Extended Report: Global migration governance: A decade of change?

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UNU-GCM Institute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility
Global migration governance

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Global migration governance: A decade of change?

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Summary

This report offers a brief selective overview of the past decade’s developments in global migration governance. It looks at how the coming-together of three types of participants (States, civil society and international organizations) has constructed a new type of debate, with new sets of terms. It examines how these changes have affected international civil society interested in migration, both in driving civil society movement-formation, and in civil society engagement with governmental debates. To do this, it analyzes the meaning of civil society and traces how civil society engagement has developed. It presents three moments of change: 2006, 2011 and 2013 and considers key associated processes. This helps to establish ongoing priorities. The report uses: desk-based analysis, participation at key events between 2012 and 2014, as well as semi-structured interviews in 2014. Rather than aiming to be comprehensive, it offers an illustrative overview. It concludes with some recommendations for moving forward.

List of abbreviations

As this Policy Report uses a large number of abbreviations, it was considered useful to include a list of abbreviations before the report. Where presented, page numbers refer to the primary explanation of the terminology in the text.

CSD  Civil Society Day of the GFMD (p.11)
GCIM  Global Commission on International Migration (p.9)
GCM  Global Coalition on Migration (p.35)
GFMD  Global Forum on Migration and Development (p.10)
GMG  Global Migration Group (p.38)
ICMC  International Catholic Migration Commission (p.14)
INMD  International Network on Migration and Development (p.12)
IOM  International Organization for Migration (p.20)
MFA  Migrant Forum in Asia (p.34)
MRI  Migrant Rights International (p.9)
PANiDMR  Pan African Network in Defense of Migrant Rights (p.33)
PGA  People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights (p.32)
OHCHR  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
SG  United Nations Secretary General
SR  Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants (p.40)
SRSG  Special Representative to the Secretary General (p.40)
UNDESA  United Nations Department for Economics and Social Affairs
UNFPA  United Nations Population Fund (p.9)
WSFM  World Social Forum on Migrations (p.31)
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Introduction

This Policy Report traces the evolution in the international migration governance infrastructure over the past decade and examines its significance. It looks at how three types of actors (States, civil society and international organizations) have come together in novel ways to create and then redefine the terms of the debate. It analyzes civil society involvement in particular. Civil society organizing has both driven the processes, and been driven by them. This Policy Report adopts a number of research methodologies: quantitative and qualitative analyses of documents; participation at key events over the crucial period of November 2012 to March 2014; and semi-structured interviews carried out in early 2014. It does not offer a comprehensive study, but an illustrative overview primarily of the civil society perspective.

Interviewees were selected on the basis of their particular pivotal roles in the development of the main civil society organizing around migration. The interviews were mostly conducted shortly after the 12th Coordination Meeting on International Migration, held in New York in February 2014. As such, the selection of representatives is limited. A wider range of informants should be used if this research is to be taken forward, including also those not involved in the mainstream processes and representatives from governments and international organizations.

The report begins, in Section One, by presenting a historical discussion of three turning points, in 2006, 2011 and 2013. Section Two surveys key players and processes. Section Three examines both positive developments and continuing challenges, specifically in terms of the role of global civil society in migration governance debates, highlighting four key areas for focus (logistics, trust, substance and change on the ground). Finally, some conclusions and recommendations are offered. Two working definitions are useful to locate the report. ‘Migration governance’ as used here refers to:

The migration policies and programmes of individual countries, inter-State discussions and agreements, multilateral forums and consultative processes, the activities of international organizations, as well as relevant laws and norms (UNGA 2013 6).

Within civil society, this report includes (in alphabetical order): academia, diaspora groups, NGOs (widely defined), the private sector (widely defined), and trade unions. This definition will, however, be critiqued in Section Two.
1. Three key moments for global migration governance

The way that migration has featured on the international policy-making landscape has changed dramatically over the past decade (e.g. Rother 2013 363; Hansen et al 2011). This section traces this through three key moments: the first United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006, the Swiss-Chaired Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in 2011, and the second High-level Dialogue in 2013. First, however, Subsection 1.1 will sketch some of what happened in the lead-up to 2006.

1.1. The lead-up to the first High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development

The lead-up to the High-level Dialogue arguably began already in the 1980s and 1990s, as popular interest in migration was growing. Chart 1 shows the result of a simple discourse analysis of books available in English through the internet repository, GoogleBooks. It shows an increased proportion of books mentioning migration, spiking just before the start of the 1980s.

Chart 1: Proportion of books in English \(^1\) available on GoogleBooks mentioning ‘migration’, over time.

In 1990, the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (Migrant Workers Convention) was adopted, though it was not until 2003, when it received its minimum of twenty ratifications, that it came into force. At 151 months, this was the slowest progress from adoption to entry into force of United Nations core human rights instruments (e.g. suggested by Battistella 2009 47).

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\(^1\) Analyses are not yet possible for other languages.
Indeed, the mean period for the ten instruments considered core by OHCHR is 52 months, one third of this.²

While the earlier conventions allocate human rights to all, migrants can suffer informal and institutional discrimination in the provision and protection of these rights and difficulties in challenging the situation (Weissbrodt 2009 2-4). Later instruments reinforce the existing rights of certain groups. The Migrant Workers Convention explicitly applies to migrants a host of rights from earlier conventions (e.g. see De Guchtenerie and Pécoud 2009 8). The slow progress of the Convention is symbolic, demonstrating both an interest among the international community to address migrant rights, and insufficient consensus in order to achieve it.

In 1994, the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, organized by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), represented ‘the first major international forum tackling migration issues’ (Rother 2010 160). One of the fourteen substantive chapters in its Programme of Action is on ‘International Migration’ (POPIN 1994; UNFPA 1994) and it led to the formulation of a twenty-year progressive action plan which will end this year (2014).

In 2001, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) launched the International Dialogue on Migration (IDM), and in 2002, UNDESA established an annual Coordination Meeting on International Migration for international organizations. There was, then, increasing international activity around migration governance, but as one member of the then NGO Human Rights Committee’s Subcommittee on Migration, also set up in 2002, comments: ‘it was a very small group because migration in 2002 was not a big thing on the UN agenda’ (Sandis, interview). This was soon to change. In his 2002 Report, then Secretary General Kofi Anan announced: ‘I also believe that it is time to take a more comprehensive look at the various dimensions of the migration issue’ (UNGA 2002 10). This led to the commissioning of the Doyle Report and then a series of other developments.

For example, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), also set up by the Secretary General in 2002, produced a series of important meetings and reports. It is worth mentioning the GCIM here because, for some interviewees, particularly Colin Rajah of Migrants Rights International

² This is calculated from:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx
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(MRI), the format of this event provided positive procedures and modalities. He explained that it explicitly offered space for debate, both general, and among sectors, and gave equal status to participants within that. Despite his concerns with the substantive outcomes of the GCIM, then, he sees its structure as one worth reflecting upon when developing structures for further events. It can be observed that, while individual civil society representatives were involved in these inter-governmental and inter-agency processes at this time, wider civil society was also beginning to organize, in an initially haphazard way.

There was also a substantive shift in the way that migration was discussed in the lead-up to 2006. This is crucial for understanding what was to follow. Initially, the topic under consideration was ‘migration’, albeit from a range of perspectives, but in the early 2000s, the discourse became more commonly one of ‘migration and development’. This usually referred to the contribution of migrants to economic development through remittances, something which Devesh Kapur famously called ‘the new development mantra’ (e.g. Kapur 2004). This was taken up also in regional processes of engagement of emigrants in development (Bréant 2013 103). The shift to migration and development is reflected in the appellation of the entities and processes over time. Newer entities and processes have names relating to ‘migration and development’, while the older ones to just ‘migration’. This is not to imply that other migration discourses ceased, but that migration and development quickly became an important aspect.

In the 2004 UNFPA migration report on the Cairo process, ‘migration and development’ was included as only one of nine substantive areas, accounting for only 12.5% of the document, but it already noted that ‘migration is increasingly perceived as a development tool’ (UNFPA 2004 88). By 2006 ‘migration’ discourse had been infused with reference to ‘migration and development’. In the early 2000s, civil society groups, worried about this changing discourse, were already pushing for migration discussions to be couched in a human rights framework. They wanted there to be a World Conference on Migration among all stakeholders, an initiative that was eventually rejected as unfeasible. For those involved in that campaign, the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006 was seen as a second best (e.g. Rajah, interview).

1.2. 2006: The first High-level Dialogue and the launch of the GFMD

Although there had already been some organization around global migration governance, the 2006 United Nations High-level Dialogue on International
Migration and Development was an historic event for a number of reasons. First, crucially, it cemented the paired terminology of ‘migration and development’ and, second, secured this as a crucial and shared global issue. Third, it created the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). This Subsection will discuss briefly each of these three developments.

Several commentators describe the adoption of the migration and development terminology as pragmatic. They suggest that it was a strategic way to get states interested in talking about migration as a positive thing. Around this time, and within this new discourse, the idea of the ‘three-way-win’ or ‘triple win’ also became popular (e.g. Vertovec 2007). In any case, by making the High-level Dialogue one on International Migration and Development, the stage was set, and the GFMD process it instigated followed this lead.

The primary substantive outcome of the first High-level Dialogue was the institution of the GFMD process which, following ‘opposition by States to the establishment [of] a forum within the United Nations to discuss migration’, was located outside the United Nations framework (UNGA 2013). There was animosity from some States at the outset regarding the GFMD (and the inclusion of civil society within it), with some reticent to participate in the process at all, seeing migration as a sovereign issue (e.g. Martin 2011 29). This drove a desire to keep tight control over discussion topics.

As the first chair of the GFMD, Belgium set several precedents. Following pressure from civil society, before the two days of governmental meetings, a Civil Society Day (CSD) was instituted, which would adhere to the agenda of the government days, and would then provide remarks in the GFMD opening ceremony. John Bingham of the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) recalled that:

…it was the first Global Forum, so it’s hard to say it was a change, but it certainly was an innovation; it certainly was unexpected and unpredicted coming out of the first HLD (Bingham, interview).

However, Colin Rajah of MRI was less positive. He claimed that substantial advocacy work was needed prior to the event to secure what he saw as a tokenistic inclusion of civil society in the first Forum (Rajah, interview). This tokenism, he suggested, is reflected in the types of topics that were on the table, and the sidelining of the human rights discourse. Indeed, Eva Sandis of the NGO Committee on Migration, who has been involved in civil society organization around high-level events since the 1990s remembers being
advised by key players to avoid mention of the phrase ‘human rights’ at the Belgium GFMD (Sandis, interview).

All of those civil society actors interviewed mentioned this general attitude in 2006, and commented that it continued to be held in the early years of the GFMD. Colin Rajah of MRI recalls that there was a push to be ‘politically sensitive’ by focusing on the benefits of migration to States ‘rather than the responsibilities of States to protect migrants rights’. In 2008, under the chairmanship of the Philippines, this began to change (Bingham, interview). The Philippines had already begun a consultative process with its domestic civil society, and this clearly influenced its agenda-setting for the GFMD (Rajah, interview). This demonstrates the power of the GFMD chairs to frame the discussions.

In 2007, the Belgian Chair had allocated responsibility for organizing the CSD to a Belgian foundation. This basic structure continued and made the CSD format dependent on the allocated foundation. There was, therefore, a different civil society organizer each year, each with a different level of knowledge of the international migration civil society landscape (e.g. Blue et al 2012 24).

Box 1: First-hand account of the separate discourses at the 2010 GFMD³

In 2010, Rodolfo Cordova Alcaraz of the International Network on Migration and Development (INMD) in Mexico had the opportunity to participate in all three spaces of the GFMD. He observed that there was a substantial difference between the debates heard at the PGA (People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights), the CSDs (Civil Society Days) and the government days. He recalled: ‘during the PGA it was ... all about human rights, diasporas, ... and trying to tackle the root causes of migration’. Meanwhile, at the CSDs, the debate was ‘more mild’. He reflected that ‘there were governments that were showing good practices’ and that this contributed to tempering the debate. Then, at the government days, he noted, ‘it was like another complete story’. Overall, he concluded that it was ‘like three different visions of what is happening around migration and governance in the world.’

(Cordova Alcaraz, interview)

³ Analyses across other GFMDs are available in the literature, e.g. Rother (2010) offers a similar cross-sectional analysis of the Athens GFMD.
In 2010, the relationship between the Government of Mexico and the Bancomer Foundation, which it had selected to organize the CSDs, ran into some difficulties. There are differing accounts of what took place. Rodolfo Cordova Alcaraz, of the INMD in Mexico recalls that the selection of Bancomer was resented by some Mexican migrant organizations, who felt it had insufficient interest and ‘legitimacy’ in international migration. That said, Bancomer had provided support, for example, for a South-South migration consultative processes in 2006 (Delgado Wise and Castles 2007:4) and before the event, some were hopeful, as Bancomer announced commitment to working with the Mexican chair to enable dialogue between civil society and states, including also private enterprise (Rother 2010:171).

However, Rodolfo Cordova Alcaraz, who was involved in the organization of the civil society aspects of the 2010 PGA and GFMD, described the situation:

... the organizations in Mexico ... were ... angry because the government gave [the organization of the CSDs] to the Fundación Bancomer. ... So it created ... some tension between [the organizers,] Fundación Bancomer and the government. So it was ... a long process, in which the organizations that were involved with the PGA [People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights] negotiated with the Bancomer Foundation and the government on how to start including people from the PGA in the Civil Society Days (Cordova Alcaraz, interview).

Indeed, John Bingham recalls that pressure was also put on Bancomer by the International Advisory Committee for the CSD, cementing crucial linkages between the PGA and the CSD (Bingham, correspondence).

Despite this problem, one innovation of the Mexican chair was to prove crucial: that of including some ‘common space’ in which attendees of CSDs and government days could come together in a structured way. This would, it was believed, enable civil society concerns to enter more easily into discussion, but in 2010 it did not fully meet its aims. For example, a 2012 MacArthur Foundation-commissioned report observed:

When asked about the CSD as an institution from 2007-2010, approximately 80% of interviewees responded that the structure was ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ effective (Blue et al 2012:24).

In the large-scale GFMD report, published in 2011, mostly governments were asked whether the GFMD should interact in another way with civil society.
The results shown in Chart 2 indicate that a third answered yes, but around two fifths were unsure (GFMD Assessment Team 2011). Both of these studies indicate that, by 2011, there was readiness for some sort of change.

1.3. 2011: Switzerland hosts the GFMD

In 2011, the Swiss GFMD Chair approached the NGO, the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) to establish a Civil Society Coordinating Office. This paved the way for a different style of organization. Crucially, it established a continuity in the civil society engagement in the GFMD, something sought within civil society, but also advocated by the outgoing Mexican Chair and the incoming Swiss Chair (Bingham, correspondence). This move seems overall to have had a positive effect on the ability of civil society to manage successful engagement. For example, the same above-mentioned MacArthur Foundation-commissioned report states that:

Numerous stakeholders noted that, while the previous arrangement had “done its job”, the transfer to the ICMC was one of the most positive changes they had seen in the CSD (Blue et al 2012 24).

When they were approached by the Swiss Chair, ICMC set three conditions on taking up the role (Bingham, correspondence):

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4 [http://gfmdcivilsociety.org/about/](http://gfmdcivilsociety.org/about/)
1. That civil society be able to set its own agenda for the CSD, rather than following that set by States;
2. That the appointment receive support from other leading civil society organizations engaged in GFMD activity; and
3. That there be a genuine two-way collaboration with the GFMD Chair regarding CSD funding.

This, and particularly the first of these, created a sea-change in the style of the CSDs, but also in the level of organization civil society actors required. Table 1 sketches the evolution in the role of civil society in the GFMDs in terms of time allocation, and also charts the increasing strategic importance of the ICMC, and in particular its head of policy, John Bingham.

Table 1: The evolution of the GFMD CSD structure\(^5\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GFMD Host Country</th>
<th>CSD Host/Organizer</th>
<th>Organizer focus area</th>
<th>Notable Themes of the CSDs</th>
<th>Number of CSDs</th>
<th>Length of Common Space</th>
<th>Number of Government Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>King Baudouin Foundation</td>
<td>Social justice, democracy</td>
<td>Labour mobility, remittances</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Ayala Foundation</td>
<td>Culture and education</td>
<td>Migrant rights</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Alexander Onassis Benefit Foundation</td>
<td>Culture, education, environment, health, social solidarity</td>
<td>Migration integration and reintegration</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>BBVA Bancomer Foundation</td>
<td>Education, culture, social development, humanitarian aid(^7)</td>
<td>Partnerships, irregular migration</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>3 hours</td>
<td>1.75 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>ICMC</td>
<td>Migration and development</td>
<td>Evidence basis, labour mobility, irregular migration</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>3 hours</td>
<td>1.75 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>ICMC</td>
<td>Migration and development</td>
<td>Protection, human</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>3 hours</td>
<td>1.75 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\) Collected from various sources. Primarily from within: www.gfmd.org/meetings; accessed 14\(^{th}\) March 2014

\(^6\) This column adopts the summary offered in Blue et al 2012 for the years for which this information was available.

\(^7\) This comes from their 2011 Annual Report. BBVA Bancomer have subsequently also developed a strong migration programme.
Chart 3 shows how this seems to have led to a change in the sorts of issues at the table, not only during the CSDs, but in the GFMD more generally. This can be seen particularly in the increased relative importance of the thematic area of ‘rights of migrants’ in 2011, a trend that would continue to develop into the High-level Dialogue in 2013.

Chart 3: Discourse analysis on documents of each GFMD, by thematic area.

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8 These four hours will take place in the afternoon of 14th May. The morning has been left free for small group civil society-government conversations. This means that the GFMD has, in effect, been extended by a day in order to accommodate engagement.
1.4. 2013: The second High-level Dialogue and looking toward the post-2015 agenda

The second High-level Dialogue in 2013 was symbolic of the multi-dimensional shift in international discussions of migration governance since 2006. Civil society was highly organized, supplying key players in the process. Rights were now being prioritized across all sectors: States, civil society and international organizations. It was also more formal, with all recognizing migration as an important global issue. This is evident, for example, in three key documents coming out of the High-level Dialogue: the Member States’ Declaration; the Secretary General’s ‘eight point action plan’; the civil society’s ‘5-year, 8-point action plan’, each of which were calling for very similar things.

Data presented at the 12th Coordination Meeting on International Migration by Bela Hovy, Chief of the Migration Section of the Population Division of UNDESA, in February 2014, also demonstrates substantial agreement among Member States on these issues. The two charts below represent the proportion of the 93 State Plenary Presentations at the High-level Dialogue referring to each of the Secretary General’s Eight Points, and then, referring to key policy priorities (UNGA 2013b 20; Hovy 2014). Chart 6 shows how this coheres with views expressed more widely, using ICMC research that charts the ‘convergence across stakeholders’.

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**Table 4:** Number of Member States mentioning each of the Secretary General’s eight points in their plenary presentations (Hovy 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Member States mentioning</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Protect the human rights of all migrants</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reduce the costs of labour migration</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Eliminate migrant exploitation, including human trafficking</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Address the plight of stranded migrants</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Improve public perceptions of migrants</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Integrate migration into the development agenda</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Strengthen the migration evidence base</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Enhance migration partnerships and cooperation</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Chart 5: Number of Member States referring to specific policy priorities in their plenary presentations (Hovy 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>United Nations Secretary General's Agenda for Action (8 points)</th>
<th>UNSG Special Representative (10 points)</th>
<th>IOM Position Paper (6 points)</th>
<th>United Nations Member States Declaration by consensus 3rd Oct 2013 (34 articles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration by development group, South-south</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migration</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development aid / root causes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratification Conventions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour migration</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular migration</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-2015 development agenda</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 6: Convergence across stakeholders at the 2013 High-level Dialogue, shading indicates inclusion (Civil Society Coordinating Office 2013)

The emphasis across these three Charts on the Post-2015 Agenda shows both the recognition of the importance of migration and the interest in policy outcomes for the process for many of those involved, including 58% of those involved.
States participating in the High-level Dialogue Plenary. This seems to suggest an inclination among some to make the GFMD more formal. Another important development, which occurred over the course of the 2013 event, was a change in how civil society was integrated into the process. Initially, as at the 2006 High-level Dialogue, civil society was restricted, except for key persons, to attendance through rooms where proceedings were live-streamed onto screens. As the High-level Dialogue proceeded, the enforcement was relaxed and more civil society actors were allowed to attend discussions in person. Moreover, four civil society representatives addressed the High-level Dialogue plenary sessions (four more than in 2006) (Bingham, correspondence).

The year 2013, then, marked a third important turning point, both in the substantive terms of the migration governance debate, and in how the various parties participate in it. The High-level Dialogue also offered a focus for efforts in all sectors and across sectors, and civil society arrived to the event with a structured approach, displaying a unity which had not been in evidence in the early years of the process. Indeed, in interview, John Bingham of ICMC explicitly acknowledged the advantage this gives to civil society in organizing around global migration governance, and one can observe this in the creation of the strategic 5-year 8-point action plan document. This level of organization seems to have continued into a focus on integrating migration into the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda in a way that emphasizes migrants’ human rights and human development.

2. Key players and processes

This section examines in more detail the key types of actors (States, civil society and international organizations) and briefly sketches key entities and processes, including an exploration of cross-fertilization between them.

2.1. States

States are the actors in international migration governance with primary political power and formal obligations. They make international agreements, and set migration policy domestically and regionally (or make up the multistate bodies that do this). There is also a developing complexity of bilateral and regional processes, through which States engage with each other (Hansen et al 2011; Betts 2011 2) and with other actors. This Subsection starts by examining processes of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). It then considers the High-level Dialogues and the Global Forums on Migration and Development. Throughout, it is crucial to
recall associated bilateral and multilateral relationships between specific States and with specific groups of civil society actors.

a. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is a key intergovernmental organization involved in migration. As it is not officially a United Nations agency, but a distinct intergovernmental one, it is relevant to consider it here. IOM has developed a wide range of initiatives relating to migration, enabling debate on domestic, regional, and international levels.

The IOM started out in 1951 as the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), becoming IOM finally in 1989. Chart 7 shows the membership and the observership of IOM as of December 2013, showing a currently strong NGO presence among its observers.

To provide more detail, Table 2 summarizes IOM non-State engagements, according to their website.

Table 2: IOM non-State engagements in 2014, according to information found across the IOM website at the time of writing (April 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Actors / Description of engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research community</td>
<td>This includes: Partnerships with research and academic institutions (16 in Europe, 4 in N America, 3 in Asia, 1 in Africa, 1 in Australasia and 2 in S America and the Caribbean); External Advisory Board; Academic Advisory Board; Partnerships with other organizations and companies; Partnerships with international organizations and affiliated research groups; Partnerships with publishers; and IOM research and training centres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Various sorts of collaborations with: AmeriCares; Association of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Corporate Travel Executives; The King Baudouin Foundation; Chevron; Concern Galna Hogas; Saatchi and Saatchi; American International Group, Inc.; Dow Chemical; UBS; Carrefour; Starbucks; Maple Leaf Foods of Canada; and Media go

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource mobilization</th>
<th>While most IOM funding comes from member governments, they also liaise with other agencies and funding bodies.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-level Dialogue 2013</td>
<td>IOM provided: position paper; plenary statement; four side events; five recent related publications; and ran regional preparatory meetings in Bangkok, Cairo, Moscow, Addis Ababa and Santiago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>IOM’s work with civil society includes: annual consultations since 2011; IOM cities projects with over 1,600 civil society organizations (NGOs, advocacy groups, migrants’ organizations, trade unions and professional associations, media organizations, research institutions and universities, and philanthropic foundations). IOM has three strategic objectives in this area: 1. Take stock of existing partnerships with CSOs 2. Develop platforms, such as the annual and regional IOM-CSO consultations, for two-way exchange between IOM and CSOs 3. Empower CSOs to have greater voice in the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Migration Group</td>
<td>IOM is an active core member of the GMG (to be discussed later in this section)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Article 1(2) of the Constitution of IOM (which dates to the 1951 ICEM Constitution) states that:

In carrying out its functions, the Organization shall co-operate closely with international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, concerned with migration, refugees and human resources in order, inter alia, to facilitate the co-ordination of international activities in these fields. Such co-operation shall be carried out in the mutual respect of the competences of the organizations concerned (IOM 2013 3).

While the collaboration has not always been smooth, recent years have seen increased IOM efforts to collaborate with civil society in international migration governance processes. This has been driven by key personalities.

For example, the current Director General of IOM, William Lacy Swing, has been in post since October 2008, and has driven partnerships in non-governmental sectors. Many of those partnerships in Table 2 have arisen since that time. One interesting development is to note the changing tone of IOM’s World Migration Review, culminating in the 2013 publication, which focuses ‘on outcomes for migrants themselves and on how their lives have been affected in positive or negative ways, as a result of migrating’ and the major
recommendation that ‘instead of being the passive subjects of enquiry, migrants should be given the opportunity to tell their stories’ (IOM 2013 2).

Eva Sandis observes that another key shift in terms of inclusion of civil society in international debate occurred when the Permanent Observer of IOM to the United Nations became Michelle Klein-Solomon: ‘We were persona grata instead of persona non grata and she made a point, as did IOM as a whole, to try to involve civil society more’ (Sandis, interview). This is a sentiment also implied by others. Michelle Klein-Solomon started as the Permanent Observer of the IOM to the United Nations in August 2010 (Department of Public Information 2010). This marks another key aspect to the change in 2011, described in Section 1.3. It is important to recognize here, given the trust vested in IOM by States in the setting and carrying-out of a wide range of migration processes.

b. High-level Dialogues and GFMDs

Section One offered a chronological introduction to the High-level Dialogues and the GFMDs. There are different ways for States to participate in these events: attending, intervening, chairing or hosting. Considering which States are particularly active in these areas helps identify those with particular interests in global migration governance, though this group is not necessarily co-extensive with that interacting with civil society. It is then important to consider also the impact of these meetings in spurring regional and domestic engagement processes between governments and specific civil society communities. Table 3 presents those specific States taking two or more active participatory roles. This includes chairing a Round Table being a Round Table panelist, organizing a side event, or providing an opening statement or a statement during the Plenary of the High-level Dialogue.

Table 3: Level of interest in HLD 2013 as indicated through active participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># active participatory roles taken</th>
<th>States</th>
<th># States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Argentina*, Australia, Belarus, Canada*, Costa Rica*, Indonesia, Lithuania, Norway*, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, USA*</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Guatemala*, Italy*, Jamaica*, Morocco*, Nigeria*, Russian Federation*, Switzerland*</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This includes chairing a Round Table, being a Round Table panellist, Organising a side event, Providing an opening statement or a statement during the Plenary, during the course of the High-level Dialogue event itself.
Table 3 indicates that in 2013 16 States were particularly active. In addition, those who hosted events or organized meetings at the 2013 High-level Dialogue are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mexico*</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bangladesh*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Philippines*, Sweden*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland and USA.

This is not only relevant in considering commitment to the process. These active roles also bring certain key powers. As noted already, hosts and Chairs have significant power in agenda-setting. Relevant in terms of the engagement of global civil society with global State-led processes, several in this list were also mentioned in key-informant interviews as important civil society collaborators. They include an interesting mix of sending, transit and receiving States. At the same time, it is also useful to note that only half of those listed here have ratified the Migrant Workers Convention, though four have ratified the Domestic Workers Convention, of a total of only thirteen globally.

Engagement should not only be seen as relevant with States that engage heavily in the State-led processes. Several States not in this list have been developing important engagement processes with their civil society movements. The 2012 MacArthur Foundation Report, for example, mentions also Nepal (Blue et al 2012 15). Milka Isinta of the Pan African Network in Defense of Migrants’ Rights (PANiDMR) added Kenya, South Africa and South Sudan. Another interviewee adds also Mali to the list, and there are many more besides. Considering the case of Kenya, for example, is interesting, since Isinta notes that, while Kenyan government engagement with its own migration civil society actors has been catalyzed since the start of the GFMD process, it chose not to participate at all in the 2013 High-level Dialogue. The High-level Dialogues and the GFMDs have aided national engagement processes, then, through providing impetus, as in the Kenyan case, and through offering a neutral space as in the Mexican case (Box 2), as

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well as through the development of global debates. This will be taken up again later in this Policy Report.

Box 2: Using the processes for bilateral meetings

Rodolfo Cordova Alcaraz of the INMD and Fundar recalls how he and some colleagues found that the space of the High-level Dialogue in 2013 offered a neutral ground in which to raise domestic policy concerns with Mexican politicians that were not possible in Mexico. He notes that it ‘was the first time that I saw how you could change the terms of the debate when you negotiate with the government outside Mexico’.

He explains that in Mexico, when a new government comes into power, a ‘National Development Plan’ is enacted. A coalition of Mexican migrant and other civil society organizations, the colectivo PND-migration, had been lobbying to include migrant rights within the new plan that was being developed. By October of 2013, the time of the High-level Dialogue, the Minister for the Interior was ‘working on the terms of reference for the consultation process’. Some within the coalition of migrant and other civil society organizations felt ‘that the government was closing the window’ for civic engagement. He explains that ‘we didn’t have the chance to speak directly with … the vice ministers, or the heads of the units that are coordinating the programme’ - until, that is, the High-level Dialogue. On one of the days of the Dialogue, he had breakfast with someone from the Mexican delegation, and he recalls that ‘basically what happened during breakfast is that the whole process changed and the window of opportunity opened really quickly’.

At breakfast, he had explained that the coalition was planning to go to press with a letter criticizing the government for a lack of openness and for not taking consultation seriously. His breakfast companion replied: ‘you don’t have to do that. I’m offering you right now how can we work together’. That was the Friday. The following Tuesday, they met in his office in Mexico. Five people from the coalition and five staffers had a six-hour meeting, and they were able to get the consultation process ‘back on track’. From this process, Cordova Alcaraz explains, ‘the government established for the first time … a special migration programme’. This programme is cross-cutting and multi-sectorial, adopting a human rights approach, and will be published in May 2014.

(Cordova Alcaraz, interview)

When discussing specific States’ engagement in these processes, other factors must be recalled. First, states may change their level and/or style of engagement with changes in administration. For example, while the USA initially did not participate in the GFMD process, its new administration in
2009 not only began to participate, but joined the Steering Group and is now found in the above list of key actors. Second, it is crucial to acknowledge diversity among States (Hansen et al 2011). Consider, for example, the 2006 conference, ‘Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South’, which had involvement from India, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines and Turkey and found substantial interest in a specifically South-driven interpretation of global migration governance (Castles and Wise 2007 305), suggesting shared interests among both States and civil society in challenging prevailing migration and development rhetoric and forms of debate (Delgado Wise and Castles 2007 4).

2.2. Civil society

Those actors that are not part either of the community of States or the international organizations tend to be put together as ‘civil society’. This generally includes (in alphabetical order):

- Academic institutions;
- Migrant and diaspora groups;
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs);
- Private enterprise; and
- Trade unions.

While this classification is adopted in this Policy Report, this Subsection begins by critiquing it. It then presents an overview of some key civil society processes on international migration governance and, finally, touches upon the recently created Global Coalition on Migration (GCM), and the 5-year 8-point plan for action that, arguably, has arisen from it.

a. Who is civil society?

In the first High-level Dialogue in 2006, non-governmental engagement was divided into three parts: NGOs, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the Private Sector. Within the CSOs, different sectors were specified, as can be seen from Table 4.
Table 4: The three main categories and subcategories of participants in the Global Taskforce for the Hearings on International Migration and Development\(^{13}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non Governmental Organizations</th>
<th>Civil Society Organizations</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th>UN entities</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Sending country NGO</td>
<td>- Youth</td>
<td>- Private Sector</td>
<td>11 UN entities</td>
<td>- SRSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Receiving country NGO</td>
<td>- Trade Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Committee on NGOs</td>
<td>- Faith-based organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Academia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This drove the diversity policy in the High-level Dialogue and affected, for example, the kinds of actors making up the Task Force. Eva Sandis of the NGO Committee on Migration, recalled that in 2006, there was little unity between these sectors, or even within them:

I would say that in those early days we did not work very closely together, for a lot of different reasons. Well, we didn’t know each other (Sandis, interview).

She explained that they did not meet often, and many of the NGOs involved had little contact with the United Nations. As a result, at least initially, the various actors were a little wary of each other. John Bingham of ICMC explained that in practice this meant that, on an international level, ‘we had no international community of civil society activists, no unity no centering of focus’ (Bingham, interview). That is, as several interviewees noted, while there was much activity on a regional or national level, and also on a sectorial or interest level, there was not yet a joined-up global movement in the sense that one can observe today. Bingham continued:

We would meet randomly in disparate processes, sometimes at the Human Rights Council, or Commission, in Geneva, sometimes around the Committee on Migrant Workers or reviewing the reports of governments in Geneva, very occasionally here [in New York] on migration at the international levels. We bumped into each other at regional meetings of the Global Commission of International Migration between 2003 and 2005, a couple of world conferences on racism, but other than that the migration activism in civil society, civil society and academics I would say, met only

haphazardly, occasionally... So there was no movement, no order, no regularity of any kind among us, as civil society activists, until the Global Forum came along (Bingham, interview)

He notes the split between those engaging in refugee matters and those working in other areas (e.g. labour, gender, children, trafficking, health, etc), and the agencies and processes they would be involved with. Initially, migration was not seen as a holistic issue, and activists tended to engage with specific agencies and processes related to specific interests. Very few agencies were engaging in both aspects at that time. By 2013, this had changed. One informant went on to note that: ‘I really think there was, first of all, more trust established among civil society members’ (Sandis, interview). She refers also to the Civil Society Steering Committee and collaboration regarding CSDs. And indeed, various civil society processes observed in the period 2012 to 2014 for the making of this report, for example have included popular rallies (PGAs and WSFMs to be discussed below).

Civil society in the international migration processes today can be usefully understood according to the taxonomy found in Chart 8, which shows the attendance of the 2012 CSDs according to sector, as defined by the Civil Society Coordinating Office (data from Civil Society Coordinating Office 2012 13).

![Chart 8: Attendance of CSDs 2012 by sector, as defined by the Civil Society Coordinating Office](chart-image-url)
Global migration governance

A crucial aspect of understanding the complexity of civil society, however, is to look at the interests of the various participants. Three types of non-government actors will now be considered. Two of these, private sector and academia, are found in Chart 8, but are often left under-examined. The third is not usually included in the consideration of non-government actors, but should be. This is the sector composed of philanthropic foundations.

In 2012, the already-mentioned GFMD Assessment Team stated that:

\[ \text{the private sector, including employers and recruitment agencies, should be considered a separate stakeholder group [apart from civil society], and cooperation with this group should be strengthened by means of a dedicated consultative system (GFMD Assessment Team 2012 6).} \]

Most of those civil society actors interviewed agreed with this, though they had different views regarding what to do about it. While Colin Rajah of MRI felt that most private sector interests were too different from traditional civil society interests to participate in civil society processes, Milka Isinta of PANiDMIR suggested this may not be a reason to exclude them too easily. There is, however, general agreement about the importance of engaging more with migrant entrepreneurs and the recognition of their special role within migration and development. Milka Isinta, took this discussion of interests further to note a power difference, so that migrant entrepreneurs and trade unions should be understood also in terms of the power that they have with States, which diaspora groups, for example, do not. A further component of the private sector to be considered is that concerned with migration enforcement (e.g. see Bloom 2014).

Academia is another sector that can often be listed within civil society. However, it also has its own set of interests and norms (in terms of scientific and methodological concerns, for example). This is clear from the diversity of perspectives put forward by different academic actors. On the one hand, there are those such as David Coleman and on the other, Raul Delgado Wise and Aderanti Adepoju who have been heavily involved in civil society processes as activists as well as academics. This shows that it is incorrect to see academia as automatically sympathetic with civil society perspectives.

Criticism within the academic community helps to illustrate this. In 2013, Stephan Rother argued that of five (all edited) academic books published in 2010 and 2011 on the new field of ‘migration governance’:
To varying degrees, they … have one glaring omission in common: the almost complete absence of the migrants themselves as subjects rather than mere objects of the governance of migration (Rother 2013 364).

Though he goes on to praise crucial analyses and data that these texts offer, and whether or not one agrees with his criticism, this demonstrates the difference in presentation that there may be in academic work. Its core interests and norms are scientific, and so the academic community includes a diversity of political and ideological ascriptions. This should be remembered when academia per se is seen as part of wider civil society movements, and, for example, the inclusion of academic speakers as automatically representing a contribution to the number of civil society contributors.

One final type of entity to be considered is that of philanthropic funding bodies. All of the processes described here, and the preparations for them, need to be funded, and so if they are to be held, those involved must seek contribution (e.g. GFMD Assessment Team 2012 8). This must then be considered as a key part of the task of all actors involved, as must the role of those contributing the funds. Several foundations and funds have contributed in some way to these processes, for example, the civil society report on the 2012 GFMD lists as donors: ‘The Governments of the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland; the BBVA Bancomer Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Open Society Foundations; Cordaid, the European Commission and the Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI), Georgetown University, Oxfam Novib, and the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC)’ (Civil Society Coordinating Office 2012 1).

The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, according to a 2012 report, has contributed US$3,338,000 to the GFMD process over the period from 2006 to 2012 (Blue et al 2012), making it the largest non-government donor (Slocum 2013). It was described at the 2008 GFMD, by its then President, Jonathan Fanton (President 1999-2009), as:

…independent, not tied to any government, business or political party. MacArthur is based in Chicago, one of the world’s great immigrant cities. We have assets of $6 billion, and work in 60 nations around the world, with offices in Russia, Nigeria, India, Mexico, and soon China (Fanton 2008).

Although a relatively small overall amount of money, it is important to reflect upon the relevance and role of such non-governmental contributors in
determining the format and substance of the processes. Chart 9 offers an analysis of the changing focus of the MacArthur Foundation support of the various elements of the GFMD processes.

![Chart 9: MacArthur Foundation contribution in US$ to three key groups of stakeholders in the GFMD processes](chart)

This data is taken from the 2012 report by Blue et al into the process. They describe their categories as follows:

- Government: host governments (or other activities relating to the intergovernmental meeting);
- CSD; and
- United Nations: the Special Representative of the Secretary General on International Migration and Development to support the United Nations-GFMD link.

This may differ from year to year, depending on grant applications. One MacArthur presentation notes, for example, that in 2007, United Nations funding went to the office of the Secretary General, while in 2008, the primary applicant was UNDESA (Novy-Marx 2008).

In 2012, however, MacArthur announced newly changing priorities. Their revised strategy from 2012, announced by its Director of Migration, John Slocum, at the 11th Coordination Meeting on International Migration, noted three geographically defined initiatives:

- US immigration policy;
- Regional migration corridor; and
- Global migration.

Indeed, these revised priorities continue to be in place today\(^\text{14}\) and it will be interesting to observe how this may affect the global processes described here.

b. Three key international civil society processes

Civil society organizing relating to international migration governance is complex. However, as with the States, there are some key processes around which civil society convenes. These will be sketched here. Of course, this cannot even begin to be comprehensive and is intended only as a selective overview.

i. World Social Forum for Migrations (WSFM)

Growing out of the World Social Forum Movement, the World Social Forum for Migrations (WSFM) process began in 2005, the year before the first High-level Dialogue and since then has been an important venue for debating civil society positions. As can be seen from Table 5, the WSFM is held every two years, each time with a different host. Participation, as well as the agenda, is open to anyone that applies, and each WSFM event ends with the development of a message and a declaration. While the first four events were held in South America and in Spain, a new effort to move to other regions can be observed.

Table 5: The development of the World Social Forum on Migrations process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Port Alegre, Brazil</td>
<td>600 participants from 35 countries</td>
<td>Sailing across global disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Rivas Vaciamadrid, Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Universal citizenship and human rights. Another world is possible, necessary and urgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Rivas Vaciamadrid, Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Our voices, our rights, a world without walls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Quito, Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
<td>People’s Movement for Universal Citizenship: Collapsing the model building actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Quezon City, Philippines</td>
<td>&gt;1,000(^\text{15})</td>
<td>Mobility, Rights and Global Models: Looking for Alternatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{15}\) Figure from host, Mariam College, Quezon City, Philippines [www.mc.edu.ph/News/tabid/194/tag/WAGI/Default.aspx](http://www.mc.edu.ph/News/tabid/194/tag/WAGI/Default.aspx)
Crucial to processes like that of the WSFM is the diversity of actors that attend, which the organizers hope may, among other things, offer a way for otherwise hidden perspectives to arrive at the government-led processes. Indeed, Milka Isinta of PANiDMR explained that:

…more often than not, what happens is that discussions that take place at the World Social Forum … the issues that are raised, the discussion that takes place… are brought up as a statement of the Civil Society Days of the GFMD (Isinta, interview).

For an illustrative example of the types of actors at the WSFM, consider one session led by a group of Filipina domestic workers, working in Singapore, at the 2012 WSFM in Manila. Also attending that meeting were domestic workers and community organizers from other regions, as well as a range of other participants. This represented an opportunity for the sharing of best practice and uniting around common concerns for actors that would not normally be able to contribute to global processes, but who bring valuable insight. Crucially, they demonstrated an empowered migrancy, and although they described struggles with difficult circumstances, their discourse was not one of victimhood, as can appear from discourses about such groups. Instead, they presented expertise in a particular area of global migration governance, bringing sensible suggestions about how to make significant improvements to their human development. One key matter they addressed was how they had worked towards toward a change in domestic legislation in Singapore that now forbids employers to require domestic workers to clean windows from the outside. The campaign had been mobilized after a number of deaths from falling and represents a successful example of state-level engagement around a matter that might not otherwise arise for policymakers.

ii. People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights (PGA)

The People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights (PGA) started as a parallel event to the High-level Dialogue in 2006, under the name of the ‘Community dialogue on migration, development and human rights’. One informant noted that ‘in 2006, the PGA started as a protest forum because civil society organizations were not involved in the process’. Parallel events were then held alongside each GFMD. In 2008, this
process changed its name to the PGA. Already by this time, as John Bingham recalled, the popularity of the process had grown significantly so that: ‘there were almost 2000 people in the Philippines. Side by side with and overlapping with the Civil Society Days, the 200 [that were attending the CSDs]’ (Bingham, interview). The PGAs have usually been held in the same city as the HLD or GFMD, with the exception of 2012, when for logistical reasons, there was no PGA held in Mauritius, but a regional consultative process in Accra in Ghana (Isinta, interview) and 2010, when it was held in Mexico City rather than Puerto Vallarta, where the GFMD was located (Rajah, correspondence).

The PGA has also given rise to a number of other entities, including, for example, the Pan African Network in Defense of Migrants’ Rights (PANiDMR), which was launched in 2010. The current chair, Milka Isinta, explained that, at the 2008 PGA, ‘we felt that the African voice was not being represented adequately on migration issues at the global level’ (Isinta, interview). The Global Coalition (GCM) for Migration arguably also grew out of the PGA movement. This will be discussed below. One other crucial aspect of the PGA is the opportunity it offers for organizing side events that are outside the remit of the main interactive processes.

iii. Global Forum for Migration and Development Civil Society Days (CSDs)

As already discussed in Section One, the Civil Society Days changed in structure over time, from the Belgian Chair’s one day for civil society prior to the governmental GFMD talks, to the two days we have today. The biggest structural changes have come since 2011 when civil society could set the agenda for the event and ICMC was designated as organizer. The CSDs continue to hold importance in terms of the place of civil society within the global migration agenda in three key ways:

1) Symbolic importance: explicit recognition by the international community of the importance of civil society in international migration debate;
2) Substantive importance: able to set the agenda for CSDs, civil society can feed key matters into the GFMD processes; and
3) Logistical importance: it drives and symbolizes a strong general organization of international civil society.

All of the informants stated that, were it not for the GFMD, and for the CSDs within that, there would not be the well-organized and powerful civil society movement that exists today.
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This level of organization is made more difficult, though, by the frequency of these major annual events:

...we need more time at home to do this stuff and to relate with governments and to work among ourselves. So sometimes our criticism, right from the start, broadly held, has been, maybe something of a structure of regularity to work at regional or national levels one year, so that it's international one year, one year national, or international one year, one year regional (Bingham, interview).

But others worried that, if such an initiative were launched without proper mechanisms in place for the regional and national discussions, it would be a mistake. Milka Isinta of PANiDMR, for example, suggested this might simply water down the global processes without really strengthening regional ones (Isinta, interview).

The PGA, the WSFM and the CSDs are not mutually exclusive processes. Many of the issues and the leaders from one can be found translated across the others. The organization around the ILO Domestic Workers Convention provides one example of this, and the development of the 5-year 8-point action plan and the creation of the Global Coalition on Migration some others.

First, consider the Domestic Workers Convention. Meetings relating to this Convention have taken place in all of the processes mentioned here. Indeed, in a 2010 GFMD blog post, Stefan Rother noted that William Gois from Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), one of the most organized regional civil society groupings, ‘saw this cooperation [around the Domestic Workers Convention] as a sign that the migrant movement has gone on from networking to coalition building’ (Rother 2010b). The work around the Domestic Workers Convention also took place through the PGA processes and the WSFM. Indeed, the ILO drafter of the document attended the 2013 High-level Dialogue PGA.

The 5-year 8-point action plan put forward by civil society at the High-level Dialogue in 2013 also reflects a coming-together of the various processes. This is described in Box 3, but also developed in the following subsection, which examines the development of the Global Coalition on Migration (GCM). Box 4, meanwhile, explains in more detail the process employed by
the GCM in developing the 5-year 8-point action plan, taking into account the importance of regional consultation.

Box 3: Global collaboration – the creation of the 5-year 8-point plan

John Bingham of the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) has been a key actor throughout the development of the civil society processes, including the GCM. He recalled how the 5-year 8-point action plan arose. ‘The idea’, he notes, ‘came out of a small working group we created in Mauritius to look at global governance of migration, very much with the High-level Dialogue in mind’. Initially, it was made up of twelve or fifteen persons who had been very involved in global civil society migration organizing. They asked themselves what they had learnt over the years, and what they should be doing differently.

The primary conclusion was that they were ‘too much at the cliff’, that is, civil society campaigning tended to revolve around sudden urgent matters, rather than around long-term strategies for change. The thought was also that such strategizing could lead to a more ‘collaborative approach’ with governments. Indeed, Bingham noted that ‘collaboration is what we do, a lot of us, every day, with governments of different kinds in different settings, and international agencies’, yet it ‘hadn’t worked its way into our own strategic conduct’ at the GFMD or the High-level Dialogue. This new approach was presented to the CSDs of the GFMD in 2012 and at the WSFM the following week.

The strategy adopted was of a new style. Bingham reflected: ‘It gives this idea of a unified agenda, of a multiyear approach, of a tone and commitment to collaboration with governments on a set of issues’. He explained that, following these meetings in Mauritius and then in Manila, ‘the 5-year, 8-point plan was born. It was actually born as seven points. We screwed up at the beginning and didn’t include diaspora in there, it had not been part of the initial seven. It was added a month later as we went to global editing and sign-off in January 2013’.

(Bingham, interview)

c. Global Coalition on Migration (GCM)

Launched in 2011, the Global Coalition on Migration (GCM) arose out of the processes discussed above, composed primarily of the key drivers of the civil society engagements in the global governmental processes. This membership is shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Membership of the Global Coalition on Migration, March 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Country/Regional Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building and Woodworkers International (BWI)</td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>International (based in Switzerland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espacio Sin Fronteras (ESF)</td>
<td>Network of NGOs</td>
<td>Regional: South America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Migration Policy Associates (GMPA)</td>
<td>Network of Researchers/Advocates</td>
<td>International (based in Switzerland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>International (based in Switzerland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Network on Migration and Development (INMD)</td>
<td>Network of Researchers</td>
<td>International (based in Mexico)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)</td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>International (based in Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Via Campesina (LVC)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>International (based in Zimbabwe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Forum in Asia</td>
<td>Network of civil society</td>
<td>Regional: Asia (based in Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants Rights International (MRI)</td>
<td>NGO (network)</td>
<td>International (based in Switzerland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>North and South America (based in US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities (NALACC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR)</td>
<td>NGO (network)</td>
<td>National: US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-African Network in Defense of Migrants Rights (PANI)</td>
<td>Network of activists</td>
<td>Regional: Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform for the International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Regional: Europe (Based in Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Migrant Platform (TMP)</td>
<td>Network</td>
<td>Regional: Europe (based in Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women and Global Migration Working Group (WGMWG)</td>
<td>Network of NGOs</td>
<td>International (based in US)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When considering this membership, some things are useful to note. First, there is much overlap between the networks that are members. For example, the Migrant Forum in Asia (probably the strongest regional network) sits on the Steering Committee of Migrant Rights International (MRI), and the ICMC is part of the Global Migration Policy Associates. When asked about this, Colin Rajah of MRI noted that this appropriately reflects the complexity of civil society and how the processes have developed. He categorized the GCM as a loose coalition, as more like a ‘network of networks’. The GCM, it has been argued, was crucial to the development of the 5-year 8-point plan. This process is discussed in Box 4.

The civil society processes around global migration governance have transformed from the initial collection of disparate dedicated actors in 2006 to a diverse contemporary movement, united around key issues and strategies, though still with internal debate and dissent. That said, there is not scope within this report to examine further the perspectives of those outside these processes, something which needs to be addressed.
It seems clear that the development of this powerful civil society movement has been driven by the High-level Dialogues and GFMDs, but also that it has driven the way in which these government-led processes have developed. Indeed, as the President of the MacArthur Foundation noted in 2008, ‘the work of civil society is not incidental to the Global Forum – it is an integral part of it and should lead to ongoing collaboration between civil society and international, regional, and national bodies’ (Fanton 2008). This is epitomized in the transformation to long-term strategizing seen in the 5-year 8-point plan for action document and its positive reception.

2.3. United Nations agencies and processes

International organizations are crucial to the orchestration and agenda-setting of global migration governance discussions as well as in following up on any conclusions. This subsection discusses some key international organization-led processes and individuals.

a. Coordination Meetings on International Migration

The first Coordination Meeting on International Migration took place in 2002, convened by the Population Division of UNDESA, with financial support from IOM.\(^\text{16}\) Since then, there have been twelve such meetings, attendance of which is summarized in Chart 10\(^\text{17}\). The dominant attendance by the United Nations agencies, funds, programmes, and secretariat is made clearer by considering the proportions for each meeting in Chart 11.

This gave a crucial space for the scientists, logistics specialists, policy experts and others of the United Nations to strategize on how to proceed in the area of migration. They sought expert civil society and State attendance, but interventions were primarily made by United Nations and United Nations agency staff. There seems to be agreement among interviewees that the balance of participation has been adequately reached, which may (though this was not mentioned) reflect the increased participation of NGOs in recent years, so that in the past four years they have represented between a quarter and a third of attendees (see Chart 11).


\(^{17}\) While data is not available on attendees for the first meeting, information about contributions can be ascertained by the list of contributed papers. For the meetings that followed, the information used is that given in the official list of participants for each event, provided by UNDESA.
b. Global Migration Group (GMG)

Like so much of today’s international migration policy infrastructure, the Global Migration Group (GMG) was created in 2006, building on the Geneva Migration Group, which had been around since 2003. The current members of the GMG are mostly United Nations agencies, or else are agencies and bodies affiliated with the United Nations, with some exceptions.
Chairmanship of the Group rotates every half-year. This is summarized in Table 7. It is only within the scope of this report to examine the GMG primarily from the perspective of civil society. Further research would need to conduct interviews with key individuals from GMG member organizations.

Table 7: Membership and chairmanship of the GMG since its inception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership of the Group (GMG)</th>
<th>Year of chairmanship(^\text{18})</th>
<th># of chairmanship period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Labour Organization (ILO)</td>
<td>2014a</td>
<td>17(^{\text{th}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</td>
<td>2007a; 2013b</td>
<td>3(^{\text{rd}}), 16(^{\text{th}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)</td>
<td>2010b</td>
<td>10(^{\text{th}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Regional Commissions</td>
<td>2013a</td>
<td>15(^{\text{th}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)</td>
<td>2011a</td>
<td>11(^{\text{th}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)</td>
<td>2006a; 2008b; (2009a)</td>
<td>1(^{\text{st}}), 6(^{\text{th}}); (7(^{\text{th}}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)</td>
<td>2007b</td>
<td>4(^{\text{th}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td>2010a</td>
<td>9(^{\text{th}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)</td>
<td>2011b; (2012a)</td>
<td>12(^{\text{th}}); (13(^{\text{th}}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</td>
<td>2006b</td>
<td>2(^{\text{nd}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)</td>
<td>2009b</td>
<td>8(^{\text{th}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</td>
<td>2012b</td>
<td>14(^{\text{th}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)</td>
<td>2008a</td>
<td>5(^{\text{th}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Health Organization (WHO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There seems to be a lack of clarity among non-members of the GMG regarding what it is. This is also reflected in some comments of GMG members (eg. UNGA 2013 16). Among civil society interviewees there was a general agreement that it was not yet clear what the role of the GMG should be, or indeed what it was already. Some States, meanwhile, seem suspicious of the GMG. The GFMD Assessment Team in 2012 stated that:

\(^{18}\) Chairmanship is held on a half-yearly basis. (a) denotes first portion of year, while (b) denotes the other.
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The GMG, other international organizations and regional entities should not interfere with the GFMD structures and processes. Also, the roundtable discussions should remain platforms for States to informally exchange lessons learned and good practices. Interventions by international organizations should therefore be limited and should contribute to policy dialogue. ... Finally, to ensure that the GFMD remains a State-led process, it is important that the agenda for GFMD-meetings are set by States and not international organizations or experts (GFMD Assessment Team 2012 8).

This comment is interesting because it recognizes the power of the international organizations (by expressing a concern to keep that power in check). The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, however, suggests that some GMG member agencies are subject to more State suspicion than others, and that some are more welcome (UNGA 2013 17). If this is correct, it would suggest that concern may be less about the power of the GMG per se, and more about the possible changes to acceptable discourse that some agencies might drive.

c. The Special Representative and the Special Rapporteur

Evidence of the recognized importance of personalities is exemplified in the roles of the Special Representative and the Special Rapporteur. A number of factors drove the fixing of the migration and development discourse, one of which may have been the personality of Peter Sutherland, who was appointed in 2006 to the position of Special Representative to the Secretary General on International Migration (SRSG), but had already been speaking interchangeably about migration and migration and development for some time (from an analysis on his speeches available online).

The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants was created by the Commission on Human Rights in 1999 (UNGA 2013 7). The current incumbent, François Creppeau, uses his role to produce reports and lead research. For example, consider the 2013 report of his regional study: ‘management of the external borders of the European Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants’ (UNGA 2013c). The role of the Special Rapporteur can also be seen as being to raise certain questions relating to human rights in international settings.

This Section has presented a number of processes driven by the different types of entity described (States, civil society, international organizations) however, it has highlighted two key aspects. First, it has drawn attention to
the interaction that takes place across processes. Second, it has noted that the definitions of, and distinctions between, types of entity and between the types of entity that engage in particular processes are not fixed.

3. Positive developments and continuing challenges to the role of civil society in international migration governance

This report has sketched significant changes in how migration governance is discussed at the international level. It has also reflected upon a dramatic shift in how civil society is organized around this question, and how it is involved in the governmental processes. This section looks in more detail, at both the positive developments, and the continuing challenges, in this area. It considers this according to four key areas in which progress can be measured: logistics, trust, substance, and change on the ground.

In all of this, it is crucial, of course, to recognize the very human constraints in these processes. One interviewee mentioned:

> It’s so time consuming. You know, we’re all volunteers. We all have other jobs and family and everything else. It’s incredible to me that anything gets done really, because of the enormous amount of time it involves, enormous, and the states are the same way. Every one of them and us has about four meetings at the same time. How do you do that? (Sandis, interview)

3.1. Logistics

Some informants emphasized the importance of process. They argued that key to the successful inclusion of civil society into the state-led global migration governance processes is to have people sitting at the table. John Bingham of ICMC explained:

> …the people affected and in the centre of the subject are the ones most needed at the table, so it’s migrant and diaspora groups. There is value itself in being on the inside, at every table where decision-makers gather… (Bingham, interview).

This is not to suggest that mere tokenistic inclusion is considered sufficient. The aim of inclusion is inclusion of migrant and diaspora voices in the
discussions affecting them. This was not what Colin Rajah of MRI, for example, observed in 2006:

We recognized very early on that there was a – I wouldn’t call it an exclusion – but definitely … the process didn’t allow for the easy inclusion of migrants’ voices, especially grassroots migrants voices, organized migrant communities from around the world, to be present and to be heard within that process (Rajah, interview).

This situation has changed, as can be seen, not only by the increased inclusion of civil society representatives in the High-level Dialogue in 2013, but in the level of respect given to the 5-year 8-point plan and the level of substantive consensus evident at the High-level Dialogue in 2013.

It is also not about including civil society per se, but trying to represent the diversity of migrant voices. Section 2.2a presented the diversity of types of civil society interests and perspectives. The distribution of actors depends both on who is able to attend and who is selected to attend. Economic and paperwork barriers prevent many from taking part from the outset (consider particularly irregular migrants and persons in low-wage sectors). Then, the International Civil Society Steering Committee (formerly the International Advisory Committee) review the 500 to 800 applications for participation submitted by civil society leaders and organizations around the world, to narrow the number to around 200. John Bingham, who plays an important part in this process notes:

Emphatic attention has been given to ensuring to the maximum extent possible a representative sectoral and geographic diversity in particular (Bingham, correspondence).

One aspect of this is by geographic region (analysis by sector was given in Section 2.2 above). Chart 12 surveys the proportion of CSD attendees at each GFMD coming from each geographic region and Chart 13 details this for 2011.19

Chart 12 shows a steady domination principally from Europe/Eurasia but also, to a lesser extent, by North America. However, when the data for 2011 in Chart 12 is compared, in Charts 13 and 14, to the distribution of international migrants worldwide, this can make more sense (note that Chart 13 uses UNDESA categorization of region, which means that the charts are not entirely comparable, for example, Mexico is not included in North America here, while in Chart 14 it is). These proportions changed slightly in 2012, as shown in Chart 15. Europe still dominates, but Africa makes up a larger proportion.

The 2012 CSDs also for the first time live-streamed the plenary sessions to enable greater engagement. From Chart 12, it can be seen that in 2008, the year when Milka Isinta mentions that the idea for the Pan African Network was formed, there was a large African presence at the CSD. The proportion
of African representatives has not even reached a quarter of that since with the exception of 2012, when the proportion was just under half.20

20 Though it would be important to establish to what extent this may have been affected by having a category of ‘Middle East’, rather than MENA.

21 Data from (Civil Society Coordinating Office 2012 13)
The low level of representation of the MENA region is also noteworthy. Interviewees expressed concern about this and John Bingham in particular mentioned the insufficient representation from the Middle East, from Eastern Europe, and at times Central and South America. He felt that at the level of the PGA, the inclusion of actors from Africa has improved, but these Charts suggest that this may not have been the case for the CSDs.

It is important to recognize that attendance of the CSDs cannot be the only measure of representation and voice. This is not least because, for some constituencies, attendance is impossible because of administrative or financial barriers (consider particularly irregular migrants and persons in low-wage sectors). The interviewees mentioned a range of structures in place to widen representation and voice. These include:

1. Email lists (The Women’s Global Migration Working Group, for example, sends out emails long before agreements have to be reached, to enable participants to comment. This practice is employed also by other actors.)
2. Regional meetings (The regional meetings facilitated by the GCM have already been discussed, but there are also important and strong regional bodies, such as the Migrant Forum in Asia)
3. Trade union structures
4. Engagement with academics who are working at the grass roots level (e.g. The NGO Committee is working with Georgetown University on a project regarding migrants in transit.)
For all the importance of high-level representatives, there might also be a benefit in governmental actors engaging directly with the civil society processes discussed here. One option might be for more representatives of States and international organizations to go to the places where migrant and diaspora civil society actors meet, such as to the WSFM, or to regional or national consultations. Just as it is important for civil society to be present at the State-led and international organization-led meetings, perhaps it would be good for States and international organizations to be present at these civil society meetings.

The GFMD Assessment Team first phase report indicated overall support among governments for participation in the CSDs (GFMD Assessment Team 2011 55):

Alongside the data illustrated in Chart 16, the report adds that:

...according to them, the benefits are the exchange of different perspectives and the opportunity for dialogue, common reflection and developing a common understanding of the issues discussed. One government proposes to strengthen the governments’ engagement at CSD throughout a longer general debate section (GFMD Assessment Team 2011 57).
Respondents noted, however, that few governments attend the CSDs because of time and/or cost constraints. As demonstrated above, this has been a common problem for all stakeholders. Perhaps there may be scope to build on this interest to develop other forms of engagement.

When asked about the possibility of governments attending civil society processes, there was overall approval among interviewees approached for this report. One noted:

…there is always room for that [including States and international organizations in the PGA] and it is highly desirable. Highly. People have to get to know each other. There’s no other way. And I think they should do it and maybe they will. I think it’s very important. Very (Sandis, interview).

While another was more reticent,

…[we] always have a big discussion on that [inviting governments to the CSDs] in the civil society steering committee: you know, how much and when, when does civil society speak with itself, strategize, and when does it make sense to start to collaborate within the process (Bingham, interview).

This raises the question of whether it is appropriate to include civil society in all State-led processes, since States also need an opportunity to come together and discuss common concerns.

However, just as States are careful about how they include civil society in State-led processes, civil society also guards its gates. Colin Rajah describes previous inclusions of States into civil society processes. These have been carefully controlled, and the actors have been carefully selected. He notes:

…we’ve specifically invited specific representatives, governments, and UN diplomats, to be present at certain plenary sessions … that’s again very strategic in how we organize things. So, if we have a particular plenary session, you know, to just give you an example, in 2008, we had a plenary session where we had the Mexican ambassador to the UN. Obviously we invited him specifically because we understood him to be a key player within the governments and also somebody who was very understanding of the role of civil society and was very willing to hear what we had to say and have a discussion with us. That was a very specific
invitation. He accepted, he came, he was very eloquent, spoke very well, and carried forward what he heard and discussed into the Global Forum (Rajah, interview).

John Bingham of ICMC describes a gradual opening of civil society processes to government and international organization representatives. Indeed, he notes that initially, governments were mostly only invited for the opening and closing plenary sessions of the CSDs. This changed in 2011, when governments, United Nations, and international and regional organizations were invited also to breakout sessions as observers. However, the right to speak was still ‘left to the discretion of the breakout session moderator’ (Bingham, correspondence). Crucial to moving this on will be the continued development of mutual trust.

3.2. Trust

Developing trust among all actors involved has been key to the wider developments since 2006. This will also affect the nature of the topics that can be raised. Interviewees indicated that engagement between civil society and governments began with animosity and distrust on both sides. They all note that great strides have been made by all to break this down, though some note a persisting lack of trust.

In the large-scale GFMD assessment, it was concluded that, ‘the involvement of, and interaction with civil society is generally assessed positively’, with around 63% of States responding that civil society actors had contributed ‘to a great extent’ or ‘somewhat’ to the preparatory process of the main GFMD meetings (GFMD Assessment Team 2011 55). Indeed, the data suggests that governments were overall very positive about participating with civil society during the GFMD process, with only 6.3% stating that participation of government in CSDs was inappropriate, and only 4.8% stating that the Common Space was inappropriate.

This change perhaps began with the adoption of different styles of engagement:

They [the State representatives] didn’t know who these people were and all they knew was … that there was a whole group always making demands. And you know, states don’t like it when you make demands. And even if you make demands, you have to make it not as a demand, you make it as a request. I think that’s normal. I wouldn’t like to be said: I demand that you so and so and so, or
else. You know, demands have to be approached in a nice way, as if I might really do what you want me to do, rather than I know you’re not going to like this. So there was a difference in tone (Sandis, interview).

That is not to say that some topics should be off the table. All civil society interviewees indicated that their demands had to be ambitious. One noted that ‘[c]ivil society wants things to change. If that’s unrealistic, well then the reality will have to change’ (Bingham, interview). It was also mentioned that sometimes civil society, and its lived experience of policy, is needed in order to show when policies do not make sense in practice:

…a lot of what civil society says is as practical as saying the policies have to change to match the reality, it’s the policies that are unrealistic. The policies towards essential labour, essential workers, in just about every country in the world that relies on the work of migrants and relies on the presence of migrants for some of their basic necessities … So what civil society demands [is] human mobility that matches the reality (Bingham, interview).

Part of this was recognizing each other as partners, or, to use John Bingham’s term, ‘co-responsibles’ (Bingham, interview). And part of this was understanding the perspectives and the constraints of the other. One US-based informant noted:

I think the US government, I mean, the State Department, has been very good about consultation with us, both at Washington, and at the Global Forum, both. Of course they don’t always do what you want and sometimes that’s extremely frustrating, but I think they have their own frustrations, so you know, at least they are trying, and at least there is a locus for doing things (Sandis, interview).

Several interviewees referred to the 2013 High-level Dialogue as an example of established trust between States and civil society. Examples throughout this report also show good practices on national levels, but there is still some way to go to make this more widespread and to develop this level of trust on a global level. Distrust of United Nations and State-led processes was observed at some civil society events attended during the period of this research, as well as the better documented distrust of civil society from some States mentioned already in this report.
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3.3. Substance

Some of those interviewed mentioned that too much time and energy can be expended fighting for inclusion, detracting from the importance of the real issues at stake. Moving beyond inclusion and having developed trust, it is crucial to look at the substance of the global migration governance debate. For civil society, this has been focused around addressing certain topics (e.g. migrants in transit) and ensuring a human rights framework to the discussion. Colin Rajah of MRI put it this way:

... we recognized ... that, from 1995 onwards, you know, after the Cairo Conference on Population and Development, there was a significant shift to looking at migration within a development context only, and the human rights framework sort of fell to the wayside... (Rajah, interview).

This trend is recognized also by UNFPA in its ten-year review of the Cairo Process (UNFPA 2004 88).

The success in the civil society strategy to promote migrant rights as a general concern is evident from Chart 17 of the increasing use of the term in books available through Google Books, though the proportions are still extremely low, especially when compared with those in Chart 1, relating to ‘migration’, above (with the height reached of just under 1.2 x 10^{-6}% at its peak, compared to the peak of 2.5x10^{-3}% for migration in Chart 1 (page 7)).

Chart 17: Proportion of books in English\textsuperscript{22} available on Google Books mentioning ‘migrant rights’ over time

This move on substantive issues does not only come from civil society. UNDP’s 2009 Development Report is interesting, coming as it does from the

\textsuperscript{22} Analyses are not yet possible for other languages.
key United Nations agency for development. The report moves the development discourse in migration away from one only of State development to a wider analysis of human development aspects of migration. This cannot replace a human rights approach, but it offers an important move in a more migrant-focused direction.

3.5. Change on the ground

Beyond the other factors, the key measure of success must be change on the ground. Colin Rajah explains what this means:

…at the end of the day, it’s really important to measure our level of success … by looking at what’s happening on the ground, what is really happening in the every day lives: in our jobs, in our families, in our communities, places of worship, places that we play in, and bring our families to. All of that, you know, that’s the final measure that we need to hold ourselves accountable to… if we’re making progress into making our lives better, protecting our rights, [making] our communities healthier, stronger, more vibrant, then we can finally say, yeah, we’re getting somewhere. At this moment, I think you can probably easily say that we’re not hitting our targets, we’re not achieving that (Rajah, interview).

Milka Isinta explains that crucial to this is a commitment to ongoing engagement, so ‘that it is not a show of waking up and coming for the meetings and going back and waiting for the next GFMD, but to put this programme that they are able to build with civil society at the local and national levels, even regional levels’. She calls for genuine collaborative work to develop strategies and programmes. It seems, indeed, that there is a general agreement that the only way to achieve genuine change on the ground is to build on State-based and regional processes. This is evident from the interviews and the GFMD assessment reports (i.e. Blue et al 22; GFMD Assessment Team 2012 6).

This has also already demonstrated success for civil society. For example, Box 6 presents one view of how regional processes enabled through the GCM led to the possibility of the 5-year 8-point plan. That said, others warn that decentralized processes should not detract for the need for global standards and the ratification of international agreements in the area of the human rights of migrants (e.g. UNGA 2013). The suggestion here is that regional and domestic engagements can enable cooperation between a variety of types of stakeholders (civil society, governments, international
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Box 4: Regional processes enabled through the GCM.

Colin Rajah of Migrant Rights International (MRI) described the relationship between international and regional civil society processes as ‘a two way street’. He describes, for example, a regional preparatory process that has been held in Asia since 2008 or even 2007 towards the GFMD. This process leads to concerns that are taken to the GFMD, but then the Asian civil society members also ‘come back from the Global Forum with the results, the outcomes, of that, and take it into their own regions, …, communities’. He explains that there is an ‘ongoing back and forth all the time’.

This work practice influenced the creation of the GCM. Rajah explained: ‘the idea would be this broad coalition that would be at an international level, but would really be driven by what’s happening in the various regions, and the different sectors.’ The hope was that, in this way, ‘what’s happening on the ground would then translate up into what we would deliberate in terms of how we would approach and strategize around this’. He explains that this has been crucial to the creation of the new agenda of civil society.

‘The Global Coalition basically encompasses all of the largest regional and international networks working on migration that have been involved at this level. If you just take any of the largest regional sectors, so Asia, you have the Migrant Forum in Asia, and Africa, you have the Pan African Network. In South America, you have Espacios sin Fronteras, … some of the most active networks in the US, you know, you look at all of them, and then you look at the sectors. From the Trade Unions, the Global Unions, the International Trade Union Confederation, ITUC, and some of the international networks, like ICMC and PICUM. And, you know, [INMD, and] GFMPA experts groups, all of the largest ones that have been the most active are part of the Global Coalition, and that’s no coincidence.…’

According to Colin Rajah, there has long been a desire to develop a coherent global regional consultation process, but until there was the structure afforded by the GCM, it was not possible. Finally, in 2013, ‘we did seven regional consultations for the HLD last year around the world, … that led to discussions around the 8-point agenda’. He goes on, ‘that’s only achievable when you have these large numbers of groups being able to work together and being able to accomplish a network. It’s a very loose coalition, everybody’s independent, everybody has their own interests and trajectory, and their points, but there’s a space where we all come together’.

(Rajah, interview)

organizations) with shared interests to drive global governance to develop in a positive direction.

Other examples of regional or even sub-regional processes feeding into and out from the global processes can be seen in bilateral relations, such as the
Mexican case in Box 2, or in the case of Kenya described above. Milka Isinta explained that since the start of the GFMD, the Kenyan government has become more receptive to engagement, in the ministries of labour, of migration, and of health. Indeed, she describes the current plan to have, in the government, at least one ‘agent that works on all issues relating to migration’ (other countries are considering similar things, e.g. see discussion in Rittener et al 2011 251).

At root, the aim of all of these processes, civil society, States, international organizations, and engagement between them must be change on the ground, an improvement in the lives of migrants and their families and communities. With this in mind, perhaps some form of monitoring of the informal outcomes from the GFMD, or maybe even some more solid form of outcome may be useful (Crépeau agrees; UNGA 2013; while Hansen suggests formalized outcomes inhibit progress; 2011).

Conclusions and recommendations

On the basis of the initial analysis offered in this Policy Report, eight recommendations are offered to those involved in the development of global migration, and migration and development, governance. Crucially, however, it also recommends further and wider research into this important and changing topic, including also the perspectives of those civil society actors outside the processes as well as of States and international organizations.

1. Recognize and build upon the substantial progress so far and build on the momentum

One decade ago, there was not a joined-up approach in the international community for discussing migration, which was not seen as a topic in its own right. Now, the international community (States, civil society and international organizations) are even discussing the possibility of including migration within the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda, perhaps even as a stand-alone Goal. There is still work to be done, but subsequent efforts should build upon existing momentum.

2. A move away from single-event global focus and towards an ongoing multi-level process

Several actors are already moving their emphasis towards ongoing regional, national, and local processes. This will be key in the creation of real change.
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This must not supplant the global processes, but be a key component of them. Included in this must be an emphasis on on-the-ground progress. This includes the ratification and genuine implementation of key migrant rights conventions (and human rights conventions more generally as they pertain to migrants and diaspora communities) and the development of tangible goals for progress. One step in this direction is the work towards the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda.

3. Allowing space to think and to work both within and between sectors

While it is crucial that all types of stakeholder are part of the debate, they need to be able to do this on their own terms, taking time to develop a discourse that they can relate to within a wider context. This means protecting spaces available for States, civil society and international organizations to talk among themselves alongside the project of creating increased shared space. This includes differentiating between groups usually placed within the civil society categorization. This will be crucial to enabling each type of entity to discuss and develop best practices.

4. Developing shared spaces

While spaces need to be protected for sectorial discussion, it is also important to ensure that the vital insights of all stake-holders are included within crucial debates and policy-making. This Policy Report advocates the continued development of shared spaces and has sketched some of the steps in the evolution of civil society inclusion within State and international organization processes. It recommends that, alongside developing these processes, innovative new locations for shared spaces be found, such as alongside or within the civil society processes, ensuring that States and international organizations are able to benefit from access to a wider range of civil society migrant and diaspora voices and analyses. It is hoped that a better understanding of each others’ processes and discourses can help in the continued development of a shared approach.

5. Acknowledging, critiquing, and enabling the particular contributions of various types of actor that can otherwise be under-represented

Several different types of actor were discussed in this policy report. Three in particular, whose potential contributions and roles are not fully understood are: members of the private sector (including migrant entrepreneurs), academia, and funding bodies. Each comes, like other types of stakeholder, with its own set of interests and priorities as well as its own powers. There is
scope for examining more carefully their proper roles in the discussion of migration, and migration and development.

6. Building on convergence and trust to enable an increasing number of topics to be discussed and suggestions to be made

The High-level Dialogue in October 2013 made it clear that there significant agreement among States and between States and civil society on matters of migration and migration and development. It is crucial to build on the trust (both on substantive matters and on procedural elements) that was built during this process and the level of convergence on key matters.

7. Maintaining a focus on rights and on human (as well as State economic) development

At root, throughout the process, there needs to be an appreciation that migrants are the holders of human rights and any system of governance needs to ensure that they can make use of them. Migration and development discourse needs to be used with caution to ensure that it does not obscure the importance of migrants’ human rights.
8. Organized knowledge-sharing

Informed policy-making and policy-implementation requires a strong evidence base. This needs an increase in the channels available for sharing knowledge about migration more widely among all those involved in the international processes (e.g. Newland 2013; UNGA 2013). This includes the support of States to provide comparable migration data to UNDESA, work to ensure field and lived experience of civil society organizations and international organizations is fed into the policy-making processes, improved interactions between the global academic community and United Nations processes in this area, and a dissemination of this information in creative and interesting ways to reach key stakeholders: governments, agencies, migrants, scholars, journalists, as well as a general public, to ensure informed debate in the area of migration governance at all levels.

References


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