The current state of peacebuilding programming and evidence

April 2015
About 3ie

The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) is an international grant-making NGO promoting evidence-informed development policies and programmes. We are the global leader in funding and producing high-quality evidence of what works, how, why and at what cost. We believe that better and policy-relevant evidence will make development more effective and improve people’s lives.

3ie scoping papers

3ie thematic window grant programmes typically start with a consultative process that includes a scoping study identifying the current state of impact-evaluation evidence in a particular sector. Scoping studies identify the promising questions for research synthesis and the priority questions for further impact-evaluation research. They analyse the existing supply of impact-evaluation and systematic-review evidence as well as the demand for such evidence from policymakers and programme managers.

About this scoping paper

This paper provides an assessment of the supply of and demand for evidence on peacebuilding interventions in support of a joint 3ie – Innovations for Poverty Action – World Bank initiative called Evidence for Peacebuilding. The scoping paper is the key output of the stocktaking phase of the initiative, and the final publication reflects consultation that occurred after the draft paper was prepared and presented. All of the content is the sole responsibility of the authors and does not represent the opinions of 3ie, its donors or its Board of Commissioners. Any errors and omissions are also the sole responsibility of the authors. Any comments or queries should be directed to the corresponding author Annette N. Brown at abrown@3ieimpact.org.

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The current state of peacebuilding programming and evidence

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The scoping paper is based on three primary inputs: the evidence gap map, the portfolio review and the stakeholder survey. 3ie staff and consultants prepared the evidence gap map under the direction of Drew Cameron and Annette Brown. A separate report on the evidence gap map entitled Evidence for peacebuilding: an evidence gap map serves as a companion piece to this paper and is available as part of 3ie’s Evidence Gap Map Report series. We would like to recognise Anjini Mishra, Mario Picon, Hisham Esper, Flor Calvo and Katia Peterson, who coauthored the gap map report.

IPA staff prepared the portfolio review under the direction of Faith McCollister. 3ie staff, with IPA assistance, conducted and analysed the stakeholder survey, under the direction of Jennifer Ludwig. Annette Brown provided leadership and management over all inputs and the scoping paper itself.

We are grateful to Jane Burke for research assistance.

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Executive summary

This scoping paper examines the demand for and supply of impact-evaluation evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions. We use a matrix framework to organise the analysis, where the matrix includes 25 intervention rows, 14 outcome columns and three crosscutting theme columns. We explore demand in three ways: by conducting a portfolio review on a sample of interventions in all 25 categories implemented over the last four years, by conducting a stakeholder survey of individuals working in the field of peacebuilding and by consulting with stakeholders on the initial findings. We describe the supply of evidence using an evidence gap map, for which a systematic search and screening process identified 78 completed impact evaluations that we mapped into the matrix in order to depict the existing evidence base. We also describe the four completed systematic reviews and two systematic-review protocols that we identified in the search and analyse whether they serve to synthesise the evidence in any of the evidence gap map cells.

There are several intervention categories for which there is a high demand for more and better evidence and an absence or dearth of existing studies. These include SSR, gender-based-violence programmes, capacity building and reform of justice institutions, life skills and employment training, and public sector governance capacity building and reform. We identify other interventions with a relatively high demand combined with low supply. We suggest two categories – community-driven development (CDD) and community-driven reconstruction (CDR) and psychosocial services for victims – where a relatively high supply of evidence combined with medium to high demand suggests that investments should be made in synthesising evidence, particularly as the existing systematic reviews do not cover the evidence identified or assess the evidence for this context. Two similar categories combined – peace education and peace messaging and media-based interventions – have relatively high demand and medium supply. This finding suggests that an investment in new impact evaluations for these categories could bring high value by producing a sufficient body of evidence for evidence synthesis, particularly as no systematic reviews exist for these interventions in conflict-affected settings.
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Abbreviations and acronyms

3ie International Initiative for Impact Evaluation
CCT Conditional cash transfer
CDD Community-driven development
CDR Community-driven reconstruction
CSO Civil society organisation
DDR Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DIME Development Impact Evaluation
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
E4P Evidence for Peacebuilding
EF Economic foundations
FCS Fragile and conflict-affected state
GBV Gender-based violence
IDP Internally-displaced person
IPA Innovations for Poverty Action
J4A Justice for all
L&MIC Low- and middle-income country
LP Legitimate politics
NGO Non-governmental organisation
RSS Revenues and social services
SGBV Sexual and gender-based violence
SS Security sector
SSR Security sector reform
UCT Unconditional cash transfer
UN United Nations
UNPBF United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VAWG Violence against women and girls
1. Introduction

The challenge of moving from conflict and fragility to stabilisation and growth is immense. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding estimates that around 70 per cent of fragile states have experienced conflict since 1989 and that 30 per cent of official development assistance is spent in fragile and conflict-affected situations.\(^1\) International Monetary Fund research suggests that 20 per cent of countries that emerge from civil conflict return to violence in one year and 40 per cent return to violence in five years (Cevik and Rahmati 2013).

Responding to such challenges is essential, as development indicators are dramatically lower and poverty levels are dramatically higher in conflict-affected areas. The scale of this problem is enormous, with 1.5 billion people countries affected by violent conflict. Currently very few conflict-affected countries have met a single Millennium Development Goal. Trends show that poverty is declining in much of the world, but countries affected by conflict are not experiencing the same progress.

The international community is committed to helping communities to emerge from conflict, sustain peace and resume growth. The World Bank, along with many bilateral and other multilateral donors, invests billions of dollars every year to help achieve peace and build states. The challenge lies in making evidence-informed investments so that interventions can achieve positive impacts, even in situations where indicators are worsening, and to build greater capacity and commitment to evaluating the impact of these interventions going forward so that future programmes can be even more effective.

The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) formed a joint initiative with Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) and the World Bank in 2014 called Evidence for Peacebuilding (E4P) in order to support the production and use of impact-evaluation evidence to improve the effectiveness of interventions designed to build peace. Impact evaluations are programme evaluations or field experiments that measure the net impact of an intervention by using counterfactual analysis — that is, by comparing the impact of the intervention to an estimate of what would have happened in the absence of the intervention. The counterfactual can be estimated experimentally, using a randomised controlled trial, or quasi-experimentally, using statistics to construct a counterfactual with observational data.

The first component of the E4P initiative is the stocktaking and scoping work. We take stock of current peacebuilding programming using a portfolio-review approach, which describes a subset of interventions in each of the categories in the sector and explores the explicit and implicit theories of change for these interventions. We also take stock of the current state of impact-evaluation evidence using an evidence gap map. Combining these inputs with the results of a stakeholder survey and stakeholder consultations, we describe the scope for future research in the sector. We suggest which questions are promising, meaning that there appears to be sufficient impact-evaluation evidence to conduct a systematic review and synthesise the evidence, as well as which questions are priorities, meaning that there is both a low supply of evidence and a high demand for evidence for that intervention.

We build the scoping paper on a framework of interventions and outcomes that we identify through a consultative process. In the next section, we provide an overview of this framework. We then review the findings from the three inputs into the analysis: the portfolio review, the stakeholder survey and the evidence gap map. For each of these sections, we briefly describe the methods and then report the findings. Readers may elect to skip these detailed sections and go straight to the analysis in section 6. In section 6 we discuss the intersection of the demand for evidence with the existing evidence base and propose priority questions for future research. In section 7 we list the limitations of the study, and in section 8 we conclude.

2. Evidence for peacebuilding framework

The three inputs into this scoping paper all build on the evidence for peacebuilding framework developed for this purpose. The framework is a matrix with interventions as the rows and outcomes as the columns. By interventions, we mean distinct programmes or components of programmes carried out by governments, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) or other implementing agencies in order to build peace and peaceful states. As explained in section 3, many programmes, particularly those funded by large donors, incorporate multiple sets of activities. Wherever possible, we try to examine separately the various interventions encompassed in a large programme so that we can explore mechanisms.

Because we are interested in how these interventions are evaluated, we also categorise the types of outcomes that might be measured. We do not list specific indicators but rather outcome types for which many different indicators may be used.

We developed the framework based on conceptual and strategy documents from major international funders of peacebuilding interventions, including the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and others. We also conducted two workshops for brainstorming and refining the items in the framework. The first took place at the World Bank, and the second took place at the UN, hosted by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF).

The list of intervention categories is the union of the various sets of interventions from different strategy documents and workshops. We tried to harmonise the terminology and eliminate some categories that do not relate directly to peacebuilding. We then grouped the interventions according to the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals defined by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. The descriptions of these goals, listed below, provide some insight into the implied theories of change:

- **Legitimate politics (LP):** foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
- **Security:** establish and strengthen people’s security
- **Justice:** address injustices and increase people’s access to justice
- **Economic foundations (EF):** generate employment and improve livelihoods
- **Revenues and social services (RSS):** manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery
Table 1 presents the intervention categories for each group, along with the code used in the evidence gap map.

### Table 1: E4P framework intervention categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimate politics</strong></td>
<td>LP1</td>
<td>Demand-side governance and civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LP2</td>
<td>Support to peace processes and negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LP3</td>
<td>Peace education or dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LP4</td>
<td>Peace messaging and media-based interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LP5</td>
<td>Support for elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td>SS1</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS2</td>
<td>Disarmament and demobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS3</td>
<td>Gender-based-violence programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS4</td>
<td>Community security and policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS5</td>
<td>Civilian police reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS6</td>
<td>Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice</strong></td>
<td>J1</td>
<td>Capacity building and reform of justice institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J2</td>
<td>Dispute resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J3</td>
<td>Transitional justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J4</td>
<td>Reconciliation and services to victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>Human rights awareness and legal frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic foundations</strong></td>
<td>EF1</td>
<td>Life skills and employment training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EF2</td>
<td>Jobs, cash-for-work, and cash and in-kind transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EF3</td>
<td>Land reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EF4</td>
<td>Natural resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EF5</td>
<td>Ex-combatant reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenues and social services</strong></td>
<td>RSS1</td>
<td>Public sector governance capacity building and reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RSS2</td>
<td>Equitable access to services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RSS3</td>
<td>Community-driven development and community-driven reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RSS4</td>
<td>Urban design for prevention of violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interventions under the heading of ‘legitimate politics’ generally focus on the citizens in fragile or conflicted-affected states. The interventions encourage citizens to engage as members of civil society and as individual voters and to change their knowledge and attitudes, and perhaps also their behaviour, related to the specific issues behind the conflict and violence.

The interventions under ‘security’ focus on stabilising a conflict or violent situation and helping the population feel secure. Some also seek to prevent future conflict and violence. We have included a row for gender-based violence (GBV) programmes here, as these programmes typically aim to reduce violence and increase feelings of safety directly. Most of the GBV programmes should be cross-listed with other intervention categories based on the actual activities the programme includes. For example, a GBV programme might involve a
component on media-based information component and a component on capacity building of justice institutions. We included demining here, as it relates directly to safety, even though it is very different from interventions involving policing and SSR.

The third group is justice, which includes many interventions that one might think of as rule of law interventions. Two intervention types that we include here, even though they are not typical rule of law interventions, are reconciliation and services to victims and human rights awareness and legal frameworks. We group the human rights interventions, which perhaps could also be grouped under legitimate politics (LP), in this manner due to the focus on mainstreaming human rights into legal frameworks. Reconciliation, as we discuss above, is an objective rather than a distinct set of activities. The portfolio review below indeed finds that most programmes focused on reconciliation could be classified under other categories. There are programmes, however, that focus on reconciliation by directly improving the situations of victims of the conflict or violence, righting the wrongs to specific groups. We put these here under justice.

More than for the other groups, the fourth and fifth groups include categories that cross over between peacebuilding interventions and regular development interventions. For example, employment training is an intervention in many countries, not even just low- and middle-income countries (L&MICs). The objectives of employment training generally are improved welfare and increased growth, but there are employment-training programmes designed for fragile and conflict-affected situations with peacebuilding as one of the primary objectives. The theory of change may be that employment for ex-combatants will reduce their likelihood of returning to violence, for example. Similarly, there are many development programmes for building public sector capacity and reducing corruption. We include this row in the map to capture those studies that evaluate public sector capacity building programmes with specific elements aimed at peacebuilding. This may include, for instance, increasing the representation of certain groups among the ranks of the civil service.

Land reform and natural resource management here are not meant to include all such programmes but, rather, those designed to reduce the sources of conflict or create a post-conflict situation beneficial to the right groups (or enough groups) to make peace more worthwhile than conflict.

Under EF, we have ex-combatant reintegration, which is similar to GBV programmes in that the row defines the target group more than a set of activities. We expect studies here also to be coded under another intervention category that reflects the types of activities in the programs, for example the category for jobs and cash for work.

Provision of public services is not in the map as an intervention category to capture all public service programmes in conflict-affected situation, just those where service provision is meant to address or redress sources of conflict. Originally we felt that all interventions here would also be under public sector governance capacity building. However, stakeholders suggested that sometimes donors provide access more directly and therefore wanted a separate category to capture cases where services are provided directly in an attempt to bring peace, among other goals. The term public services crosses over multiple service sectors (for example health, education and infrastructure).
We grouped outcome categories according to individual-level outcomes, societal and institutional outcomes, and peacebuilding outcomes. Although the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals presented by the New Deal are accompanied by indicators, we do not use those indicators for the framework. The New Deal indicators are designed to be measured at the national level. Impact evaluations use indicators that can be measured for more disaggregated units, such as individuals, households or communities, in order to allow for estimation of large samples. Thus we use a set of outcomes categories corresponds to the types of indicators we expect to see in impact evaluation. Table 2 presents the outcome categories and their codes.

**Table 2: E4P framework outcome categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual outcomes</th>
<th>I1: Knowledge and skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I2: Beliefs and norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I3: Economic situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I4: Social and psychological situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal and institutional outcomes</td>
<td>S1: Participation and inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S2: Equitable access to services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S3: Social cohesion and cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S4: Public confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S5: Institutional performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding outcomes</td>
<td>P1: Displacement and repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P2: Intergroup conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P3: Interpersonal conflict and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P4: Crime and gang violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P5: Perceptions of safety and security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The outcomes category ‘social and psychological situation’ encompasses indicators that attempt to measure concepts such as empowerment and status, as well as measures for psychological outcomes such as trauma. The equitable access to services category includes indicators of services received by those who are conflict affected. The different types of conflict and violence indicators under the ‘peacebuilding outcomes’ section are the hardest to disentangle. Here, ‘intergroup’ generally means war-type violence, including tribal conflict, cross-border conflict and civil wars. ‘Interpersonal conflict and violence’ generally includes domestic- and intimate-partner violence. ‘Crime and gang violence’, then, includes violence experienced from those outside the home as part of crime rather than as part of intergroup conflict. General crime and criminality are included here.

3. **Portfolio review: how are peacebuilding programmes designed?**

The primary goals of the portfolio review are to identify and describe peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions that are implemented worldwide, to uncover trends in programming and to explore the theories of change as set out in the programme documents. We also report which types of interventions are often combined within major programmes and in which countries different interventions types tend to be found. This portfolio review is more limited than portfolio reviews conducted by multilateral banks, which also review the number of interventions and the volume of financial support based on the information they
have available to them. We present here abbreviated text from the full portfolio review *Evidence for peacebuilding portfolio review* (McCollister 2015).

**Methods**

*Rationale for inclusion of interventions*

The review covers interventions that have been recently implemented, are currently implemented or are in the pipeline within fragile and conflict-affected situations. We do not include every intervention that takes place in fragile and conflict-affected situations but, instead, focus specifically on interventions and programmes that intend to affect outcomes related to peacebuilding and statebuilding. So, for example, we would not include a programme that offers health services to a conflict-affected population with the primary outcome of improving long-term health outcomes.

This review is not systematic. We do seek to identify programmes in all of the categories of interest, but we do not attempt to record every programme in these categories. The interventions we list here have been selected and curated based on a variety of factors, including size and scope of the program, amount of funding, implementation in key areas of interest to major donors and governments, and existence and accessibility of publicly available information on the programmes and interventions.

We filtered the programmes included here by date in order to only include current and recently completed programmes – those active at some point during the period from 2010 to the present – with an emphasis on programmes currently taking place and in the pipeline.

The interventions are heavily weighted towards multisector programmes funded by major bilateral and multilateral organisations, including DFID, the UN, USAID and the World Bank, because the review seeks to identify programmes and programmes with significant momentum and potential for impact. The review also aims to identify themes in which types of programmes and interventions are currently being implemented and are slated to extend several years into the future, rather than interventions that are less likely to be funded and implemented on a large scale going forward.

The World Bank’s Harmonised List of Fragile Situations FY14 (2014b) forms the basis for the selection of countries included in the portfolio review. In addition, we include other low- and middle-income countries based on their current or recent conflict status and the presence of funding and interventions for peacebuilding, statebuilding and violence relevant to this review, including Colombia, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Philippines.

**Search strategy and resources**

We attempted to gather all the relevant materials from the primary sites listed below. We tried to find at least a few examples for each of the categories, but we also wanted to get a sense of which interventions are currently the most prevalent. Therefore, we tended to follow where the documents led.

The primary sites and tools we searched are the following:

- DFID Development Tracker
- Various UN online databases from individual UN divisions; the UNPBF
Results

Prevalence and trends

Figure 1 shows the number of programmes identified for each of the intervention categories. The two outliers are the first, which includes a variety of civil society interventions, and the category for public sector governance interventions that have peacebuilding elements. Those that are less prevalent are disarmament and demobilisation, demining, transitional justice, land reform, natural resource management and urban design for the prevention of violence. We hypothesise that the dearth of documents for disarmament and demobilisation and for demining is due to the fact that these programmes are often implemented by military agencies, which have different processes around programme documentation.
We also explored priorities and trends by looking for specific language to this effect in the strategy documents and interviewing some key stakeholders. The agency documents and stakeholders indicate some upcoming trends, priorities and interests for fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS’s) that do not fit easily within the framework’s categories. These include the following:

- Although interventions cash and in-kind transfers in general were included here and have been extensively implemented in conflict-affected situations, the utility and feasibility of newly popular unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) in FCS environments is under debate.
- Natural resources is also a category that stakeholders at the UNPBF have identified as a category in which programme implementation has so far been limited but for which interest is expected to soon increase.
- The UNPBF also identified cross-border programmes as a particular area of future interest and relevance for programmes aiming to promote peace and to reduce
conflict. Though at least one programme (focusing on the Great Lakes) tackled cross-border issues, several more pilots are in the planning stages. Difficulties inherent in cross-border programming include political concerns and tensions that keep groups from signing on and coming to an agreement, but these interventions often consider the process by which groups in conflict come to a joint decision on a development agenda to be part of the programme outcome rather than simply part of the planning process.

- Elements addressing climate change in fragile and conflict-affected contexts are becoming more prevalent, with special attention being paid to ways in which climate change affects already fragile or challenging situations through mechanisms such as increased natural disasters, rising sea levels or desertification. Disaster risk reduction and resilience, though not covered here, is of increasing interest to agencies planning programmes in challenging contexts.

**Theories of change**

We were able to find complete programme documentation (planning documents, project descriptions, progress reports, process evaluations and so forth) for only a small set of the programmes. We did find discussion of theories of change in some of the documentation. Several donors, most notably the World Bank and USAID, have published guides to theories of change in certain related sectors, such as conflict and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). However, in many cases, theories of change or logical frameworks are not a key part, or a part at all, of the programme-planning process.

Some programmes contain logical and well-thought-out theories of change, with measurable indicators and outputs specified, but this is by far the exception to the rule. Where theories of change are presented for entire programmes or specific interventions, they often are not coherent and do not reflect a consistent effort to apply the concept of theories of change or to apply evidence from past programmes to new programmes being designed. Some programmes claim to include a theory of change but lay it out in nonstandard circular or iterative configurations, without a logical progression from activity to outcome and impact and with no clear way to measure success. A common approach is to explain programme activities and then make a leap to a broad outcome or impact, such as ‘greater peace’, without explaining mechanisms or tracing how the activities should lead to this anticipated impact.

Where there exists an agency theory of change for an intervention category or sector, programme documents often do not explicitly state or link the project activities to the agency theory of change. The specific programmes that do enumerate a theory of change are often multisector programmes that theorise an interaction among multiple intervention types that claim to work together in a unique way. In no intervention category does there exist a truly agreed-upon, consistent, overarching theory of change to provide guidelines for where and how to apply interventions in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.

It is very rare that accessible programme documents mention a planned evaluation, particularly a rigorous experimental evaluation, or even contain measurable indicators.
Results by category

For each intervention category, we begin by giving a general overview of the objectives of the intervention and then provide more detailed descriptions of activities and explore the theories of change. We describe the other categories with which each type of intervention is combined, if applicable, before moving to a general analysis and discussion of the common countries for the interventions.

Almost every intervention we examined for this portfolio review featured activities in more than one category. Three or more categories of intervention per programme proved very common. This makes simple organisation of programmes by category difficult if not impossible. Thus, in this section, the review aims to give a general analysis of each category, including trends, points of interest, common linkages across categories and commonalities and areas of divergence.

Legitimate politics (LP)

LP1: Demand-side governance and civil society development (includes citizen engagement and quick-impact grants)

Civil society interventions represent by far the most common intervention category in peacebuilding and statebuilding programmes. The activities within these programmes fall within a wide range and often represent the core element of a multipronged program. Demand-side governance focuses on citizen-led engagement and accountability efforts, with citizen score cards for government and other social accountability efforts that call upon citizens themselves to hold government to task. Civil society development is the least specifically defined yet most commonly included category and includes many types of efforts to work with civil society organisations (CSOs) to develop their capacity to act as a force for change. Citizen-engagement interventions are focused on increasing the involvement of citizens in governance and civil society through a variety of means, often channelling funds and programmes through local and issue-focused groups and NGOs. Quick-impact grants are rapid infusions of cash to local NGOs to meet a particular urgent community need, such as funding to help restore livelihoods or provide basic necessities to communities hit by natural disaster or conflict.

Most programmes within this category are focused on civil society development, which is typically intended to take place through activities, primarily trainings, to increase the capacity and abilities of CSOs to advocate for and engage with citizens and government. Activity descriptions in programme documents ranged from vague plans to support outreach- and institutional-capacity development of CSOs with citizens and various public service and government agencies to detailed plans to assist NGOs and CSOs to develop pre-election dialogue programmes and voter education programmes in support of elections. Other common activities were workshops, trainings, grants to improve organisational management and international-exchange events. Although most activities and funding streams were focused on in-country CSO activities, one civil society development program’s main activity was to fund and implement exchange trips, sending Afghan civil society representatives to the UK, and to support the costs for a London-based secretariat created to support advocacy and humanitarian aid and act as a coordinating agency for efforts to support Afghan aid and development.
Many programmes with somewhat vague descriptions of support and capacity building for CSOs and general citizen-engagement programmes nevertheless listed a number of detailed outcomes expected from relatively basic activities. For example, DFID’s Somaliland Election Support programme (DFID 2012a) provides ‘technical and management expertise at key parts of the election process to ensure that there is full and adequate support to the election process’ (p.1) through activities including educating voters about political candidates and their agendas, forming the Somaliland Civil Society Election Forum and holding dialogue meetings between this forum and government agencies, and encouraging the Somaliland Non-State Actor platforms to actively engage in policy dialogue with authorities. Although several detailed outputs are listed, the overall intended outcome it lists is enumerated as ‘democracy strengthened in Somaliland’ (p.2).

Theories of change are in many cases not listed at any significant level of detail or linked to past work that informs the logical underpinnings of the program. This category of intervention was notable for programme documents that make significant leaps from relatively limited activities such as workshops to major outcomes and impacts, such as ‘democracy strengthened nationwide’. DFID’s Jonglei Peace Process Project in South Sudan (DFID 2013e) worked from February 2012 through August 2012 on support to the peace process, ‘enhancing the capacity of the Sudan Council of Churches to support a complex peace process’ and coordinating donors and NGOs with the council. The programme documentation does not enumerate a detailed theory of change, but its ultimate goal is listed as ‘to prevent violence and promote peace in Jonglei State [and] ensure a more coherent approach to building peace in Jonglei, including in the delivery of “peace dividends” in the medium to long term’ (DFID 2013e).

Strong linkages appear between civil society interventions and public sector reform, with a significant number of projects seeking to reform both civil society and public sector and government institutions. Programmes with strong civil society and public-institution strengthening components include IPACS-II in Afghanistan, Justice for All (J4A) in Nigeria and Local Government and Infrastructure (LGI) in Palestine. Though many programmes have a strong or primary component of demand-side governance and civil society development, it is often in support of an outcome more closely related to another intervention category, such as building the capacity of CSOs working on human rights and access to justice. This review tags such interventions under both civil society and the other category or categories.

The ubiquity of interventions in this category and their frequent implementation in programmes that include interventions from each of the four other umbrella categories, including intervention types under LP, suggests that donors and programme planners view CSOs as key actors and stakeholders in the peacebuilding and statebuilding process and as crucial partners in ensuring the success of interventions across a broad spectrum of intended outcomes. Though rarely explicitly elaborated in programme documents and theories of change, the existence of capacity building for CSOs alongside programmes for public sector governance capacity building and reform implies that engagement of CSOs may be key to successfully reforming government agencies and that efforts to reform government and the public sector are not enough without active promotion of citizen engagement and accountability.
This intervention category appeared multiple times in every country considered for this review, a total of 37 times. It is a particularly common component in programmes implemented in Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali and Nigeria.

LP2: Support to peace processes and negotiation

We only identified three programmes in this category, which is likely due in part to the relative rarity of active, formal peace processes within the period of time and countries included in this review. Though this small sample makes generalisation difficult, the programmes examined here include a suite of interventions from a wide swath of categories, from three to nine different types of interventions combined. The activities used large-scale support to elections, CSOs, reintegration programmes, transitional justice, elections support, declaration of mine-free areas and service-provision assistance to constitute an overall measure of support to the larger peace process. Measurement of success of the overall programme measured success of the individual components rather than of any larger concept of support.

The theory of change of the largest programme within this category, constituting at least nine different categories of intervention, was quite basic and stated that ‘by supporting an inclusive political settlement, the conditions for stability, poverty reduction and development will be enhanced’ (DFID 2011b p.9). The program’s stated outcome was that the Nepalese government and UN could provide support to the peace process through ‘coordinated and appropriate assistance’ (p.3) to the implementation of peace agreements, with an impact of ‘a sustainable peace to help reduce poverty and social exclusion in Nepal’ (p.8).

The Sudanese Jonglei Peace Process program, a smaller-scale effort, offers the theory of change that ‘increased inclusion of armed/cattle camp youth will create critical conditions for negotiated settlement between Jonglei’s warring tribes’ (DFID 2012c p.4) but does not trace the path from inclusion to negotiated settlement and also fails to fully detail the conditions mentioned. Perhaps the lack of detail suggests that, within the context of support to major peace processes, coordinated packages of programmes that might otherwise be understood on their own to have smaller impacts are assumed to somehow work together and interact to create a major impact when applied to an overall peace process.

The included programmes take place in Nepal and South Sudan.

LP3: Peace education or dialogue (includes civic education)

We found 10 programmes incorporating major elements of peace and civic education and dialogue. These programmes use events or the media to open up dialogue or provide peace education between groups that have been victims of conflict or have in the past been in conflict with each other. Civic education more generally trains citizens on the basics of civic rights and engagement. This category of intervention rarely stands alone or even constitutes the main pillar of a program. Rather, these interventions are often designed as add-ons to programmes working through CSOs and the media and include activities such as dialogue groups, radio forums, organised mediation activities and cultural activities such as dance competitions.

The goals and theories of change, though rarely articulated in detail, seem to operate on a small scale, with significantly more manageable impacts than those of other categories.
Planned impacts are often to establish linkages and improve dialogue between smaller groups or communities. These education and dialogue interventions often operate through or in tandem with media-based interventions, such as debate and civic education radio broadcasts targeted at women in Mali or civil society development programmes in which CSOs are trained and empowered to provide their own pro-peace dialogue interventions as part of civil society development, notably in the southern Philippines. Civic education is also often an add-on to community-driven development reconstruction programmes at every scale, with training programmes taking place prior to development programmes and intended to educate participants in community-driven development (CDD) and community-driven reconstruction (CDR) about civic rights and responsibilities.

Many programmes in this category were recently implemented and/or are currently active, indicating an ongoing donor interest in dialogue programmes, especially at the community level. This category also includes many programmes that work outside of traditional forums or dialogues, work with youth, or work through cultural activities. Timor Leste’s Laletek (Bridge) programme not only used traditional dialogue and small-scale infrastructure programmes as a route to better community relations but also held traditional dance competitions to attract youth from different communities. Laletek is notable in that its design, though not explicit in available programme documents, follows USAID’s theory of change for community-based peacebuilding from its Theory of Change Matrix (USAID 2010), which states that ‘if belligerent groups within a community are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another and will prefer to resolve conflicts peacefully’ (p.20). USAID’s Youth Radio for Peace Building in Timor Leste programme also targets young people through two national youth forums to discuss topics relevant to youth. Its radio-production training programmes indirectly further the cause of peaceful dialogue by providing training on conflict sensitivity in radio programming.

This category is especially prevalent in Asian settings, including the Philippines and Timor Leste, with additional programmes in Mali and Afghanistan. USAID is a primary donor for programmes incorporating this intervention category.

LP4: Peace messaging and media-based interventions

This category of interventions is heavily weighted towards media production and capacity building for media organisations. Activities include working with media agencies to both write and produce radio series (for example, a magazine and drama series with peace messages in Timor Leste, support for production of journalistic peace-oriented radio and video and print products in Burma) and to broadcast dialogue programmes focused on conflict sensitivity and the reduction of conflict. Support under this category tends to be for activities such as radio programmes targeted at particular groups, particularly women and youth, and the production of professional-level material for broadcast inside countries of interest. Training and mentoring programmes for journalists living in or in exile from conflict-affected countries also constitutes a major component of this program.

Theories of change are rarely defined for this category. The media outcomes for the Nigeria stability and reconciliation program, funded by DFID, is a notable exception, positing that ‘if NSRP can help conflict sensitise the Nigerian media and government officials, and if it can increase opportunities for marginalised groups to have their voices heard on governance and conflict issues, then it will contribute to making the Nigerian media a tool for peace
rather than a trigger for conflict’ (DFID 2012f p.27). Programme documents point to anecdotal evidence of media-based violence triggers in the Nigerian context as evidence that the theory of change may be valid for peace outcomes, though rigorous evidence-based linkages for specific components of the programme are absent. A refreshingly honest programme completion document for DFID’s media for strengthening democracy and accountability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) programme admits that ‘one of the key weaknesses of the programme was the absence of the theory of change. Focused outputs were not required at the time of its design, but led to a significant gap between programme output achievements and transformational change. The lesson for future programmes is to better map out how institutional change can happen and what the milestones look like’ (DFID 2013b p.20). USAID’s theory of change for media (USAID 2010) states that the more diversity in media institutions, including identity group ownership, management and staff, the greater the likelihood that media content ‘fostering social resilience rather than core grievances’ will increase (p.23).

Here, the multi-category approach is also evident, with radio programmes for civic education appearing in recently implemented interventions. Several interventions that would at first glance qualify as media-based interventions actually better fit a mould similar to civil society development programmes, because the interventions aim to increase the capacity and management of the media profession itself rather than to deliver a particular message through the media. This includes, for example, the media-sector development programme in the DRC, which provides technical assistance and support to increase the management capacity of community radio stations in various provinces.

Lessons from documentation of media-based interventions or media-based components of larger programmes indicate that media interventions across the board are popular with donor agencies, perhaps in part due to their ability to reach large numbers of people through peace-focused radio, television and social-media efforts, due to the relative ease of working through local NGOs or journalist groups to provide training on peace and conflict-sensitive reporting and due to the presence of concrete and measureable outputs (for example, measuring success by number of journalists trained, articles published or listeners ostensibly reached by a television drama).

We identified media-based interventions in a wide variety of countries, including the DRC, Nigeria, Palestine, Mali, Afghanistan, Burma and Timor Leste.

LP5: Support for elections

Elections-support interventions provide security specifically to elections. These are distinct from interventions under the first category (demand-side governance, civil society development, citizen engagement and quick-impact grants), which provide technical assistance to civil society groups and capacity building to citizens in the form of training and education for the elections process. Activities within this category include monitoring of elections via SMS technology, elections-monitoring hotlines and mapping efforts and deploying elections observers. Interestingly, these interventions tend to have well-developed theories of change that are enumerated in programme documents. The overall theory is that better-managed elections will lead to greater accountability, which will ultimately bring about better governance and stability.
These interventions are often combined with efforts to develop civil society as well as dispute resolution, civic education and dialogue, support to peace processes and public sector governance reform.

Although theories of change for elections support tend to be better documented than those for other intervention categories, the flow of logic to impact varies. For example, DFID’s Somaliland elections-support programme posits that better management of elections and an increased voter turnout leads to greater legitimacy and authority of district councils, bringing about a more accountable district government, which – hand-in-hand with separate service delivery interventions – leads to stability for Somaliland. DFID’s programme on supporting stability and promoting democracy in the Occupied Palestinian Territories lays out a theory of change centred on improving inclusivity and the effectiveness of Palestinian civil society in demanding accountability of the Palestinian Authority, including anticorruption progress. The desired impact of the programme as a whole is quite significant: ‘a negotiated outcome enabling a viable, contiguous and democratic Palestinian state, alongside a secure and prosperous Israel’ (DFID 2012e p.1). Programme documents admit that there is weak evidence to achieve that impact from the outcomes anticipated earlier in the logical framework: ‘an accountable PA [Palestinian Authority] that is more responsive to a broader range of citizens, will provide the conditions for continuing stability (albeit fragile) and a strong foundation for democratic accountability if elections are held’ (DFID 2012e p.11).

Countries with intervention documents for elections support include Mali, Nepal, Palestine and Somalia. These programmes are primarily funded by USAID and DFID.

Security

SS1: Security sector reform (SSR)

Security sector reform (SSR) programmes work to help governments improve their provision of safety, security and justice through actors within the security sector (SS), which includes all levels of military and civilian organisations, governmental bodies providing oversight to such organisations, and actual state security providers (including police, customs, military forces, civilian police forces, corrections officers and more groups). SSR from a donor perspective often encompasses consolidated programmes that aim to reform the armed forces, improve national security planning and provide oversight and transparency to justice, police and corrections actors. Activities are often not delineated in great detail at this level but are defined as providing support or funding to SS organisations or to SSR as a whole. Measurement is also not clearly delineated for outputs and outcomes in the programme documents available. Outputs are defined as, for example, greater accountability, without mention of what specifically is measured. Theories of change are not included within available programme documents for many of the programmes examined, with two notable exceptions described below. SSR work is often paired with civil society development in multipronged programmes but also with community policing reform or civilian police reform interventions in complex multisector programmes. Programmes in this category commonly focus on internal accountability, external oversight and improved service delivery within the sector.

Detailed efforts at theories of change are laid out for both the Nigeria stability and reconciliation programme (DFID 2012f) and DFID’s programme on supporting peace and
stability in the eastern DRC (DFID 2012d). The theory of change for the Nigeria stability programme is presented in a traditional format, with the SS activities including ‘funding for federal level security networks’ and ‘partnerships supporting the development of state security plans’ leading to ‘more inclusive and accountable networks’, then ‘more effective conflict management mechanisms’ and finally the outcome stating that ‘conflict in Nigeria is managed nonviolently more often’ (DFID 2012f p.23).

In contrast, the theory of change for the DRC is conceived in a nonstandard way. Programme documents note that, due to the level of complexity in the programme and response in the eastern DRC, ‘an overall complexity-informed theory of change “compass” was developed to guide a responsive, iterative, and nonlinear programming approach supported by a wide-ranging monitoring and evaluation framework facilitating real-time strategic analysis, learning and adaptation’ (DFID 2012d p.12). The description is accompanied by a multicoloured circular diagram rather than a more common flow chart in order to represent the theory of change. The logical framework puts the impact at the centre of the circular compass diagram, with national political frameworks at the outside of the circle and with specific interventions including SSR and others (natural resources, DDR, conflict resolution, land reform, resilience and the UN’s ISSSS or International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy) encircling the central impact of ‘greater peace and stability in eastern DRC’ in layers reminiscent of the design of a dartboard. Instead of following the logical flow of individual interventions to impact, the programme planners expect that ‘all interventions should ultimately work towards improving the peace, stability and early in the eastern DRC and therefore provide the foundation for sustainable poverty reduction, moving from the outside of the circle inwards’. Planners admit that ‘moving from the planning horizon towards the impact circle reflects moving forward in time and deeper into “the fog of uncertainty” – i.e., that space where results cannot be predicted with a reasonable degree of accuracy’ (p.12).

The UN maintains a significant footprint in SSR, with not only country-level operations but also with regional-level work through their Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Countries of note with interventions examined for this portfolio review are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and include the DRC, Nigeria, South Sudan and Libya.

SS2: Disarmament and demobilisation

We found relatively few currently active programmes in disarmament and demobilisation, with two of the most recent programmes in the DRC and Sudan. DFID’s disarmament and demobilisation programme in the Sudan, combined with ex-combatant reintegration, ended in 2012, and disarmament and demobilisation also appeared as an element of the complex peace and stability programme for the eastern Congo.

The UN is heavily involved in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). They support programmes through their missions in the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire and Haiti; plan for DDR work in Darfur/Sudan and Somalia; and provide operational advice and support to programmes in Burundi, the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau. In the past several years, the UN approach to DDR has shifted to activities targeting specific groups for DDR, including militias, and incorporating additional considerations and programming such as programmes for at-risk youth, emergency employment programmes and reinsertion or
transitional allowances and livelihoods contributions to ex-combatants, which overlap with multiple other intervention categories addressed later in this review.

This category, like SSR, suffers from a lack of carefully delineated theories of change available in publicly accessible programme documents. Where these programmes exist, the stated plan is often that dismantling armed groups, along with other community dialogue and resilience activities, will help ex-combatants, particularly youth, to avoid joining armed groups in the future.

The programmes examined for this review are located primarily in Sudan and the DRC.

SS3: Gender-based violence (GBV) programmes (typically combined with at least one other category)

GBV is a consideration for many programmes taking place within fragile and conflict-affected situations, cutting across multiple sectors. As the category title notes, GBV is rarely a stand-alone intervention and often is combined with multiple other intervention categories, with varying degrees of integration ranging from a core goal of the programme to what could be perceived as a token add-on.

Activities related to GBV in the programmes examined for this review include trainings on advocacy for women among local religious and traditional leaders, establishing a hotline for victims of GBV, establishing and supporting centres to help resolve domestic violence matters, developing university programmes aimed at increasing understanding of violence against women, and media programmes for awareness.

Although some programme documents lay out theories of change for the GBV components of their programming, others do not. However, this category was unique in that organisations often publish theories of change for their overall GBV strategies, sometimes made specific to fragile or conflict-affected environments. The World Bank’s theory of change for sexual violence in conflict (Willman and Corman 2013) clarifies that conflict affects women differently than men and that ‘social controls that may in nonconflict times serve to reduce violence are often in flux during conflict’ (p.20). It theorises that interventions ‘work at different levels (responding to victims, changing harmful norms) to improve the environment for preventing violence’ (p.20). The Bank also has theories of change for GBV in other thematic areas, including economic empowerment, urban upgrading and transport, post-disaster and displacement, justice sector strengthening and reform, health, energy and extractives, transforming norms, and education and early-childhood development.

DFID has an overall ‘Theory of Change for Tackling Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG)’ (DFID 2012g) for GBV programmes that posits that every domain of intervention (empowerment, changing social norms, building political and legal will and institutional capacity, and providing comprehensive services) works to support empowerment of women and to recognise that VAWG is ‘unacceptable and a crime’, leading to outcomes of social change related to gender power relations and gender equality and women- and girls-related social norms. The overall impact is the freedom of women and girls from GBV and the threat of GBV, with the following large-scale dual super impacts: ‘women and girls are safe to pursue their human rights and fundamental freedoms’ and ‘development gains (for example, meeting the MDGs) are made as a key barrier to their success is eliminated’ (p.3).
Interventions to reduce GBV in conflict-affected and fragile contexts frequently combine GBV interventions with interventions from most or all of the other categories, particularly in the area of justice (community security and policing, access to justice, transitional justice and so forth). They are often also included in programmes with a main focus on life skills and employment training, media, and CDD and CDR.

DFID’s core state functions programme in Somalia has a strong GBV-prevention component, addressing service provision and access to justice – namely, equitable access to legal services and justice – among a population of female survivors of SGBV. In this case, the theory of change is differentiated by region but does follow the governmental responsibility approach. However, GBV is not specifically addressed in the program’s overall theory of change diagram.

The World Bank has played a particularly strong role in GBV programming, and a notable programme is the Bank’s Rwanda Great Lakes emergency SGBV and women’s health project (World Bank 2014d), a cross-border effort also extending into the DRC and Burundi. The programme focuses on poor and vulnerable females with support to survivors of GBV and sexual violence as well as efforts to expand healthcare service provision to these survivors. However, accessible World Bank programme documents for these programmes do not lay out explicit theories of change for GBV-related interventions.

Programmes that included GBV interventions are noted particularly in Afghanistan, the DRC, Nepal, Nigeria, Somalia and South Sudan, all countries that have recently undergone or are still undergoing significant conflict and upheavals in governance.

SS4: Community security and policing

Community policing, in which traditional policing is combined with strong community engagements and partnerships with citizens and civil-service organisations for crime prevention, is rarely seen on its own and is often combined within a multisector peace programme with other interventions in the security category, such as civilian police reform and SSR. This is one category in which interventions are also often implemented in the United States and other high-resource countries. Activities are often centred on partnerships and programmes such as forums and town halls in order to bring police into contact with citizens. The programmes often work together with the media to communicate with citizens about policing concerns and strategies through, for example, radio call-in programmes, and they sometimes involve organising neighbourhood-watch or voluntary-policing programmes, providing mobile phones and phone credits to encourage citizen communication with community police, and emphasising foot patrols and assigning the same officers to specific beats. The UN and DFID play a major role in policing interventions examined for this review.

In J4A in Nigeria, an ambitious programme works simultaneously with civil society, the SS, the civilian police and on community policing techniques, as well as with public sector governance, to improve access to justice, to decrease corruption, to increase police accountability, and, crucially, to ‘enhance cross-sector coordination and external oversight’ (DFID 2011a). In this case, Community Safety Partnerships and Community Accountability works alongside police to provide a low-risk venue for dialogue and accountability interactions. This programme also establishes Voluntary Police Services and model police stations with specific woman-centric Family Support Units. Though they often operate
without a specific human rights-based intervention, outcomes of community security and policing interventions often include a goal of improved human rights.

Specific theories of change are often absent from accessible programme documents. However, the J4A programme in Nigeria, funded by DFID, included in its business case a theory of change relevant to community policing interventions that proposed that ‘the poor view issues of safety, security, and access to justice as high priority. If citizens experience progress in holding their police accountable, they may try to apply the same principles to other state bodies’ (DFID 2011a p.20). This theory of change forms part of a full picture of impact that ties together outcomes in improved security and policing, improved rule of law and reduced corruption, leading to faster growth and reduced poverty for Nigeria while noting that arrangements to these ends need to be country specific. Measurement is often centred on the number of community safety problems resolved or the number of voluntary police members recruited.

Community policing interventions in programmes of more modest scope are most often combined with civilian police reform. They are also frequently packaged with interventions aiming at capacity building and reform of justice institutions and access to justice and public sector governance capacity building and reform.

In programmes examined for this review, community policing interventions are seen in Afghanistan, Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, Somalia and South Sudan.

SS5: Civilian police reform

Many traditional civilian police reform interventions work within the system of traditional police forces to restructure, reform and improve access to police services. Rather than focusing on engagement at the grassroots community level, these interventions are more likely to involve higher-level and governmental reform of police forces, though they may take place alongside efforts to engage these forces more actively with communities. Activities in the programmes examined here include recruitment of new, additional police officers; establishment of model police stations; establishment of case-management systems for police and prison systems; activities such as training of police officers to increase the capacity of police forces and the strategic leadership abilities of force leadership; improvement or development of systems to manage personnel, budgets and equipment; and expansion and integration of police forces into rural areas of countries in question (Durch, England and Mangan 2012). The UNDP and DFID have been particularly active in this intervention category.

Theories of change are not always clearly and explicitly elaborated in accessible programme documents for this intervention category for major UN and DFID programmes. Therefore, it is difficult to generalise about expected paths to impact for programmes in this sector. However, Nigeria’s J4A programme is one exception, and its theory of change for civilian police reform builds on the elements for community policing mentioned earlier in this review. Emphasising the ‘high priority’ (DFID 2011a) of security and safety issues for the poor, the theory of change does not lay out a clear framework and path to impact but does indicate that police accountability may lead citizens to apply the principle elsewhere in government and theorises that safety and security are essential to economic development.
In the case of smaller-scale programs, this intervention category is often combined with community policing. In large-scale programmes, it is frequently packaged along with SSR, capacity building and reform of justice institutions and access to justice, and public sector governance capacity building and reform (including anticorruption).

Despite donors’ statements of the importance of this intervention, the documentation is weak in terms of elaborated theories of change and logical underpinnings for impact. A core civilian police reform program that re-establishes basic policing in Somalia, funded by DFID, is taking place through 2017 in urban areas in south-central Somalia and includes support to Somali authorities in recruiting a significant number of new police officers in order to re-establish access of the population to basic functions of the police, with a focus on women and girls and preventing SGBV. Though the planning documents are not available online, some elements of a potential theory of change can be inferred from the log frame, including measurement of the number of police officers recruited, trained and deployed and the percentage of locations receiving stipend support for police salaries.

The SS accountability and police-reform programme in the DRC, funded by DFID, began in 2010 but only adopted a theory of change in 2013, midway through the programme, as indicated by a February 2014 annual review document (DFID 2014d). Prior to 2013, planners had agreed on seven outputs, but those were modified in the new theory of change. However, the theory of change document was made an internal document only ‘because of its belated adoption and complexity’ and could not be assessed in the present paper (p.17).

These interventions are particularly observed in Afghanistan, the DRC, Liberia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan.

SS6: Demining

Demining interventions are the exception to the tendency towards multisector engagement in programmes targeted at FCSs. Demining programmes often offer a singular intervention type that involve activities solely related to removing mines, with the goal of economic improvement and access to livelihoods, and often work towards the goal of removing unexploded ordnance from a particular region of a country or territory. Donors like the UN and DFID show particularly strong engagement in this category.

Demining itself is often carried out by partner NGOs specialising in mine clearing and education. Mine-risk education is also often a component of demining programmes, though less evidently a part of major demining programmes covered in this review. Activities of major demining programmes often focus directly on clearing certain areas of land. Programmes examined here are, as mentioned, mainly focused on demining, but DFID’s programme titled support for conflict affected people and peacebuilding also brings in interventions in dispute resolution, peace-process support, reconciliation, livelihoods, access to justice and equitable access to services, along with mine removal.

Demining programme documents reviewed here often have detailed theory of change diagrams and outputs, outcomes and impacts which they targeted, including livelihoods improvement, the freeing up of land for agricultural use in poor areas, and – in the case of Burma – increased confidence in the peace process and better delivery of humanitarian relief.
The strategy of demining as an intervention falls into two camps: demining as the main intervention, with outcomes intended in other categories, and demining as a part of a much more complex package of assistance and services to a conflict-affected population, with demining activities planned only as a piece of a combined approach intended to have a number of disparate impacts. The former approach is evident in the ongoing programme in Afghanistan, which focuses on clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance in Herat Province in 2013–2018 (funded by DFID). The theory of change diagram lists activities as ‘direct demining’ as well as ‘close engagement with development interlocutors for facilitating development projects’ (DFID 2013c p.16). A simple set of outputs – including Herat’s clearance of mines, improved integration of demining activities with social and economic development, and monitoring and evaluation – are assumed to lead to an increase in legal livelihood options for the poorest and most vulnerable communities, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The overall impact is ‘increased economic growth and reduced poverty in Afghanistan’ (p.10).

On the other hand, DFID’s programme in Burma, which provides support for conflict-affected people and peacebuilding, mentions in its business case (DFID 2012b) demining as a possible activity. Though this has not yet been confirmed at the time of document publication, such an activity would support overall goals for conflict-affected people in Burma. Activities on demining are planned to coincide with the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative, with rather complicated outputs including ‘supporting peace processes’ by increasing confidence and contributing to effective delivery of goods to displaced people. Outcomes include reduced vulnerability of IPAs, integrated and productive IDPs, sustained ceasefires, and reduced spread of disease. The direct impact is predicted to be that ‘refugees and IDPs take control over their own lives, including preparation for eventual return’, with the indirect impact that these people have ‘a greater voice in the political change process in Burma’ (p.12). This complex set of interventions is assumed to interact in many ways, but the strength of the evidence for various activities achieving the outcomes varies. It is particularly unclear how the jump from demining to greater confidence in the peace process occurs.

Within the scope of this review, Afghanistan has been by far the greatest recipient of demining-programme funds, with major programmes also noted in Burma.

**Justice**

**J1: Capacity building and reform of justice institutions (includes access to justice)**

Capacity building and reform for justice institutions, as well as access to justice, is a common and popular theme noted in the interventions covered in this review, with at least nine programmes within a wide geographic range listing work with justice institutions or access to justice as a primary intervention. These kinds of interventions work with the formal justice sector to, for example, improve court systems and access to legal-aid programmes.

Activities in the programmes examined for this review include trainings for prosecutors and judges on specific topics (including violence against women and women’s rights), establishment of model courts with improved transparency, technical assistance to national courts in areas such as writing opinions and general litigation, and provision of mobile courts in remote areas. Common goals and outcomes often include trainings to build the capacity of
the formal justice system to provide access-to-justice mechanisms and dispute resolution. Kosovo’s effective rule of law programme (USAID) provides technical assistance directly to national courts as well as the presidency and Ministry of Justice. Greater public awareness of the dialogue and the dialogue itself on hot-button justice issues are often cited as well – for example, in programmes in Colombia and Palestine. Theories of change, when present in accessible documents, primarily propose that the programmes will work through improved access to and confidence in justice institutions to bring about an ability to resolve disputes effectively without resorting to violence, leading to an impact of greater peace or decreased violence.

The relative prevalence of interventions in this category suggests that donors, particularly USAID, DFID and the World Bank, highly value formal justice institutions as a crucial part of systematic reforms to decrease violence and bring about peace. In some cases, such as in DFID’s programme for strengthening access to justice for women who have been victims of violence, the outputs are easily measurable – for example, ‘increased VAW cases resolved with positive outcomes’ (DFID 2013a), numbers of consultations and trainings conducted, and numbers of family-resolution centres established. The outputs listed in their South Sudan Access to Justice programme are less measurable, though (for example, ‘dialogue and actions to improve oversight and accountability on human rights promoted’). Nigeria’s J4A programme gives less emphasis to ability to achieve reform in the access-to-justice area, though activities were focused on a practical level, including ‘supporting practical improvement in lower courts’ and ‘developing Justice Sector Reform Teams’ (DFID 2011a) with stakeholders from justice and SS’s from each state. Non-DFID programmes typically do not have a theory of change enumerated in publicly accessible programme documents.

These are often also a part of a multipronged programmatic approach that includes security interventions, GBV work and public sector governance reform. Countries with significant interventions being implemented in this category include Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Palestine and Afghanistan, among others.

J2: Dispute resolution

Dispute resolution emphasises handling disputes through informal means, including specific programmes dedicated to dispute resolution and traditional councils and cultural means of dispute resolution. Dispute-resolution activities examined here include specific activities, such as establishing and supporting traditional shuras for dispute resolution, and less tangible activities with descriptions such as promoting understanding and peaceful coexistence.

In many cases, theories of change are not elaborated in detail, but we are able to infer mechanisms from available programme documents and goals. The Somaliland elections-support programme (DFID 2012a), running through 2015, has the overall goal of ‘promoting credibility and integrity of the 2012 elections and embedding democratization’ post-election but also includes a critical plan to develop a process to resolve elections disputes (p.24). The broad-based programme for peace and stability in the eastern Congo views dispute-resolution mechanisms for communities in the east as key to building stability and ‘delivering tangible peace dividends’ (DFID 2012d). As seen for many other programmes, the indicators laid out in the framework do not lend themselves easily to measurement, as the diagram
presented as the theory of change is said to be ‘complexity-informed’, ‘non-linear’ and ‘iterative’ (pp.11–12).

Interventions are often combined with other sectorial interventions, particularly public sector governance work and access to justice, to provide mechanisms and processes for dispute resolution among conflict-affected populations. Programmes are often meant to harmonise the informal and formal justice systems, such as in USAID’s Afghanistan rule of law stabilisation (informally known as RLS-I) program. Dispute resolution is often also packaged together with reconciliation programmes for displaced populations, such as in Colombia and Burma, or in larger programmes focusing on SSR and disarmament and demobilisation in the DRC and Nigeria.

Dispute resolution appears frequently but rarely stands alone, with a variety of levels of specificity when it comes to enumerating activities and mechanisms of action. It seems to be an intervention category that is often employed to complement more formal support to governments or justice systems and seems to vary widely with national and cultural context. Moreover, a clear, overarching theory of change for dispute-resolution interventions is not evident in the programmes examined for this review. This suggests that dispute-resolution mechanisms are viewed as useful, but donors and programme planners may not widely or uniformly grasp the mechanisms of action.

Dispute-resolution programmes are broadly geographically distributed and here are found in Burma, Colombia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Somalia and the DRC.

J3: Transitional justice

Transitional justice programmes are less common among the programmes examined for this review, appearing just three times. Transitional justice interventions offer formal and informal (or, judicial and nonjudicial) measures to address the legacy of human rights abuses in a country. They often include truth commissions, programmes for reparations, actual prosecutions and a variety of other reforms. In the programmes examined for this review, no explicit theories of change were delineated for transitional justice interventions, with the path to impact and specifics of measurement remaining some of the least defined areas in all of the intervention categories.

These interventions can be part of a broader programme for peace support or focused interventions focused on transitional justice and human rights. The large DFID-funded Nepal peace-support programme contains transitional justice as part of a suite of interventions that includes job training, life skills and employment, community security and policing, and public sector governance and equitable access to services. The goal is to support Nepal’s peace agreement, with an overall impact of a peace that is sustainable and will lead to reduction of poverty and social exclusion. Here, transitional justice commissions were established to address human rights issues within this framework. Transitional justice is also seen combined with only human rights work in more narrowly focused programmes, such as the USAID support to the Mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia. This programme specifically addresses protection of victims’ rights through transitional justice commissions and implements a national plan on human rights.

Although transitional justice does seem to be a key component of some programmes in conflict-affected and fragile situations, this review suggests that the evidence base and
logistical framework for transitional justice interventions are rather undeveloped (Duggan 2009), particularly considering the programmes’ often-lofty goals for conflict-affected nations. Additionally, conducting rigorous evaluation of, for example, truth-seeking commissions might be challenging due to the nature of the intervention. This finding echoes Justice and Security Research Programme’s 2013 review of evidence for transitional justice programmes.

Transitional justice programmes in this review appear in countries emerging from long conflicts: Afghanistan, Colombia and Nepal.

J4: Reconciliation and services to victims

Programmes for reconciliation and services to victims include programmes specifically claiming to deliver reconciliation as well as programmes that specifically assist refugees and those displaced as victims of conflict and violence, including humanitarian programmes. This intervention category was less clearly defined in many of the multisector programmes included in this review. Instead, reconciliation was often seen as an outcome of other programmes, particularly under LP both in civil society development and citizen engagement and through media-based and civic dialogue interventions promoting reconciliation. A notable exception is the access-to-justice programme in South Sudan, which directly promotes reconciliation and activities related to healing and counselling. Programmes that provide services to victims are excluded here if they only deliver services without intending outcomes specifically related to peacebuilding, conflict reduction or other relevant categories.

Reconciliation activities are sometimes not very well defined in initial programme documents, such as the proposal to ‘help the process of ethnic reconciliation’ in Burma’s Access to Reform Facilities (ARF) program, and it is unclear through which mechanisms the programme planned to work. However, programmes with activities focusing on delivering services to refugees and displaced communities, combined with other support to peace processes and community dialogue programmes, have more defined theories of change. The mechanism for these types of programmes seems to be that the combination of meeting basic refugee needs through services to victims – packaged alongside programmes to increase peace, build refugee understanding of the peace process and develop a voice in the process of change – will help displaced people improve their lives and prepare for future return.

The former set of interventions does not have sufficiently specific explanations of activities or theories of change in the programmes examined here to review effectively or understand the logical underpinnings of the program. For example, due to a lack of information in publicly accessible programme documents, USAID’s consortium for elections and political-process strengthening programme notes that one goal is ‘to reinforce progress towards a peaceful, active and stable political society by promoting reconciliation and participatory development' (USAID 2013 p.1). Reconciliation here seems to be a vaguely defined term. The latter theory of change, for services to victims, does not seem to have a clear, linear flow from activities to outputs, outcomes and impact. Though provision of services to conflict-affected populations is understandable as a step towards improving individuals’ lives, reducing vulnerability and moving towards eventual peaceful return, the theory of change for the overall programme
package for the Burma support for conflict affected people and peacebuilding programme is acknowledged in programme documents to have somewhat limited evidence.

Reconciliation programmes are most often combined with civil society development programmes and public sector governance reform efforts.

Programmes in this category relevant to the review are observed in Mali, Timor Leste and Burma.

J5: Human rights awareness and legal frameworks

Interventions focusing on human rights awareness and mainstreaming human rights in legal frameworks are prevalent in the programmes reviewed here. Many of these programmes are funded by USAID and are notable for being somewhat narrowly focused and sometimes stand-alone interventions rather than part of large packages of diverse programmes. Human rights programming focuses on raising awareness of human rights issues, both formally and informally, and integrating them into a country’s formal legal system. Thus, activities include many training programmes in human rights for law students, citizens and government officials on rights; overall promotion of human rights policies; and assisting governments in implementing larger human rights initiatives. Theories of change are not delineated in accessible USAID documents, but it can be inferred that the path to impact assumed by programme planners may be that increased knowledge of human rights leads to increased capacity to both implement (for officials) and advocate for (for lawyers and citizens) improved human rights, resulting in an improved human rights status.

Although improvement in human rights awareness is sometimes an outcome of multisector programmes, USAID often implements interventions that focus on human rights awareness and education as a primary activity and goal as stand-alone interventions. Non-USAID programmes tend to combine human rights interventions with both CSO development and, in the case of the South Sudan national police service, disarmament and demobilisation, community security and policing, and civilian police reform.

Though human rights awareness and mainstreaming interventions do not lay out clear theories of change in accessible programme documents in this review, USAID does have an overall theory of change that covers security, judicial and human rights interventions (USAID 2010). Under this theory, security and justice act to protect human rights and equitably enforce laws, thus decreasing the extent of the core grievance. This theory is not clearly reflected in the programmes noted here. Many of the programmes that support human rights awareness, at least those funded by the US, are ongoing and seem likely to continue as a popular intervention strategy in the future.

Many of these programmes are implemented in Colombia, with Nigeria, South Sudan and Timor Leste as the setting for others.

Economic foundations (EF)

EF1: Life skills and employment training

Life skills and employment training form a major intervention category, often combined with other categories in multisector programmes, and commonly focus on youth and vulnerable populations. This category comprises training programmes primarily for jobs and livelihoods.
but can also include programmes such as music instruction for youth that may have less immediate or obvious monetary rewards but aim to provide skills and provide an alternative to violence and savings groups and programmes that help conflict-affected populations develop financial life skills.

Though most donors implement programmes that include this intervention type, the World Bank particularly stands out as a specialist in this category. Although very detailed theory of change documents are not easily accessible, a review of two representative ongoing programmes helps to illuminate the theory of change proposed. In Cote d’Ivoire, training modules on social cohesion, business-plan development and entrepreneurship and life skills were combined with options of credit and savings and credit plans aimed at creating ‘better livelihoods for vulnerable and marginalised groups’ (World Bank 2014c) in western Cote d’Ivoire via increased productivity and social cohesion. Though this doesn’t comprise a full theory of change, the underpinnings and basic mechanisms are sketched at a basic level. A World Bank programme in Nepal called Making Markets Work for the Conflict Affected in Nepal, which is currently ongoing, has as its goal to ‘enhance the opportunities and share of rural artisans (especially the poorest, internally displaced people, landless and the vulnerable), in the crafts and cultural market’ (Ghatate 2014 p.2). This programme posits that by targeting disadvantaged people in troubled areas, participants will gain more sustainable livelihoods, be able to enter mainstream markets, and thus feel less of a need to migrate, all of which will in turn lead to a reduction in the tendency towards unrest.

These interventions very frequently go hand in hand with programmes focused on jobs, cash for work, and cash and in-kind transfers. They are also frequently paired with reintegration programmes for ex-combatants but also are packaged with a wide variety of other intervention types in narrowly focused and very broad programmes. In the case of a music-training programme in El Salvador, it is implemented on its own.

The popularity of life skills and employment training interventions in current programming indicates that this category is highly likely to continue to have high prevalence in the future. Though World Bank programme documents lay out specific indicators to adequately measure success (such as increases in income, number of artisan clusters linked to markets, number of direct beneficiaries and so forth), many other programmes do not, at least not in easily accessible documentation, which may put this category at risk of being tacked on to larger programmes without an effective theory of change or strategy for measuring success.

These programmes have a wide geographic range and relevance. The programmes included in this review are located in Afghanistan, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Nepal, Pakistan and Uganda.

**EF2: Jobs, cash-for-work, and cash and in-kind transfers**

Interventions focused on jobs, cash-for-work, and cash and in-kind transfers are as popular in current and recent programmes as employment and life skills training and are funded especially often through the World Bank. Jobs programmes undertake specific efforts that have job creation as their goal, even if a main intended outcome is something other than job creation (perhaps, for example, an infrastructure or tourism program). Cash for work is a newer programme type that is often targeted at people who have survived conflict or
disasters and that provides assistance in the form of cash in exchange for performing labour, rather than receiving the traditional aid hand-out. Cash and in-kind transfers are programmes that provide cash transfers either conditionally or unconditionally, or transfers of goods, as assistance.

Activities in jobs programmes may include the creation of infrastructure or another structure or element meant to provide employment for community members. In cash-for-work programmes, implementing agencies for an aid or relief programme may manage programmes that pay beneficiaries to work on some element of the programmes, such as unskilled construction, thereby quickly generating jobs. Cash and in-kind transfers indicate programmes that give cash or goods to recipients, sometimes with an obligation and sometimes with none.

These programmes are most commonly paired with employment training and life skills interventions. However, they can also appear alone or with large packages of support to address multiple major issues in a country (in the case of the Nepal peace-support programme, these are peace-process support, GBV, community policing, transitional justice, reintegration, public service capacity building and equitable access to services.)

An extensive recent review by the World Bank on job creation in fragile and conflict-affected situations reviews 98 programmes with goals for employment generation and job creation in post-conflict and fragile situations (Ralston 2014). Though the paper looks farther back in time than this review and does not delineate an overarching theory of change for jobs programmes, it does provide a sense of the categories of job programmes implemented by the World Bank (agriculture and rural development, infrastructure and reconstruction, economic policy, financial and private sector development, education and vocational skills development and general job-creation projects). It also gives a range of common indicators in each category. Indicators include expected ones, such as the number of beneficiaries, as well as, for certain areas, markers such as improvement in the level of nutrition and improvement in rural and urban infrastructure, which indicate goals of other elements of the programmes and how they are expected to have outcomes and impacts outside of simple job creation and increased income. In fact, theories of change are often absent from job-creation programme documents, but a main desired impact that can be inferred is the potential for licit rather than illicit growth and that job creation will not only lead to greater economic strength but will reduce the likelihood of a population falling back into violence.

The theory of change for cash-for-work programmes is not noted in programme documents examined for this review. Although Kosovo’s community-action initiative project implies an ultimate goal of increased confidence for nonmajority communities receiving the cash-for-work intervention, an International Food Policy Research Institute report for general resilience programming (Frankenberger et al. 2014) indicates that cash for work is often intended to assist people affected by shock to build their resilience and recover from the shock, and measurement may include livelihood indicators and indicators that measure level of recovery from the shock. Cash-transfer programmes are also often targeted towards displaced communities or communities that have experienced a shock. Though publicly accessible programme documents did not delineate a specific theory of change, a sense of free will and independence was mentioned as one of the benefits to cash transfers. Other literature on the theories of change behind cash-transfer programmes indicates that cash transfers release restrictive bonds on households’ capacity to grow (Browne 2013). Some
documents propose pathways for improved health and nutrition outcomes, with cash giving women greater control over financial resources. Some also suggest there can be outcomes in social justice and state-society relations.

This intervention category is notable for applying creative solutions to the question of jobs and income generation that go beyond typical livelihoods efforts and attempt to make targeted and long-lasting improvements in the areas and in people’s lives. For example, the World Bank’s Abraham Path programme in Palestine implements a unique project that combines tourism and infrastructure growth with job creation, with the goal of economic improvement and poverty reduction, particularly among women and youth. Development of the Abraham Path as an experiential tourist destination aims to both contribute to infrastructure and provide jobs for people in ‘marginalised rural communities’, as well as building capacity for similar future development with local actors, businesses and organisations, which could help build an ecosystem of tourism that will sustain employment opportunities beyond the project’s end date (World Bank 2014a). Overall, though the creation of jobs, cash for work, and cash and in-kind transfer programmes may seem like a straightforward path to economic growth and assistance to conflict-affected populations, it would be useful to see more specific theories of change for individual programmes.

Jobs projects examined for this portfolio review are typically (but not always) found in environments that have been at peace for some time. Countries include Afghanistan, Kosovo, Nepal, Palestine, Sri Lanka and Uganda. There is a recent UCT programme with plans for scale up implemented by UNHCR in Lebanon for Syrian refugees in 2013.

EF3: Land reform

Land reform is a relatively uncommon intervention in conflict, peacebuilding and statebuilding programmes, with only three recent or current programmes examined for this review implementing land-reform efforts as part of their package of interventions. Land-reform programmes often work with governments to develop and put into effect laws that ensure that poor or disadvantaged citizens will control a greater proportion of agricultural land. Activities include creating legislation, reorganising ownership, retitling and reregistering land, and working with key stakeholders (for example, holding meetings, forums and so forth) as part of this process.

There is no theory of change delineated for land-reform interventions in Colombia’s two programmes, a public-policy programme and pro-tierra (a people-to-people resolution of land and natural resource conflicts), but the former posits that land issues are a root cause of Colombia’s internal conflict. Its goal is lasting peace and a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Peace is also the planned impact for DFID’s peace and stability programme in the eastern DRC, but the design of the theory of change does not make clear what will be measured or by what mechanisms land reform will contribute to this peace.

Land reform often includes dispute-resolution interventions. Additionally, in programmes of larger scope, it may be combined with interventions for public sector governance reform, equitable access to services, SSR and natural resource management.

Although land reform often has as its goal the reduction of poverty, it is unclear from programme documents for land-reform interventions in conflict-affected situations what the logical framework is that helps the intervention move from activities to outcomes and impact.
Though rigorous land-reform evaluations are being attempted in non-conflict-affected settings, setting up basic logistical frameworks and indicators would be useful in determining how these interventions might lead to greater peace in FCS settings.

Land-reform interventions with outcomes intended to influence conflict-relevant outcomes can be seen in Colombia (USAID) and the DRC (DFID).

**EF4: Natural resource management**

Natural resource management interventions appear three times in the programmes examined for this review. Natural resource management interventions aim to improve the management of these industries in countries affected by conflict, often with the goal of ending current conflicts or preventing future violence. Activities include creating conflict-free supply chains and resource extraction methods that are socially responsible, involving communities in responsible natural resource management and enhancing governance surrounding related industries through changes in legislation, taxation and other regulatory matters.

No coherent theories of change are evident in accessible programme documents for these interventions, though the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery Grant in Cote d’Ivoire gives indicators for measuring success, including the set up of a cocoa-coffee council and the adoption of a new government strategy for the cocoa sector. Goals and expected outcomes from these three programmes indicate that natural resource management interventions have a variety of anticipated impacts: to improve regional cooperation, reduce exploitation of natural resources, strengthen livelihoods, and improve sector-specific transparency, governance and efficiency.

These interventions are most likely to be implemented together with interventions to reform public sector governance. SSR, disarmament and demobilisation, land reform and dispute resolution are also combined intervention types.

Although this area is one of significant interest and buzz, programmes often lack clarity in the theories of change and logical underpinnings of how and why they anticipate that natural resource management interventions will achieve the major peacebuilding and governance objectives planned.

Natural resource management interventions are observed only in Africa, including the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire and Somalia and are primarily funded by the World Bank and DFID.

**EF5: Ex-combatant reintegration (usually combined with at least one other intervention category)**

We found interventions to reintegrate former combatants into regular society in four programmes examined for this review. These programmes attempt to go beyond formal disarmament and demobilisation programmes not only to help former combatants exit the armed forces but also to fully integrate them into their post-conflict communities. Activities involve packages, programmes and trainings to help former combatants return to their communities peacefully, become civilians and develop economic independence, as well as occasionally assisting governments with laws to help restore their legal status. Theories of change are not delineated for these programmes in publicly accessible programme
documents. However, the goals of the programmes include improvement in ex-combatants’ socioeconomic outcomes and fair inclusion of ex-combatants in society, with the ultimate impact of helping a society move towards peace and greater long-term development.

These interventions are combined with a variety of other types of interventions, most often disarmament and demobilisation and employment and life skills training efforts. They are often also packaged together with interventions that aim to provide equitable access to services, civil society development, GBV and public sector governance reform, and are sometimes part and parcel of a larger peace-process support program. These programmes are often open-ended and take place at the community level (International Labour Organisation 2009).

Reintegration programmes are observed in Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Nepal and Sudan and are funded by USAID, the World Bank and DFID.

Revenues and social services (RSS)

RSS1: Public sector governance capacity building and reform (includes anticorruption)

Interventions aiming to build capacity or reform public sector governance, including anticorruption interventions, appear in 26 programmes and are the second-most-common category observed for this portfolio review, after demand-side governance, civil society development, citizen engagement and quick-impact grants. These interventions work broadly with government (rather than with civil society) to reduce corruption or to make broad-based improvements in many areas of governance.

Activities associated with these interventions include providing technical support to a multitude of government agencies, particularly having to do with budgets, transparency and census; assistance drafting laws, rules and regulations and adopting best practices; and training programmes, conferences and workshops for government officials. The theories of change for these interventions, where available, seem to generally work through the assumption that empowered, transparent government agencies facilitate good governance, which leads to greater peace and stability for the country.

Public sector reform work is most often paired with demand-side governance interventions, particularly civil society development, with the assertion that civil society and government interventions would be most effective when tackled together, both through formal government structures and through citizens’ groups and civic engagement. Public sector governance reform is also grouped with a wide variety of other intervention types in major programmes, with human rights as another standout tandem-intervention category. Major public sector governance reform interventions are sometimes planned as stand-alone interventions, notably in Burmese census reform and Afghan anticorruption programmes.

These types of programmes are obviously a top priority for donors, and engagement with formal governance structures is seen as a key piece of many interventions for reform in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Interestingly, programme documents in this category occasionally note that the reform or intervention is in support of improved future overall evidence building and evaluation in the country, as was the case with the Burma census program. This category seems to be one of the stronger and better-developed areas in terms of application and inclusion of theories of change.
This intervention category is observed in many countries, particularly Afghanistan, Burma, Kosovo, Nepal, the Philippines and Timor Leste.

RSS2: Provision of public services

Interventions aiming to provide equitable access to services include programmes that provide services often seen across the board in development, such as health or education, but do so in settings affected by conflict and with ultimate goals relating to peacebuilding or conflict reduction.

Activities common across this intervention type in the programmes examined include health interventions for populations affected by conflict, general capacity building for service delivery among local governments and other entities in conflict-affected areas, programmes to improve infrastructure in these contexts, and education interventions. Stated theories of change are more common for this category than for other intervention categories, though these theories are quite distinct across programmes. In general, equitable delivery of services and capacity for delivery of services are assumed to lead to improved quality of management of public services and service delivery, with impacts dependent on the particular programme and its goals and ranging from a well-governed state to peace and stability, which is expected to lead to economic growth.

Programmes that include equitable access to services as a main goal are often paired with a varied suite of other intervention types. Notably, this intervention sometimes comes as a part of a package providing support to peace processes. It is also often paired with public sector governance capacity building and civil society development work.

Interventions targeting equitable access to services play a part in a variety of programmes and are more frequently supported by theories of change, such as DFID’s Local Government Support programme in Nepal. However, ultimate impacts and mechanisms to reach the impact are often not clear, given the broad scope of programmes that contain this intervention type, and also due to the lack of clearly laid out indicators. Notably, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office has published a sector-wide set of outcomes and impacts for provision of services of different kinds (United Nations 2012). This document lays out an evidence base for the contribution of equitably delivered public administration and social services to decreased violence, specifically by tackling underlying grievances that trigger violence and providing a mechanism for state outreach to society. This document notes that the theories of change enumerated (delivering peace dividends, strengthening sector governance and providing entry points to delivering peacebuilding results) are fairly consistently employed in programming for administration and social services, but an examination of programmes in this review did not bear this out across agencies (United Nations 2012 p. 7).

Interventions offering equitable access to services are observed in Burma, Colombia, the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Nepal and Somalia.

RSS3: Community-driven development (CDD) and community-driven reconstruction (CDR) (includes including participatory planning and community-action groups)

CDD and CDR interventions employ participatory planning and civic education to put the tools and decision making for development and reconstruction programmes into the hands of
the communities for which the programmes are intended. Activities within this intervention type often include activities not only for building infrastructure but also for engaging community members in participatory decision making and training them in elements of local governance (such as budgeting) in support of the infrastructure-improvement activities.

Theories of change are more frequently laid out for CDD and CDR interventions than for many other intervention types. These interventions often use participatory infrastructure work as a route to an equally or even more important goal of building social capital within communities affected by conflict, with the inclusion of community members in the decision-making process an essential element in these programmes’ paths to impact.

CDD and CDR interventions are frequently combined with interventions in the area of LP, particularly with citizen engagement, which is a crucial part of CDD and CDR. Civic education and dialogue interventions also frequently play a part, as does dispute resolution.

Of all the intervention categories, CDD and CDR programmes are most likely to be combined with only one or two other categories of intervention, and theories of change in this category tend to be more straightforward than with interventions frequently implemented in more complex multipronged packages. Inclusion of women or marginalised groups is an important element in many of these interventions. For example, the World Bank’s programme for Inclusive Development in Post-Conflict Bougainville works to strengthen women’s CSOs and encourage implementation of more CDD activities that include women in decision making, as part of the goal of rebuilding social capital in communities.

CDD and CDR programmes, including participatory planning and community-action groups, are observed in the DRC, Kosovo, Palestine, Papua New Guinea and Thailand.

RSS4: Urban design for prevention of violence

Interventions targeting urban design for prevention of violence were not commonly seen in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The few existing or recent interventions in this category are intended to have an impact in middle-income countries affected by violence. This category covers efforts of cities and urban planners to design communities and buildings in a way that discourages and reduces crime and violence. Strategies can include planning mixed-use developments rather than single-use zones within a city and upgrading elements of urban public space to include increased lighting, sidewalks and spaces that can act as bases for community patrols. Theories of change are not explicitly laid out in in the documents for these programmes, but from programme summaries it can be inferred that specific urban-planning strategies and upgrades are assumed to create social engagement, which then helps to discourage and prevent crime.

The main programme that utilises this intervention is the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading programme in Cape Town, South Africa, funded by the German Development Fund. It includes the above elements and is based on the ‘belief that proper design and effective use of the built environment will lead to a reduction in crime and the fear of crime’ (Metropolis 2014). The programme also claims to have impacts in a number of areas: improved safety; victim support and crime prevention; improved access to social, recreational and cultural facilities; increased capacity of CSOs, empowerment of inhabitants through employment and income; conflict resolution; and ‘sustainability via communal service delivery.'
This intervention category is not observed in combination with other intervention categories, though the South Africa programme does incorporate a ‘community-based situation analysis’ similar to participatory methods in CDD and CDR to get a grasp on what residents felt they needed from the program (Metropolis 2014).

4. Stakeholder survey: what evidence are stakeholders using and what do they need?

Methods

We developed an online survey in order to collect information from a wide variety of peacebuilding stakeholders on perceptions of evidence availability, types of evidence used, types of outcomes measured and needs for better evidence. We piloted the survey with representatives from Alliance for Peacebuilding, the World Bank and the UNPBF and revised the instrument based on feedback. We made the survey available through the 3ie website as well as providing a direct link in email requests. We sent email requests to a large distribution list based on interactions we previously had, and the piloting agencies as well as IPA distributed the survey to their contacts as well. We also advertised the survey through 3ie’s various social-media outlets.

Results

Respondent characteristics

Of the 92 respondents who started the survey, 59 completed it by providing demographic information and answering a set of questions about a specific peacebuilding intervention. The information that follows is from completed surveys.

Figure 2: Respondent affiliation
Figure 2 shows the distribution of respondents by primary affiliation. The majority of respondents work in universities or academia (25.4 per cent), international organisations (18.6 per cent), or private consultancies and development contractors (18.6 per cent). Smaller numbers of respondents work for peacebuilding NGOs (13.6 per cent), high-income government agencies (3.4 per cent) or development NGOs (8.5 per cent). Respondents working in multilateral donor agencies and foundations each comprised 1.7 per cent of the respondents. A few respondents (8.5 per cent) selected the ‘other’ option. None of the respondents work in the government agencies of a low- and middle-income country. Figures 3–5, below, display some of the characteristics of the respondents.

**Figure 3: Distribution of respondents by level of responsibility within organisation**

- Professor
- Independent researcher or consultant
- Director
- Manager
- Associate

**Figure 4: Number of years that respondents have worked in peacebuilding**

- 20 plus
- 10 - 19
- 5 - 9
- 2 - 4
- Under 2
Figure 5: Activities performed by respondents in their organisation (all that apply)

![Bar chart showing activities performed by respondents](image)

*Intervention effectiveness*

The survey asked respondents to answer a set of questions about at least one but not more than five intervention categories on which they have worked. We received 144 sets of responses related to 24 intervention types from the framework.\(^2\) Response frequencies according to the five high-level groups are LP (47 responses), security (21 responses), justice (19 responses), EF (22 responses) and RSS (35 responses). Figure 6 shows the number of responses for each intervention category.

\(^2\) We added the intervention category ‘LP5: support to elections’ to the framework based on the search results after we wrote the survey, so the survey responses do not include that intervention category.
The survey asked a set of questions for each of the interventions that the respondent chose to assess. The first question asked whether the respondent considers these types of interventions to be effective. Respondents could answer ‘often or usually’, ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely, if ever’, ‘counterproductive’, ‘effective for other development outcomes but not peacebuilding’, or ‘I don’t have any evidence/I don’t know’. Figure 7 shows the distribution of these responses across all interventions, and table 3 reports the distribution of responses for each of the intervention groups. No respondents consider the intervention they assessed to be counterproductive, and only 3 per cent of the respondents selected ‘I don’t have any evidence/I don’t know’. Across all groups, over 70 per cent of respondents consider the interventions to be often, usually or sometimes effective. The standout results are that 19.1 per cent of those assessing LP interventions consider them rarely, if ever, effective, and 15.8 per cent of those assessing justice interventions consider them effective for other development outcomes but not peacebuilding. No other groups receive more than 10 per cent for either of these answers.
The data at the intervention-category level (not shown in the table) are generally consistent with the aggregated results in table 3. The disaggregated data suggest that the driver for the ‘rarely, if ever’ response for LP is the category that includes demand-side governance and civil society development. Of the 19 responses received for this category, five, or over 25 per cent, assessed the interventions as rarely, if ever, effective.

**Types of evidence**

The next set of questions asked the respondents to report what kind of evidence they used when assessing the effectiveness of the interventions categories they chose. The options
were impact evaluation, monitoring and evaluation, anecdotal evidence, non-impact-
evaluation research, and ‘not applicable – I did not consider evidence’. Respondents could
select all that applied. Figure 8 displays the prevalence of evidence used across all
interventions, and table 4 gives a break down by intervention group. Respondents most
often used monitoring and evaluation (72.6 per cent) and anecdotal evidence (60.2 per
cent). Impact evaluation was only used by a majority of respondents for justice interventions
(57.9 per cent), although roughly half (48.6 per cent) used impact-evaluation evidence for
RSS interventions. There is noticeable variation in the use of evidence from non-impact-
evaluation research across intervention groups, ranging from 40.4 per cent for LP to 61.9 per
cent for security, and in the use of impact evaluations, ranging from 33.3 per cent for security
to 57.9 per cent for justice.

Figure 8: Prevalence of types of evidence used for assessing interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Type</th>
<th>Legitimate politics</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Economic foundations</th>
<th>Revenues and social services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact evaluation</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring &amp; evaluation</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anecdotal evidence</td>
<td>66.0%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-IE research</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A I did not consider</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Prevalence of types of evidence used to assess interventions, by group

Looking at the data at the level of the intervention categories (not shown here), the biggest
standout is that 12 of 17 responses for CDD and CDR used impact-evaluation evidence, the
same number that used monitoring and evaluation evidence for that intervention category.
We asked respondents to select up to five intervention types from the list where more and better evidence would be useful to their work. We received 212 selections from the 59 complete surveys. Figure 9 shows the frequency for each intervention category.

**Figure 9: Number of times selected as an intervention for which more and better evidence would be useful**

The selections are fairly well distributed across the high-level groups.

**Outcomes**

We also asked respondents to report what types of outcome indicators they used when assessing the effectiveness of the interventions they chose. Figure 10 displays the prevalence of responses. Respondents could select more than one type of outcome indicator. Note that in the survey, the outcome category for displacement and repatriation was combined with the category for intergroup conflict and the category for interpersonal conflict and violence was combined with the category for organised crime. Even with these categories combined, these types of outcomes were considered least often by respondents when assessing interventions. Analysis of youth outcomes, which is a crosscutting outcome category, also has lower prevalence.
Table 5 reports the responses by intervention category. The variation between intervention categories within groups is important here because it reflects different theories of change. For example, only 15.8 per cent of the responses for demand-side governance and civil society development considered outcomes for individual social and psychological situations, while 66.7 per cent of the response for peace education and dialogue programmes did. We only report results in table 5 for those intervention categories that received six or more responses, so not all of the interventions appear here. The table suggests that some intervention types, such as CDD and CDR, are expected to have a wide variety of impacts, while interventions types such as human rights awareness are expected to have more focused outcomes.
### Table 5: Prevalence of outcomes used for assessing effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Individual knowledge and skills</th>
<th>Individual beliefs and norms</th>
<th>Individual economic situation</th>
<th>Individual social and psychological situation</th>
<th>Participation or inclusion</th>
<th>Equitable access to services</th>
<th>Social cohesion or cooperation</th>
<th>Public confidence</th>
<th>Institutional performance</th>
<th>Displacement or inter-group conflict</th>
<th>Interpersonal conflict or crime</th>
<th>Perceptions of safety or security</th>
<th>LEGITIMATE POLITICS</th>
<th>Analysis of gender outcomes</th>
<th>Analysis of youth outcomes</th>
<th>N/A - No indicators were used</th>
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<td>Demand-side governance and</td>
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<td>cash and in-kind transfers</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Evidence gap map: what is the evidence base?

3ie evidence gap maps are thematic collections of information about studies that measure the effects of international-development policies and programmes. The maps present a visual overview of existing and ongoing studies in a sector or subsector in terms of the types of programmes (or interventions) evaluated and the outcomes measured.

Methods

The first step to creating an evidence gap map is to define the matrix of interventions and outcomes, or the framework, to be populated. We discuss the framework in section 2 above. The next step for developing an evidence gap map is the search and screening in order to determine which studies will be included. These processes are guided by a search strategy and a screening protocol. We present these in the companion report Evidence for peacebuilding: evidence gap map report (Cameron et al. 2015). Using the search strategy, we searched 29 indexes and databases, 21 websites, four research registries and several other resources. We conducted the search in late October 2014. After we cleaned the search results of duplicates, we used the screening protocol to conduct first a title and abstract screening and then a full-text screening. Given the diversity of the interventions and the variety of terms used in the sector, we searched on theme, study type and location (including all L&MICs). The title and abstract screening criteria for exclusion used location, theme, study type, methods and date. We did not exclude any studies based on intervention type or outcomes measured until the full-text screening stage.

The next step is to code the included studies and populate the map. At least two researchers screened and coded each of the studies included in the full-text screening. The coded information includes bibliographic details for the study, the interventions (from the framework) that the study evaluates and the outcomes (from the framework) that the study measures. The outcome categories for the E4P map include three crosscutting designations: whether the study presents gender-specific evidence for that intervention, whether the study presents youth-related evidence for that intervention, and whether the study includes cost-effectiveness analysis for that intervention.

Results

Figure 11 presents the search results.
Figure 11: E4P search results

We present a picture of the evidence gap map in figure 12. The interactive version is in the companion Excel workbook. The picture format shows the number of studies that provide evidence for each cell. The darker cells represent those with more evidence. It is important to note that the map only shows where there is evidence, not what the evidence says. As such, it is incorrect to interpret a dark cell to mean that there is a lot of evidence supporting a
positive impact of the intervention on the outcome. The evidence may actually show negative effects, null effects or be inconclusive. A dark cell does mean that there is a deeper base of evidence for the effect of that intervention on that outcome.

The 78 studies in the map present evidence from 70 different programmes. Of those, 31 are experiments or pilot programmes only and 39 are actual programmes. One of the pilot programmes has two studies, so overall, 32 of 78 studies, or 41 per cent, are experiments or evaluations of pilot programmes.

When populated into the map, the studies produce 256 occurrences. An occurrence is each cell in which a study appears. The large number of occurrences relative to the number of included studies reflects both that many programmes comprise different types of interventions and that many impact evaluations measure the impact of the programme on multiple types of outcomes. For example, the Humphries et al. (2014) study on CDD in the DRC measures the impact on outcomes in six different categories.

We have also crosshatched some cells where there is not a clear theory of change. For example, demining programmes are not intended to have societal or institutional outcomes, support for elections is not intended to change individual economic situations, services to victims are not intended to improve institutional performance and so on. We base these choices on information from the stakeholder survey, as well as on our own knowledge of programming. The reason we want to denote cells for which there are not theories of change between the interventions and those outcomes is that we do not want to give the impression that there are evidence gaps in places where we would not expect to see evidence.

The companion evidence gap map report includes a bibliography of all 78 included complete impact evaluations.
Figure 12: Evidence for peacebuilding evidence gap map

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual level outcomes</th>
<th>Societal and institutional outcomes</th>
<th>Peacebuilding outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I1: Knowledge and skills</td>
<td>I2: Beliefs and norms</td>
<td>I3: Economic situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I4: Social and psychological situation</td>
<td>S1: Participation or inclusion</td>
<td>S2: Equitable access to services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3: Social cohesion or cooperation</td>
<td>S4: Public confidence</td>
<td>S5: Institutional performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1: Displacement and repatriation</td>
<td>P2: Intergroup conflict</td>
<td>P3: Interpersonal conflict and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4: Crime and gang violence</td>
<td>P5: Perceptions of safety or security</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP1: Demand-side governance and civil society</td>
<td>LP2: Support to peace processes and negotiation</td>
<td>LP3: Peace education or dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP4: Peace messaging and media-based interventions</td>
<td>LP5: Support for elections</td>
<td>LP6: Support to peace processes and negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS1: Security sector reform</td>
<td>SS2: Disarmament and demobilisation</td>
<td>SS3: Gender-based violence programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS4: Community security and policing</td>
<td>SS5: Civilian police reform</td>
<td>SS6: Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J1: Capacity building and reform of justice institutions</td>
<td>J2: Dispute resolution</td>
<td>J3: Transitional justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J4: Reconciliation and services to victims</td>
<td>J5: Human rights awareness and legal frameworks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF1: Life skills and employment training</td>
<td>EF2: Jobs, cash-for-work, cash and in-kind transfers</td>
<td>EF3: Land reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF4: Natural resource management</td>
<td>EF5: Ex-combatant reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS1: Public sector governance capacity building and reform</td>
<td>RSS2: Provision of public services</td>
<td>RSS3: Community-driven development and reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS4: Urban design for prevention of violence</td>
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</table>
Features of the evidence base

Figure 13, below, shows the number of distinct impact evaluations for each intervention category, as well as the number of types of evidence for each intervention category. The latter is the count of occurrences in the gap map for each intervention category (sum of the row numbers). We count an occurrence for each combination of intervention category and outcome type for which a study provides an effect size measured using a counterfactual. A much longer, more lightly coloured section than the dark-coloured section on a bar represents cases where the individual impact evaluations measure outcomes from multiple outcome categories. Note that this figure shows only completed impact evaluations, those for which a complete write-up of the study is publicly available.

Six intervention categories do not have any impact evaluations. Three of these are in the security grouping: SSR, civilian police reform and demining. Two are in the justice sector: capacity building of justice institutions and transitional justice. The final category with no impact evaluations is natural resource management. Three intervention categories stand out as having a relatively large number of impact evaluations: demand-side governance and civil society development, reconciliation and services to victims, and CDD and CDR. We found 29 impact evaluations of interventions designed to provide direct services to victims. The majority of these are psychosocial treatments, and most measure outcomes in the individual social- and psychological-situation category, which is the cell with the most evidence occurrences in the evidence gap map. Three other categories stand out as having quite a bit of evidence: peace education; peace messaging and media; and jobs and cash for work.
Figure 13: Number of impact evaluations and number of types of evidence for each intervention category

LP1: Demand-side governance and civil society
LP2: Support to peace and negotiation
LP3: Peace education or dialogue
LP4: Peace messaging and media
LP5: Support for elections
SS1: Security sector reform
SS2: Disarmament and demobilisation
SS3: Gender-based violence programmes
SS4: Community security and policing
SS5: Civilian police reform
SS6: Demining
J1: Justice institutions
J2: Dispute resolution
J3: Transitional justice
J4: Reconciliation and services to victims
J5: Human rights
EF1: Life skills and employment training
EF2: Jobs and transfers
EF3: Land reform
EF4: Natural resource management
EF5: Ex-combatant reintegration
RSS1: Public sector governance
RSS2: Provision of public services
RSS3: Community-driven development
RSS4: Urban design for prevention of violence

# Evidence # IEs
Figure 14 shows the number of distinct impact evaluations for each outcome category. Studies are counted for each intervention they evaluate and each outcome category they measure, so the total number in each of the figures is greater than the total number of impact evaluations included. Figure 14 shows that more than 20 studies measure outcomes in categories of beliefs and norms, social and psychological situations, participation and inclusion, and social cohesion and cooperation. There are fewer occurrences among the peacebuilding outcomes than among those measured at the individual level and at the societal and institutional levels.

Figure 15 shows the number of impact evaluations by the date of posting and date of endline data collection. ‘Posting’ means either the publication date for those that are published or the version date for those we found online in draft paper or working paper form. We limited our search to studies dated 1993 and later, but we did not find any studies with endline data from before 1997. The figure shows relatively large numbers of studies in the last four years, suggesting that interest in impact evaluation of peacebuilding interventions is on the rise.

The mean lag between endline data collection and posting is a little over three years with a standard deviation of a little more than two years. This is better than the mean lag for social-science impact evaluations generally (see Cameron et al. 2016), but our sample includes draft papers, while the population in the Cameron et al. study does not.
Figure 15: Number of impact evaluations by date posted and date endline data collected

Figure 16 shows the frequency of studies and evidence occurrences by country, similar to figure 13 but by country instead of intervention category. Liberia has clearly been a popular country for impact-evaluation research, with the largest number of studies and also a large number of outcome types measured.
The right-hand side of the evidence gap map captures what we call other considerations, which are certain features of impact evaluations that help us to understand the evidence base. For this evidence gap map, we chose to code whether a study targets youth, targets gender and provides cost-effectiveness estimates. By target youth and gender, we mean that there is an aspect to the intervention related to youth or gender and that the impact evaluation measures one or more outcomes for that group separately. We do not code gender if there is a just a gender dummy variable included in the regression analysis. Table 6 presents the gap map results for these three considerations.

The map shows five occurrences of cost-effectiveness estimates. It turns out that those five occurrences only come from three different studies. One study (Blattman and Annan 2014) provides estimates across three intervention categories. There are a large number of impact evaluations with information specifically on youth for the category on services to victims, which includes the psychosocial interventions for trauma. The intervention category with the most studies looking at gender is CDD and CDR.
Table 6: Number of impact evaluations that provide estimates for youth, gender or cost effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Category</th>
<th>Youth analysis</th>
<th>Gender analysis</th>
<th>Cost effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LP1: Demand-side governance and civil society</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP2: Support to peace and negotiation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP3: Peace education or dialogue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP4: Peace messaging and media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP5: Support for elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS1: Security sector reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS2: Disarmament and demobilisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS3: Gender-based violence programmes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS4: Community security and policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS5: Civilian police reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS6: Demining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J1: Justice institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2: Dispute resolution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3: Transitional justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J4: Reconciliation and services to victims</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5: Human rights</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF1: Life skills and employment training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF2: Jobs and transfers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF3: Land reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF4: Natural resource management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF5: Ex-combatant reintegration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS1: Public sector governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS2: Provision of public services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS3: Community-driven development</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS4: Urban design for prevention of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Promising questions for future research

Intervention categories that have many studies are those that should be considered for evidence-synthesis work. Looking at the full map and figure 13, there are three intervention categories that stand out as potentially promising for synthesis research, meaning that there is a relatively large number of studies and many types of outcomes measured. These categories are demand-side governance, civil society development, citizen engagement and quick-impact grants; reconciliation and services to victims; and CDD and CDR. As it turns out, three of the four completed systematic reviews in our search results are for interventions in the services to victims category (Tyrer and Fazel 2014; Gilles et al. 2012; Lloyd et al. 2005). They are all reviews of studies on psychological or psychosocial interventions to help youth in conflict-affected situations. We summarise these in Cameron et al. (2015).

In spite of the three existing systematic reviews, there is scope for more systematic review and meta-analysis work on the question of the impact of psychological interventions on
psychological outcomes. A new review could look specifically at interventions in conflict-affected situations in L&MICs and would likely be able to explore heterogeneous outcomes for youth and women.

Another of the three categories in the evidence gap map that appear promising for systematic-review work is CDD and CDR. The fourth of the completed reviews (King et al. 2010) falls in multiple intervention categories, one of which is this category. In contrast to a review question that specifies both intervention type and outcome type, this review focuses on an outcome type – social cohesion – but includes studies across different intervention types. This review is not restricted to conflict-affected contexts but is restricted to sub-Saharan Africa.

Looking at the curriculum-intervention studies, there is only one study in each of the two relevant categories in a conflict-affected environment, both in Rwanda. Only one of the CDD studies included in the systematic review is included in our evidence gap map, as the others are not in conflict-affected situations. The reason the systematic review does not include more CDD studies in conflict-affected situations is that most of the CDD and CDR studies in the EGM were posted or published after 2010 and so were not available at the time of the systematic review. Thus, in spite of this existing systematic review, the impact of CDD and CDR looks to be a promising question for systematic review.

We did not find any systematic reviews or protocols falling in the third possibly promising intervention category: LP1. A look at the studies mapped into this category reveals that several are cross-listed with RSS3 (CDD and CDR), leaving only a small number that are distinct civil society-type interventions. As such, this intervention category is not promising yet, but assuming that demand for evidence in this category is high, this would be an intervention category that is a priority – that is, where there is a handful of studies but several more could create a critical mass for meta-analysis.

We see two other possibilities for promising questions in the evidence gap map. The map and figure 13 show two cases where two related categories together have a handful of studies that measure a relatively large number of outcome types. These are civic-education and dialogue programmes combined with peace messaging and media-based interventions grouped under LP and employment and life skills training combined with jobs, cash for work, and cash and in-kind transfers grouped under EF. The theories of change within the combinations are fairly similar, and, in fact, we see that several studies are cross-listed in both categories of each combination. Although there may not be enough studies in the combined categories yet to conduct fruitful meta-analysis, these combinations could be promising in the future, especially if the interventions in the related categories are similar enough. There are also four ongoing studies in the LP3 and LP4 categories, suggesting that these combined may soon be promising for meta-analysis (Cameron et al. 2015).
6. Possible priority questions for new impact evaluations

Methods

We explore what might be the priority questions for future research by analysing the demand and supply information from the inputs together. To understand the demand, we look at the portfolio review and stakeholder survey, as well as at the comments made at three stakeholder-consultation events. We held these events, hosted by the United States Institute for Peace and Alliance for Peacebuilding, the World Bank and the International Rescue Committee, to present the findings and gather additional stakeholder inputs after we completed the gap map and stakeholder survey. There were roughly 60 participants altogether at the three events including those attending in person and over webcast. These participants represented at least 15 different organisations involved in peacebuilding work.

Results

In order to get a sense of how the evidence supply compares to the demand as expressed in the stakeholder survey, we categorise each intervention as having low, medium or high supply and high, medium or low demand. For the supply side, we assign those with fewer than five studies to low, those with five to nine as medium and those with 10 or more as high. These groupings are not equal in size, but the cut offs seem natural when looking at the distribution. On the demand side, the distribution of the number of responses from zero to 16 is fairly smooth. We thus assign those with 11 to 16 responses to high, seven to 10 to medium, and zero to six to low. These groupings are roughly equal in size. Table 7 presents a matrix with the combinations of low, medium and high for supply and demand and shows where each intervention falls. We can think of those interventions in or near the top-left corner as having high priority for more impact evaluation (high demand combined with low supply), while those in the cells moving right and down the matrix as having lower priority.

The five interventions with high demand and low supply according to this classification are SSR, GBV programmes, capacity building and reform of justice institutions, life skills and employment training, and public sector governance capacity building and reform.

Table 7: Supply of and demand for impact evaluation evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supply</th>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>SS1, SS3,</td>
<td>LP2, SS4,</td>
<td>SS2, SS5,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J1, EF1,</td>
<td>J2, EF3,</td>
<td>SS6, J3,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RSS1</td>
<td>EF5, RSS2</td>
<td>J5, EF4,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RSS3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>LP3</td>
<td>LP4</td>
<td>EF2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>LP1, RSS3</td>
<td>J4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We hypothesise that the absence of impact evaluations for SSR is due to the nature of the interventions and consequent challenges in designing impact evaluations. The portfolio review gives the example of a DFID SSR programme in the DRC that has a ‘complexity-informed theory of change and a nonlinear programming approach’ (DFID 2012d p.12). Nonetheless, respondents to the survey and several participants in the consultation events stated that they definitely want more and better evidence on SSR.

Two of the categories in this cell are among the four areas on which Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) is currently focusing as part of this E4P initiative. DIME has awarded one preparation grant for a GBV impact evaluation, although not in a conflict-affected context, and four preparation grants for public sector governance impact evaluations.

It is important to remember that the evidence gap map is restricted to conflict-affected contexts. There are several impact evaluations in L&MICs for some of these five categories, especially GBV, life skills and employment training, and public sector governance capacity building and reform. Although this evidence may be useful for programme designers, there are good reasons to believe that interventions need to be designed differently or may work differently in conflict-affected settings and thus should also be rigorously evaluated in conflict-affected contexts. In the case of GBV, for example, Wilman and Corman (2013) argue that conflict affects women differently than men and thus can change the context for GBV. As another example, life skills programmes in conflict-affected settings may be targeted to ex-combatants or at-risk youth, which makes them different from more standard life skills programmes.

Looking at table 7, we see there are also a large number of intervention categories for which supply is low and demand is classified as medium. These include support to peace processes and negotiation efforts, community security and policing, dispute resolution, land reform, ex-combatant reintegration and equitable access to services. There are no impact evaluations of support to peace processes and negotiation efforts. Similar to SSR, this is likely due to the nature of the interventions and the difficulty designing an impact evaluation. The evidence gap map search did uncover one ongoing study on community security and policing. Land reform is a category that several participants at the consultation events highlighted. Not only did they stress that more such interventions will be needed in the future, but they also argued that fewer outcome categories should be crosshatched in the evidence gap map, both for land reform and natural resource management. These interventions should realise outcomes related to social cohesion and reductions in violence, they argued. The map in figure 12 incorporates these recommended changes.

There is one intervention category in table 7 for which the demand is high and the supply is medium. This is peace education and dialogue programmes. As discussed above, this category (LP3) is similar to peace messaging and media-based interventions (LP4). The latter appears in the table as medium supply and medium demand. We argue above that the fact that there are some studies could mean that adding a handful more could create the critical mass necessary

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3 See Rankin et al. 2015 for an evidence gap map of secondary education and transferable skills, which includes life skills, in L&MICs.
for conclusive meta-analysis. We see in table 7 that there is also a relatively high demand for more and better evidence for these two intervention categories.

We discuss the three categories with a high supply of evidence as potentially promising questions in section 5. Here we see that there is a still a high demand for more and better evidence for demand-side governance, civil society development, citizen engagement and quick-impact grants and for CDD and CDR, even though several impact evaluations do exist. One way to meet the demand may be to synthesise the existing evidence to provide more conclusive findings. In the case of the first category, however, the interventions are not similar enough or overlap with CDD and CDR. The high demand for evidence on these various programmes suggests it is also a priority for new impact evaluation investments. The services to victims category, which captures primarily psychosocial programmes, is classified as having a medium demand for more and better evidence. As with CDD and CDR, this finding recommends an investment in synthesis.

Looking at the last column of the table, it is surprising that there is not more demand for evidence for EF2, jobs, cash-for-work and transfers. This category is one of the four DIME focus areas. There are a few existing studies, but it is hard to believe they provide sufficient cross-country evidence. It appears that, at least among our respondents and participants, life skills and employment training is the more preferable or prevalent type of intervention for using employment as a path to peace. In practice, as noted in section 3, we see many programmes that combine these mechanisms. Another category that appears to have low demand is civilian police reform. This finding is contrary to the importance of this intervention, as argued in the systematic review protocol for policing interventions in developing countries. Higginson et al. (2013) argue that ‘the largest, arguably most important, component of the justice system that focuses on efforts to reduce violent crime is policing’ (p.4). They also point out that developing-country policing agencies suffer many more challenges than developed-country policing agencies, which indicates need for more specific evidence on how to improve developing-country policing.

There appears to be a low demand for more and better evidence for natural resource management. Section 3 points out that this sector has been limited in the past but will become more important in the future. As such, this sector could also be a priority for new impact-evaluation evidence.

Finally, the analysis of evidence occurrences by outcome category suggests that there is a dearth of studies that attempt to measure outcomes further along a peacebuilding causal chain – that is, actual peace and violence outcomes. Participants at the consultation events for the scoping paper noted that there is a clear need to have future studies measure impacts at this level.

7. Limitations

The limitations for the evidence gap map are described in Cameron et al. (2015). An important limitation of this scoping paper is the low number of respondents to the stakeholder survey. Because respondents did provide information on roughly three interventions each on average,
we have a larger sample of stakeholder information about interventions, but the sample of respondents is not large enough to conduct meaningful analysis of heterogeneity across different types of respondents. The participants at the consultation events were very interested in this kind of analysis, but the sample size is too small.

For the portfolio review, sufficient information was not available for us to construct a dataset of the financial investments in different intervention types. Several stakeholders at the consultation events requested this information.

8. Conclusion

This scoping paper examines the demand for and supply of impact-evaluation evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions. We use a matrix framework to organise the analysis, where the matrix includes 25 intervention rows, 14 outcome columns and three crosscutting themes columns. We explore demand in three ways: by conducting a portfolio review on a sample of interventions in all 25 categories implemented over the last four years, by conducting a stakeholder survey of individuals working in the field of peacebuilding and by consulting with stakeholders on the initial findings. We describe the supply of evidence using an evidence gap map, for which a systematic search and screening process identified 78 completed impact evaluations that we mapped into the matrix in order to depict the existing evidence base. We also describe the four completed systematic reviews and two systematic-review protocols that we identified in the search and analyse whether they serve to synthesise the evidence in any of the evidence gap map cells.

There are several intervention categories for which there is a high demand for more and better evidence and an absence or dearth of existing studies. These include SSR, GBV programmes, capacity building and reform of justice institutions, life skills and employment training, and public sector governance capacity building and reform. We identify other interventions with a relatively high demand combined with low supply. We suggest two categories – CDD and CDR and psychosocial services for victims – where a relatively high supply of evidence combined with medium to high demand suggests that investments should be made in synthesising evidence, particularly as the existing systematic reviews do not cover the evidence identified or assess the evidence for this context. Two similar categories combined – peace education and peace messaging and media-based interventions – have relatively high demand and medium supply. This finding suggests that an investment in new impact evaluations for these categories could bring high value by producing a sufficient body of evidence for evidence synthesis, particularly as no systematic reviews exist for these interventions in conflict-affected settings.

References


Publications in the 3ie Scoping Paper Series

The following papers are available from http://www.3ieimpact.org/en/publications/3ie-scoping-paper-series/

*The current state of peacebuilding programming and evidence. 3ie scoping paper 2. Brown, AN, McCollister, F, Cameron, DB and Ludwig, J (2015)*

Currently very few conflict-affected countries have met a single Millennium Development Goal. The need for effective peacebuilding programmes is acute, as development indicators are dramatically low and poverty levels are dramatically high in these conflict-affected areas. This scoping paper reviews the supply of and demand for evidence from impact evaluations and systematic reviews on peacebuilding interventions.

The analysis focused on three inputs, which were presented according to a common framework of intervention and outcome categories developed by key stakeholders working in the area of peacebuilding.

The first two inputs, a review of current and recent programming across 25 intervention categories and the results of a stakeholder survey, provide information on the demand for more and better evidence.

The third input is a 3ie evidence gap map, which illustrates the evidence base of impact evaluations and thus the supply of evidence on intervention effectiveness.

The scoping paper reveals several areas where the demand for evidence is high and the supply is low. There are other areas where some evidence exists, but a high demand for evidence suggests the need for further research or for meta-analysis to synthesise the existing research.