transitional arrangements put in place by the January 2010 Ouagadougou Agreement were crucial

in setting the course for political change, in the years that have followed the economy has continued to suffer. Some of that results from external shocks—the Ebola crisis and the international commodities market—but it also raises the question how to tie political agreements more concretely to economic governance reforms. Having a strong sense of the socio-economic drivers of conflict, and trying to build stronger connections between the short-term political processes and longer-term structural support (especially by the World Bank), is an area for further reflection by the Organization.

**5) SSR Needs Sustained Efforts:** It was a significant breakthrough that the mediation included security sector reform in the 2010 Ouagadougou Agreement, one that gave some reassurances to both sides. But as became evident in the period following the crisis, broad commitment to SSR does not necessarily translate into improvements on the ground. Thinking through how to link a political level agreement on reform to more concrete plans and capacities, may be an important area of further thought for the UN.

**6) Luck Matters:** The assassination attempt against Camara was a dangerous moment, but an extraordinary stroke of luck for Guinea's trajectory in 2009. An event like that cannot be planned for. But the UN's regional presence and its strong, capable leadership at the time meant it was able to respond when the opportunity arose. The UN should consider how early planning for preventive diplomacy could complement these approaches, making the Organization even more responsive in future crises.

**7) National Agency:** There were a range of moments when national actors took brave decisions for the best interest of their country. Days after suffering at the hands of the security services, the willingness of the **Forces Vives** to meet face to face with the junta was admirable. National media actors who proactively broadcast the leaders' messages of peace ahead of the elections went against the approach of many media agencies worldwide to drum up fears and divisions. And women's groups that mobilized for peace often did so across longstanding ethnic and social divides. This case study is focused on the role of the international community, but ultimately it was the bravery and difficult decisions of the Guineans themselves that got them through the crisis.

## Endnotes

Cover Image: Said Djinnit, Special Representative for West Africa briefs on Elections in Guinea and Niger. UN Photo/ Devra Berkowitz

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- 1 A previous joint UN-ECOWAS mission to Guinea in July 2008 had found that “there are many signs to justify concern that the country is drifting closer to civil war than it was in January 2007.”
- 2 [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr\\_20072008\\_en\\_complete.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf).
- 3 Kikolar, Naomi, “Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the Responsibility to Prevent in Practice,” in *Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention*, Edited by Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh, Oxford University Press, 2015. For a broader description of the colonial impact upon Guinea’s socio-economic sphere, see also Arandel, Derick, et al, “Reducing fragility through strengthening local governance in Guinea,” *Third World Quarterly*, June 2015, page 989 et seq.
- 4 For a more thorough discussion of ethnic identity in Guinea, see Bah, Mamadou Diouma, “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Escaping Ethnic-based Armed Conflict in Guinea,” *African Identities*, February 2016, page 299.
- 5 The decision to appoint a civilian Prime Minister, Mr. Kabiné Komara, on 30 December was similarly seen as evidence of Camara’s commitment to civilian rule.
- 6 Call, Charles, “UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after Constitutional Crises,” IPI, 2009. See also, International Crisis Group, ‘Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun’, *Africa Briefing*, No. 58, 5 March 2009.
- 7 Institute for Security Studies, ‘Country Analysis: Republic of Guinea’, *Peace and Security Council Report*, No. 13 (Addis Ababa: Institute for Security Studies, 2010), p. 17; see also, Kikolar, Naomi, “Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the Responsibility to Prevent in Practice,” in *Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention*, Edited by Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh, Oxford University Press, 2015. See also, Security Council Report, ‘Update Report No. 3: Peace Consolidation in West Africa Guinea’, 11 January 2010. Available at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-gIKWLeMTIsG-b-5717287.php?print=true>
- 8 <https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/01/400052-guinea-bissau-ban-calls-proper-transfer-power-after-leaders-death>.
- 9 Full membership of the Contact Group was the UN, the European Union (EU), the African Members of the UN Security Council, la Francophonie, and the Mano River Union. See, UNSC, ‘Letter Dated 11 March 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso’, S/2009/104, 12 March 2009. Available at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Coup%20S%202009%20140.pdf>. See also United Nations Department of Political Affairs, ‘Guinea’. Available at: [http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities\\_by\\_region/africa/guinea](http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/guinea).
- 10 The New York Times, ‘Coup Leaders in Guinea Agree to Hold Election in 2009’, 5 January 2009. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/05/world/africa/05iht-06guinea.19098198.html>.
- 11 Kikolar, Naomi, “Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the Responsibility to Prevent in Practice,” in *Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention*, Edited by Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh, Oxford University Press, 2015.
- 12 Crisis Group, “Guinea: Military Rule Must End,” *Africa Briefing* N°66, 16 October 2009, available at <https://www.crisis-group.org/africa/west-africa/guinea/guinea-military-rule-must-end>. See also, Kikolar, Naomi, “Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the Responsibility to Prevent in Practice,” in *Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention*, Edited by Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh, Oxford University Press, 2015.
- 13 Human Rights Watch, ‘Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated’, 27 October 2009. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/27/guinea-september-28-massacre-was-premeditated>; Human Rights Watch, *Guinea: Stadium Massacre, Rape Likely Crimes Against Humanity, 2009* <https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/12/17/guinea-stadium-massacre-rape-likely-crimes-against-humanity>; see also, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office for West Africa, S/2009/682.
- 14 Including former UN SRSG Francois Fall, who was arrested.
- 15 The sanctions regime included visa bans, travel restrictions and the freezing of assets.
- 16 <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLT440627>.
- 17 Despite a concern voiced by Russia regarding a perceived lack of clarity on the process for setting up the Commission, and a statement from Colonel Qaddafi, then Chair of the AU, opposing the UN’s initiative, the ICI was welcomed by the AU Peace and Security Council, ECOWAS Heads of State, and the UN Security Council, as well as Guineans themselves. The Secretary-General then established the commission of inquiry into the events, led by the Office of the High Commis-

- sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) with the support of the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of Legal Affairs.
- 18 According to some experts within DPA, it was the threat of possible action by the International Criminal Court (ICC) further down the road coupled, possibly with a lack of understanding of international accountability mechanisms, which spurred Dadis Camara into accepting the Commission.
- 19 SRSJ Djinnit, Dr. Chambas of ECOWAS and Mr. Fall of the AU.
- 20 In fact, Camara thought he had been flying to Conakry when Compaoré apparently arranged for the flight to be diverted to Ouagadougou.
- 21 <http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9863.doc.htm>.
- 22 Call, Charles, "UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after Constitutional Crises," IPI, 2009.
- 23 Secretary-General's Report on the UN Office in West Africa, S/2009/682.
- 24 Kikolar, Naomi, "Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the Responsibility to Prevent in Practice," in *Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention*, Edited by Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh, Oxford University Press, 2015.
- 25 The results were former Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo of Union des Forces Democratiques de Guinee (UFDG) in first place with 44 % of the vote, followed by veteran opposition leader Alpha Condé of the Rassemblement du Peuple Guineen (RPG) with 18 %, and Sidya Toure of Union des Forces Republicaines (UFR) with 13 %.
- 26 At Djinnit's initiative, the Contact Group received the two presidential candidates on Friday, 5 November, who agreed to publicly commit to a peaceful election and call on their supporters to refrain from violence.
- 27 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/16/guinea-violence-election-alpha-conde>.
- 28 According to some experts within DPA, it was the threat of possible action by the International Criminal Court (ICC) further down the road coupled, possibly with a lack of understanding of international accountability mechanisms, which spurred Dadis Camara into accepting the Commission.
- 29 Crisis Group, "Guinea: Military Rule Must End," Africa Briefing N°66, 16 October 2009, available at <https://www.crisis-group.org/africa/west-africa/guinea/guinea-military-rule-must-end>.
- 30 Crisis Group, "Guinea: Military Rule Must End," Africa Briefing N°66, 16 October 2009, available at <https://www.crisis-group.org/africa/west-africa/guinea/guinea-military-rule-must-end>.
- 31 For example, the US and France restored bilateral assistance immediately after the Ouagadougou agreement, and the EU dropped some of the harsher sanctions on Guinea.
- 32 Fabienne Hara, "Preventive Diplomacy in Africa: Adapting to New Realities," International Crisis Group, available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/preventive-diplomacy-africa-adapting-new-realities>.
- 33 See the Centre for Policy Research's Assessment Framework, discussing the difficulties of attribution in complex mediation settings.
- 34 See Centre for Policy Research case study on Resident Coordinator-led prevention in Guinea.
- 35 As Fabienne Hara notes in her International Crisis Group article 'Preventive Diplomacy in Africa: Adapting to New Realities,' UNOWA played an important role in supporting the preventive mediation efforts. Available at <https://www.crisis-group.org/africa/preventive-diplomacy-africa-adapting-new-realities>.
- 36 <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLT440627>
- 37 <http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9863.doc.htm>.
- 38 Call, Charles, "UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after Constitutional Crises," IPI, 2009.
- 39 See Centre for Policy Research forthcoming case study on Resident Coordinator-led prevention in Guinea (on file).
- 40 See, Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results, SG Report, available at <http://www.un.org/undpa/sites/www.un.org-undpa/files/SG%20Report%20on%20Preventive%20Diplomacy.pdf> ("When the Security Council forms a common vision for addressing a situation of concern, as it did in the case of Guinea's constitutional crisis in 2009 and 2010 and the Southern Sudan 2011 independence referendum, it has proven its effectiveness in generating political momentum and engaging with key interlocutors in pursuit of a common strategy.").
- See also, Call, Charles, "UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after Constitutional Crises," IPI, 2009. "The UN played an important role in facilitating the mediation efforts until the appointment by ECOWAS of President Compaoré, whom Mr. Djinnit then played an active and key role in supporting. Mr. Djinnit and his staff proposed mediation strategies to the other mediators, keeping them informed of developments, calling them frequently, picking them up with the UN airplane that proved crucial for his work, and ensuring the support of the diplomatic community for a united regional-subregional-UN effort."
- 41 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guinea-politics/guineas-ex-junta-leader-indicted-over-stadium-massacre-idUSKCN0PJ05G20150709>
- 42 <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/report-of-the-international-commission-of-inquiry-mandated-to-establish-the-facts-and-circumstances-of-the-events-of-28-september-2009-in-guinea/>.
- 43 <http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9863.doc.htm>
- 44 International Crisis Group, Guinea: Putting the Transition Back on Track, Africa Report N°178 – 23 September 2011.

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- 45 Evaluation du portefeuille de projets du fonds de consolidation de la paix en Guinée, Contrat no. PD/CO183/16, Transtec, 13 Juillet 2017.
  - 46 International Crisis Group, Guinea: Putting the Transition Back on Track, Africa Report N°178 – 23 September 2011.
  - 47 Ibid.
  - 48 Ibid.
  - 49 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guinea/overview>.
  - 50 <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21673650-things-could-turn-nasty-after-disputed-poll-fingers-crossed-guinea>.
  - 51 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/february-2018#guinea>.
  - 52 International Crisis Group, "Guinea: A Way Out of the Election Quagmire," available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/guinea/guinea-way-out-election-quagmire>.
  - 53 See, e.g., the Centre for Policy Research case study on the southern Sudan referendum, which discusses how the ICC warrant acted to isolate Khartoum from international engagement.
  - 54 Camara was indicted by the ICC. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/07/503822-un-envoy-welcomes-indictment-former-guinean-leader-over-2009-stadium-deaths>.