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The Importance of Understanding, Projecting and Planning for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

Policy Report

2018

This report aims to contribute towards the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular focus towards:

- SDG 1 – No poverty: End poverty in all its forms everywhere.
- SDG 8 – Decent Work and Economic Growth: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.
- SDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

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Summary

This policy report aims to highlight the importance of understanding, projecting and planning for forced migration. By projecting forced migration, future migration crises could be avoided and their negative effects on humanity in general and on societies in particular could be transformed into safe, orderly and regular migration. In particular, this policy brief focuses on the projection of forced migration through regional scenarios of the osmosis model of migration. Based on migration pressure and border permeability, regional scenarios could project the force, the trajectory, and the settlement of forced migrants. In the Syrian case, migration pressure and border permeability have explained the trajectory and the settlement of the Syrian refugees in countries and cities. As a result, the policy brief sheds light on the feasibility and the importance of projecting and planning in order to transform refugee crises into safe, orderly and regular migration.

‘Trying to block migrants won’t work.

Europe needs a realistic plan’¹

Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants insists on the importance of saving the lives of refugees directly or by finding long-term and sustainable solutions. In addition, the reports acknowledge the shared responsibility to manage refugees and migrant flows in a humanistic manner. This same declaration highlights the need to understand the root causes of refugees and migrants’ large movements in order to avoid crises situations based on early preventive diplomacy.

‘We are committed to protecting the safety, dignity and human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migratory status, at all times. We will cooperate closely to facilitate and ensure safe, orderly and regular migration...’

(The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 2016)

¹ The Guardian (2017)

Based on the New York Declaration, the Zero Draft of the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR) (2018) has insisted on sharing the burden and the support of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. In order to achieve this last goal, the GCR outlines the importance of three points: the reception and admission, meeting needs and supporting communities, and finding solutions.

In the same vein, the final draft of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration recommends that migration works for all when it takes place in a well-informed, planned and consensual manner. In this global report, the heads of states, governments and high representatives have determined 23 objectives for safe, orderly, and regular migration. The first part insists on the collection of timely information about migration and its drivers in order to protect migrants. The second part concerns the inclusion and the integration of the migrants, and the last part is about migration and development.

In the second part of the second objective, titled ‘Natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation’, the report insists on:

‘Strengthening joint analysis and sharing of information to better map, understand, predict and address migration movements, such as those that may result from sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, environmental degradation, as well as other precarious situations, while ensuring the effective respect, protection and fulfilment of the human rights of all migrants.’

(GC, 2018)

In addition, this report demonstrates the importance of displacement considerations into disaster-preparedness strategies and promotes cooperation with neighbouring and other relevant countries. The aim of such cooperation is to prepare for early warning, contingency planning, coordination mechanisms, evacuation planning, reception and assistance arrangements, and public information. The Global Compact also highlights the need for harmonisation and the development of coherent approaches and mechanisms at the sub regional and regional levels to address the vulnerabilities of forced migrants.

According to the same report, the development of coherent approaches to address the challenges of migration movements in the context of sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters is vital for safe orderly and regular migration. In the fifth objective, in order to enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration, the report highlights the importance of the review and the revision of the existing options and pathways. Similarly, the eighth objective focuses on their commitment to save lives and prevent migrant deaths and injuries through international cooperation.

During the Syrian migration crisis, refugees have died, others have been lost, and many have become victims of human trafficking due to their vulnerability. In addition, social tension, xenophobia and racism have risen between refugees and natives, and the concerned countries have experienced economic losses and political tensions. Therefore, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration wants to avoid a new migration crisis, or at least be ready for it. According to this report, international cooperation could at least minimise the harmful effects of such crisis on the forced migrants and the concerned countries, and transform it into a win-win migration. To do so, timely information could be helpful and early warning is necessary; however, predicting a migration crisis is the key for the safe, orderly, and regular migration.

The Relevance of Understanding Forced Migration

Peter Drucker believes that *'if you can't measure it, you can't improve it'*, and in reality, if you cannot understand it you can never measure it. In fact, there are no special theories that can explain the volumes and trajectories of forced migration, and researchers explain forced migration by the standard migration theories (Zolberg (1983), Suhrke (1994), Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguyo (1989), Schmeidl (2001)). By dividing migration into voluntary and forced, Boswell (2002) combined the factors of refugees' movements, and according to him, the previous studies suffer from one of two deficiencies. The first relates to their inability to provide 'systematic categorisation of the causes and dynamics of migration and refugee flows, or the temporal sequence linking these different factors' (Boswell, 2002). According to Boswell (2002), such typology will be indispensable as a basis for defining the nature, sequencing and possible impact of policy responses. The second deficiency is the impossibility of their application and transformation into real and useful policies. The majority of these studies fail to connect the causes of the different levels and types of forced migration in order to conclude recommendations (Boswell, 2002).

'Most studies fail to link accounts of causes to different levels and types of EU policy response. Where they do discuss policy responses, most simply give a list of possible instruments, assuming they will all have a generally benign impact.'

(Boswell, 2002)

The existing theories of international migration are embedded in their respective disciplines (geography, sociology, or economics), and in addition, they focus on a special level of analysis (Micro, Meso, or Macro). Forced migration is the inverse of voluntary migration. According to IOM, it is 'a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects).'² Based on this definition, forced migration could be a result of geographic, social, economic and/or even political determinants. Furthermore, its effects concern both the migrants themselves as well as the different sides of concerned societies. This is why the existing theories could not be used to adequately explain forced migration.

As migration is not well understood, the existing policy reports could not consider the possibility of making projections about the subject. The majority of them focus on the integration of forced migrants rather than their journey to reach their destinations. A number of policy reports (EUKN, 2012) provide general recommendations for countries and cities about the integration of new immigrants.

The immigration countries, based on their own experience,³ could plan and organise infrastructures for the expected immigrants before their arrival. Naturally unaccountable and unexpected, what about the forced migrants? How can countries and cities anticipate their arrival? What are the targeted cities? Apart from a few initiatives, (UNESCO (2016), Delvino (2017)), the existing reports insist on the inclusion rather than the integration of irregular migrants. As the regulation process takes time, the presence of the irregular migrants in cities

² <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>

³ The annual flows of labour migration and the number of foreign students that will stay and work in the local labour market.

creates tension, and in some cases conflicts that make their regulation and integration more complicated.

In general, understanding migration is of great importance for safe, orderly and regular migration. Understanding forced migration through a unifying forecast (including the different disciplines, analysis levels and typologies) would lead to more in depth research around the subject and, consequently, could predict it.

Projecting Forced Migration: Is it possible?

Projecting forced migration crises is the key for safe, orderly and regular migration. In reality, this task seems impossible, which is what discourages researchers from working on it. If we cannot understand migration, we cannot understand the forced type and, consequently, we can never predict it. In an essay, Djelti (2017b) explained migration force by the difference of migration pressure between countries and its direction by border permeability (Djelti, 2018). Based on the osmosis analogy, this study considers migration as a spontaneous phenomenon that happens from a country with less migration pressure to a country with high migration pressure. Migration pressure is the stage of the evolution of the natural determinants of human migration combination in a limited space. According to the author, water availability, climate, security, and population density are the natural determinants considered as the drivers of the old and the new migrations (Djelti, 2017a).

Regarding border permeability, this theory defines it as ‘the degree of the openness of borders or the capacity of borders to permit inflows or out flows of migration’ (Djelti, 2018). According to this study, the border permeability degree is the result of two inverse forces: control policy and migration networks. Control policy decreases the permeability of borders, while migration networks increase their permeability.


This study explains migration in general and forced migration as a special case. In practice, Djelti (2018) focuses on the explanation of the dynamic and trajectory of forced migration. In addition, by using migration pressure differences and borders’ permeability, the author demonstrated that the Afghan refugees first crossed the most permeable borders in the direction of the safest countries and then continued their journey to the high migration pressure countries.

Anticipating a natural disaster or a conflict is very difficult – and impossible in some cases. An earthquake or a political decision could cause a migration crisis anywhere at any time. By using the previous forced migration logic, the study predicts that regional scenarios could project the force and the trajectory of forced migration. For instance, in the case of conflict in a given county, the force of forced migration will be correlated to the migration pressure difference and its direction depends on the border permeability level. Practically, this study has been checked in the Afghan case, yet what about the Syrian migration crisis?

The Syrian Migration Crisis

In Syria, pro-democracy protests started in March 2011 and evolved into civil war. According to the United Nations, 90,000 people had been killed by June 2013 and 250,000 by August 2015. The figure below shows that the level of insecurity in Syria from the beginning of the protests in March 2011 until 2012 was considerable. It reached the top in the second half of 2012 and then started to decrease slowly until 2015.

Figure 1: Insecurity Level Measured by the Number of Kills



Source: Violations Documentation Centre, Syrian Shuhada, Syrian Network for Human Rights, Syrian Centre for Statistics and Research

At the beginning of this civil war,⁴ due to fear, people fled their homes. At this stage, the Syrian refugees were divided into two groups: the first one represents those who can emigrate – and have the possibility to choose their destination – while the second group includes those who are not able to move directly to a safe place. The majority of these refugees try to move as soon as possible to the nearest safest place – meaning that in the first stage, Syrian refugees did not decide whether to cross the internal or the international borders, or to reach poor or wealthy countries; all that mattered for them was to reach a safe place. This migration continues with the prolongation and the expansion of the conflict.

Figure 2: Syrian Refugees in the Receiving Countries in 2011




Source: The Refugees Project <http://www.therefugeeproject.org/#/2011/SYR>

⁴ The study of Suhrke (1994) reveals that forced migration is strongly correlated to the level of violence. He concluded that the macro determinants are more dominant than meso ones in the case of forced migration.

The map shows the distribution of Syrian refugees in the destination countries. In the early stage of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the number of refugees started to increase. In the neighbouring countries, Turkey hosts only nine refugees, Iraq 69, Jordan five, and Lebanon 60. Regarding the developed countries, Italy hosts 51, France 71, USA 63, Canada 29, UK 194, and Austria 398. It is clear that the developed countries have hosted most of the Syrian refugees compared with the neighbouring countries in the first stage of the crisis.

Figure 3: Syrian Refugees in the Receiving Countries in 2016



Source: Syrian crisis map 2016, image courtesy of the UNHCR

Four years later, the dispersion of Syrian refugees had radically changed. In the second stage of the Syrian migration crisis, it is clear that the majority were concentrated in the neighbouring countries. Even Iraq – with higher levels of insecurity – represented a destination for the Syrian refugees. This shows that Syrian refugees migrated out of Syria to be in a safer place, which was described by the previous study (Djelti, 2018) as the first stage of forced migration.

Figure 4: Syrian Refugees Trajectory



Source: Frontex (2015)

In the third stage, Figure 4 displays the trajectory and the settlement of the Syrian refugees in Europe. It represents a snapshot of a continued migration. The refugees' trajectory crossed the Turkish borders and split into two pathways. The first group joined Istanbul and continued their road to Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and so on, whilst the second group joined Izmir, the Greek Islands and continued their trajectory to the north. Are there any logical explanations to clarify these three stages of forced migration, these mutations among refugees' dispersion, and their trajectory?

The Syrian Forced Migration Scenarios: Myth or Reality?


Based on the osmosis analogy, Djelti (2018) presents an essay to explain forced migration dynamics and trajectory. According to this study, forced migration is triggered by the failure of security indicators due to a natural disaster or a conflict. This in turn means the increase of migration pressure in this country (region, city or district⁵), a large gap of migration pressure difference in comparison with other countries, and consequently a mass exodus of forced migrants. This study predicts that the first wave of migrants has more chance to choose their destination, while the second wave crosses the closest and the most permeable borders to be in a safe country. Regarding the continuation of forced migration, the high migration pressure in developed countries continues to shape migration flows and traces their trajectory. The author argues that these three stages of forced migration represent exactly what happened in Afghanistan's refugee case study; however, what about the Syrian case?

Firstly, as presented in the Syrian crisis evolution, the first refugees have been attracted by the Northern America countries (USA and Canada) as well as European ones (France, UK, and Italy). Based on the forced migration theory, the large gap of migration pressure is the engine of this first migration (the average of migration pressure in Syria was 55.11 before the crisis, the north American countries had an average of 25346.86 and Europe was around 393.38). Secondly, the permeability of borders – calculated by the migration networks and policy control – facilitated this migration. The North American countries hosted 71,339 Syrian migrants in 2000 while the European ones hosted 14,607 migrants in the same year. This migration network, in addition to the tolerance towards refugee immigration, results in a considerable level of permeability. Higher migration pressure and higher permeability explains the increasing emigration to North American and European countries.

During the second stage, those who are not able to emigrate directly cross the closest, safest, and most permeable border to be in secure area. This means that the neighbouring countries will be, *par excellence*, the main temporary destination for refugees. Even in this forced migration, migration pressure and border permeability play an important role in the dispersion of refugees in the neighbouring countries.

⁵ The author thinks that this model could work on the different analysis levels

Figure 5: Migration Pressure Average



Source: Djelti (2017b)

Figure 5 shows that Turkey was the country with the highest migration pressure among the neighbouring countries of Syria. In addition, with about 822 kilometres of borders, in 2009 Turkey and Syria signed an agreement about visa exemption for a less than three-month stay in Turkey. Regarding networks, in early 2011, about 6,774 Syrian migrants were living in Turkey. In practice, low control of the border between Syria and Turkey, and strong networks between the two populations, means a higher degree of border permeability. Furthermore, the geographical situation of Turkey made it not only a destination, but also a transit to the developed countries. To sum up, the highest migration pressure in Turkey and the border permeability, in addition to its northern situation,⁶ made Turkey the main destination for the Syrian refugees – with 2,715,789 in 2016.

Despite the highest migration pressure being in Iraq between 1960 and 2000, after 2003 it shut down due to the war. In 2014, the 599 km border between Syria and Iraq fell under the control of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This lower migration pressure and lower degree of permeability, in addition to the southern geographical situation, led to a decrease in the number of Syrian refugees in Iraq. Regarding Jordan, the 375 km highly controlled border⁷ in the south of Syria decreased in permeability and consequently the number of Syrian refugees in this country.

Despite the decrease of migration pressure in Lebanon, its geographical position places it alongside the countries with higher migration pressure. The borders between Syria and Lebanon run for a total length of 375 km. During the Syrian migration crisis, these borders have been open for hosting refugees. The 44,129 Syrian migrants in early 2011 showed the strength of migration networks. The Lebanese-Syrian borders have been characterised by a

⁷http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Jordan_awards_Raytheon_186_million_to_expand_border_security_999.html

high level of permeability, which is why Lebanon is ranked as the second neighbouring country hosting Syrian refugees after Turkey.

In the third stage – after the dust settles and the refugees are in a safe place – migrants continue to disperse in the direction of the highest migration pressure countries. During their journey, forced migrants have to be rational by minimising efforts and costs of migration. In other words, they have to cross the most permeable borders by minimising distance to reach their destination. The delays in their journey differs from one to another, and some of them can reach their destination in a matter of hours, while it can take years for others, and many die in the process.

In this stage, migrants are guided by migration pressure that drives them to their destination, through the most permeable and closest borders. At the macro level, the high migration pressure in the developed countries acts like a magnetic field that attracts the forced migrants. Whereas at the micro level, refugees cross the easiest and most accessible roads that cross internal as well as international borders. Through this way, the trajectory of Syrian refugees has been shaped. As demonstrated in Figure 4, the Syrian refugees have been attracted to the high migration pressure in developed countries, and as ‘the most permeable borders are those historically the most crossed in the voluntary as well as the forced migration’ (Djelti, 2018), the Syrian refugees have followed the trajectory of irregular migrants.

Figure 6: Overview of the Asian Route to the Fringes of the EU



Source: Kuschminder K, Bresser J & Siegel M (2015)


Anticipating forced migration force and trajectories through regional scenarios is what we need for a win-win migration. In doing so, forced migrants will be helped and accompanied during their journey and concerned cities as well as countries will be prepared for hosting them. Through such anticipation, the Global Compact plans for the implementation of safe, orderly and regular migration. In reality, more precision could lead to the maximisation of the GC goals, so what about the internal trajectory of forced migrant?

The Trajectory and the Settlement of Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Cities

The majority of Syrian refugees crossed the Turkish border, and once in Turkey, they were housed in camps generally situated next to the borders. In reality, out of 3,546,905 refugees in Turkey, only 210,794 are now living in these camps. The others have settled in other cities permanently, or temporarily before continuing their journey to their final destination.

By zooming into cities, the map in Figure 7 shows the distribution of Syrian refugees in the Turkish cities. Through the global view, the trajectory split in Figure 4 is clear in this new map through the settlement in the Turkish cities. The trajectory of Syrian refugees is in the direction of northern Europe through Izmir and the Greek Islands or through Istanbul and then Greece. What about the determinant of their trajectory and their stay in the Turkish cities?

Figure 7: Registered Syrian refugees by Turkish province.



Source: Directorate General of Migration Management

At the internal level, cities have borders that are not only geographical. The level of security in the city as well as the social and the economic level of the population living in this city represents their borders. The previous study predicted that refugees cross the most permeable borders in the direction of the highest migration pressure. In the case of cities, due to the lack of local statistics,⁸ the migration pressure in Turkish cities could not be measured. Regarding the estimation of the permeability of borders between cities, the fragility indicator will be considered. In other words, cities' fragility indicator will be used as a variable that reflects the border permeability of these cities. Fragile cities project⁹ developed a platform that provides visual insights into city fragility¹⁰. The fragility indicator is based on the combination of 11 selected indicators¹¹ for cities: population growth, unemployment rate, income inequality, access to services, air quality, homicide rate, political violence, terrorist killings, exposure to natural hazards, national fragility, and national armed conflicts.

In order to test the effect of migration pressure and border permeability on the shaping of the Syrian refugee trajectory, it is assumed that the most fragile cities are the most permeable

⁸ The local water reserve, the temperature average in the city, the local security indicator and the population density by cities.


⁹ <https://unu.edu/projects/resilience-and-the-fragile-city.html#outline>

¹⁰ http://datadrivenjournalism.net/featured_projects/fragile_cities_plotting_lesser_known_urban_stories

¹¹ Shortlisted from 1000 possible metrics and numerous databases, underpins the visualisation

ones. Figure 8 shows that the fragility indicator (PRC¹²) is correlated to the percentage of the Syrian refugees in the province population.

Figure 8: Fragility and Syrian Refugees Concentration



Source: Directorate General of Migration Management and Fragile Cities Platform

In the same vein, comparing the number of Syrian refugees in the Turkish cities and the fragility score of these cities revealed that, among the 81 Turkish cities, those that host the highest number of Syrian refugees (more than 70,000) are the most fragile cities. More precisely, the table in Figure 9 shows that the 14 cities that host the highest number of Syrian refugees (except Hatay Kilis and Mardin, where the most important camps are located), were ranked as level 2 fragile cities in 2010 (before the migration crisis). This finding confirms the fact that refugees cross and settle either temporarily or permanently in the most fragile cities during their migration journey. This also confirms that the refugee trajectory is shaped by crossing the more permeable international or internal borders in the direction of the high migration pressure countries.

Figure 9: Refugees' Concentration and Fragility Indicators in the Turkish Cities

	Registered	Comparison Percentage with Province Population	2010		2015	
			Fragility Level	Fragility Score	Fragility Level	Fragility Score
Istanbul	561.159	3.73%	2	2.08	2	2.09
Gaziantep	384.285	19.16%	2	2.33	3	2.50
Adana	202.676	9.14%	2	2.42	2	2.4
Izmir	137.267	3.21%	2	2.25	2	2
Kahramanmaraş	100.346	8.90%	2	2.08	2	2.20
Kayseri	74.524	5.41%	2	2.25	2	2.10
Konya	107.515	4.93%	2	2.08	2	2.10
Mersin	208.139	11.60%	2	1.9	2	1.63
Sanliufra	475.782	23.96%	2	2	2	2.33
Ankara	92.844	11.47%	2	2	2	2.30
Bursa	148.077	5.04%	2	2.09	2	2

Source: Directorate General of Migration Management and Fragile Cities Platform

¹² Press reference to conflicts indicator

The same logic of analysis works at the micro level; forced migrants – generally vulnerable – could not live in cities with high standards of living and high level of security. They are obliged to settle at least temporarily in cities and districts where they can find free or cheapest housing. In the fragile cities, refugees will be likely to find their accommodation.

In general, the Syrian case analysis could lead to a general understanding of the dynamics and the trajectories of forced migration. In addition, analysing other forced migration cases could lead to the generalisation of these findings. The main result of this analysis is that more in depth research about forced migration could provide possible methods about its projection. To sum up, projecting forced migration through the osmosis analogy is the key of the safe, orderly and regular migration. This task is now feasible through detailed research on the regional scenarios of forced migration.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Due to the increasing gap in the difference of migration pressure and border permeability in the world, migration crises will multiply and flows of voluntary and forced migrants will cross cities and countries to reach the developed countries. The governments of these countries will try to stop them. In general, such migration crises lead to human, political, social, and economic losses.

Imagine if we had understood the mechanism of forced migration, developed good indicators for both migration pressure and border permeability, and prepared regional scenarios and emergency plans before the Syrian migration crisis. The regional scenario estimates the force, the trajectory, and the settlement of the Syrian refugees. At this stage, the respective emergency plan would be ready for implementation. In addition, the neighbouring countries, destination countries, NGOs and even particular volunteers would be informed. This way, many people could be saved, and social shocks, economic loss, and political tensions could be avoided. That would be a really big step towards safe, orderly and regular migration.

This brief analysis argues that the success of safe, orderly and regular migration objectives depends on the projection of forced migration. This task, which seems impossible, could be achieved with regional scenarios. Such scenarios could anticipate the force and the trajectory of forced migrants through migration pressure and border permeability in case of natural disasters or conflicts. Such scenarios are related to emergency plans to achieve a safe, orderly and regular migration. Based on these findings, NGOs and policy makers of countries concerned with safe, orderly and regular migration should consider the importance of the following:

- Projecting forced migration by regional scenarios is of central importance for the safe, orderly and regular migration. NGOs and countries should, therefore, encourage research about this topic.
- Large diffusion of the scenario information about the force, the trajectory and the settlement of forced migrants: NGOs, policy makers and civil societies – and particularly volunteers – should be informed to be ready to help ensure a **safe migration**.
- Related emergency plans for the regional forced migration scenario: NGOs and policy makers should implement the emergency plan with the objective to **order migration**.

- Negotiations about hosting the forced migrants: concerned countries' policy makers should negotiate the hosting of forced migrants for a **regular migration**.

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